
COMMISSION ON THE REVIEW OF OVERSEAS MILITARY FACILITY
STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED STATES

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HEARING

TUESDAY

NOVEMBER 9, 2004

The Hearing convened in the Senate Appropriations Committee Hearing Room, Room 138, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C., at 9:05 a.m., Al Cornella, Chairman, presiding.

PRESENT:

AL CORNELLA	Chairman
LEWIS CURTIS, Maj Gen, USAF (Ret)	Vice Chairman
ANTHONY LESS, VADM, USN (Ret)	Commissioner
KEITH MARTIN, BG, PA ARNG (Ret)	Commissioner
PETE TAYLOR, LTG, USA (Ret)	Commissioner
DR. JAMES THOMSON	Commissioner

WITNESSES

THOMAS P. M. BARNETT, Prof., U.S. Naval War College
MARCUS CORBIN, Center for Defense Information
DR. JOHN J. HAMRE, President & CEO, Center for
Strategic and International Studies
AMBASSADOR ROBERT E. HUNTER, RAND Corp.
CHARLES A. HORNER, General, USAF (Ret)
MONTGOMERY S. MEIGS, General, USA (Ret)
MICHAEL P. NOONAN, Foreign Policy Research Institute
CHARLES "TONY" ROBERTSON, JR., General, USAF (Ret)

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1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 Time: 9:07 a.m.

3 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Good morning,
4 ladies and gentlemen. This hearing constitutes the
5 third public meeting of the Commission on the Review
6 of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United
7 States, more commonly known as the Overseas Basing
8 Commission.

9 My name is Al Cornella, and I serve as the
10 Commission's Chairman. Other Commissioners present
11 today are, from my far right, the Commission Vice
12 Chairman, Lewis Curtis, Major General, United States
13 Air Force, Retired; Anthony Less, Vice Admiral, United
14 States Navy, Retired; Pete Taylor, Lieutenant General,
15 United States Army, Retired; Keith Martin, Brigadier
16 General, Pennsylvania Army National Guard, Retired;
17 and Dr. James Thomson.

18 I would also like to introduce the
19 Commission's Executive Director, Ms. Patricia Walker.

20 The Overseas Basing Commission was
21 established by Public Law in Fiscal Year 2004. The
22 Commission's task is to independently assess whether

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1 the current overseas basing structure is adequate to
2 execute current missions and to assess the feasibility
3 of closures, realignments, or establishment of new
4 installations overseas to meet emerging defense
5 requirements.

6 The Commission's work is not intended to
7 preclude the Department of Defense's efforts toward
8 developing an integrated global presence and basing
9 strategy. Rather, the Commission report will assist
10 Congressional committees in performing their oversight
11 responsibilities for DoD's basing strategy, military
12 construction appropriations, and the 2005 Base
13 Realignment and Closure Commission determinations.

14 This Commission has been active since May
15 2004, and has conducted a previous hearing where we
16 received testimony from former military experts,
17 defense analysts, and experts on military family
18 issues. We have engaged in briefings from the
19 Department of Defense, the State Department, the
20 Congressional Budget Office, Congressional Research
21 Service, and other entities.

22 The Commission has met with commanders and

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1 received extensive briefings on the transformation
2 plan for the European Command. We visited military
3 installations in several countries, meeting with U.S.
4 Forces, embassy representatives, foreign military
5 officers, and local officials.

6 We ended our trip by meeting with the
7 Supreme Allied Commander Europe and the European
8 Combatant Commander, General James Jones. The
9 Commissioners have received briefings from the U.S.
10 Central Command, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Special
11 Operations Command, and most recently, U.S.
12 Transportation Command.

13 A trip to Pacific Command and a return
14 trip to European Command are also scheduled.

15 The composition of the Commission staff
16 has been established. We have hired lead research
17 analysts, a not-for-profit government consulting firm,
18 administrative staff, and received six analysts
19 detailed from the Department of Defense.

20 The Commission will provide Congress and
21 the President with a preliminary report by March 31,
22 2005, and the final report by August 15, 2005.

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1 At this point, I would like to describe
2 the procedure for today's hearing. We have three
3 panels, and we will introduce each panel as they
4 appear. Each panelist will receive up to 10 minutes
5 for an opening statement. At the conclusion of all
6 opening statements, each Commissioner will have up to
7 10 minutes to question the panel.

8 We will use lights as a courtesy reminder.
9 When the yellow light appears, you have two minutes
10 remaining. When the red light appears, time has
11 expired. However, I would ask the panelists to please
12 take as much time as necessary to complete your
13 comments.

14 On Panel One, it is my privilege to
15 introduce Dr. John Hamre and Ambassador Robert Hunter.
16 Ambassador Hunter is the former U.S. Ambassador to
17 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and U.S.
18 Representative to the Western European Union and
19 currently is Senior Advisor at the RAND Corporation in
20 Washington and Senior International Consultant to
21 Lockheed Martin Overseas Corporation.

22 Dr. John Hamre is a former Deputy

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1 Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense,
2 Comptroller, and currently serves as the President and
3 CEO of the Center for Strategic and International
4 Studies.

5 Welcome, gentlemen, and thank you for
6 appearing before the Commission. Today we would
7 appreciate your frank and professional views on:
8 Suggested focus areas for the Commission to
9 investigate in its review; potential unintended
10 consequences of returning large numbers of troops
11 stationed overseas to the United States from an
12 overseas and U.S. perspective; your thoughts on
13 concerns and issues surrounding DoD's integrated
14 global presence and basing strategy; and any other
15 issues that you think the Commission should consider.

16 So first I would call on Ambassador
17 Hunter, if he has an opening statement, to go ahead
18 and do so.

19 AMBASSADOR HUNTER: Thank you, Mr.
20 Chairman. It would have been easier if John Hamre had
21 gone first, because I could have said that I agreed.

22 I am honored to share with him, and

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1 honored also -- I must say, we at RAND have loaded the
2 deck this morning, because Jim Thomson is one of your
3 distinguished Commissioners.

4 I should also say, Mr. Chairman, to begin
5 with that we need to settle a major issue here, which
6 is: what is the best part of South Dakota? You are
7 from Rapid City. This gentleman here to my right is
8 an easterner from Willow Lake, and my people are from
9 Belfouche. So we will gang up against the easterners.

10 It is an honor to be here. You have a
11 very daunting task in front of you, to try to predict
12 the future and predict what the United States should
13 do in that future to keep ourselves as secure as
14 possible with military force and other types of
15 American power and influence, and also to retain
16 America's position in the world and the position of
17 leadership that we have for so long occupied.

18 I recall sometime ago, it was exactly 15
19 years ago today, I was in a meeting with the good and
20 the great on European security policy.

21 We met for a whole morning. It was the
22 real big names in the United States, talking about

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1 what was happening in Central Europe, and we talked
2 about every possibility there could have been except
3 for one. Nobody even suggested that the Berlin Wall
4 might open, and we were right -- for four hours.

5 Today is the 15th anniversary. Much has
6 changed since then. That was not predicted
7 adequately, the question. Your task is to try to
8 predict adequately for the next 15 years. It is a
9 daunting task, and I am pleased to be helping you with
10 it.

11 One recognizes that what you are doing has
12 to be balanced with requirements for U.S. basing with
13 regard to the next BRAC, which are difficult decisions
14 as well, and which require in looking at foreign
15 basing that there be a pretty compelling case to have
16 American bases and forces abroad rather than at home.

17 We have had the double shift in the last
18 15 years: First, the post-Cold War period and,
19 secondly, the period after 9-11 and related
20 requirements, plus our long term commitments in the
21 Middle East. We are going to be as a nation,
22 militarily and otherwise, in the Middle East for as

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1 far into the future as we can say -- as we can see.

2 That doesn't necessarily mean deployments
3 to any particular place. God help us that we will
4 have an early end to the fighting in Iraq and enabling
5 American forces to do their job, to be fully
6 protected, and to come home. But we are going to be
7 in the Middle East for as far ahead as we can see, and
8 we are going to also have serious, significant
9 deployments abroad. But they may be very different.

10 The kinds of bases and kinds of
11 deployments will not be those of the Cold War,
12 probably not of the kind that we had in the 13 years
13 up until 9-11 and some that you have to judge for the
14 future.

15 I think there are six main criteria, and
16 three are military. One is the efficiency and
17 effectiveness of military operations. How much can we
18 project just from the Continental United States and
19 from Alaska and Hawaii without actually having to have
20 people on the ground or, if we have bases, bases of
21 different kinds such as those being proposed now by
22 the Secretary of Defense.

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1 To say the word base, you now have to
2 qualify it mightily before you know what you are
3 talking about.

4 We have the importance of transit
5 facilities, intelligence, communications, logistics
6 and support for operations in other countries. These
7 are growing in importance, these specialized basing
8 requirements, with peacekeeping, peace support and
9 what we now call nation building.

10 There is also the value of contingency
11 basing in one form or another, facilitating access and
12 promoting speed and effectiveness of power projection.
13 That includes logistics and prepositioned stocks and
14 facilities, and shortened time required to make
15 arrangements with host governments when we want to
16 project power into their countries.

17 Then, of course, there are the relative
18 costs of forces deployed abroad as opposed to
19 projecting power from the continental United States,
20 both the costs of sustaining forces abroad, the costs
21 of moving them from here to there, and the cost of
22 transiting.

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1 With the capacity to deploy vast amounts
2 of power directly from the United States or from a
3 limited number of principal bases overseas, by these
4 criteria there can clearly be reduced need for large
5 scale basing and force deployments, though with the
6 military concepts developing, perhaps more smaller
7 facilities of different types will be needed, as
8 proposed by the Secretary of Defense.

9 Mr. Chairman, there are also criteria that
10 are not strictly military that I am going to focus on
11 for a couple of minutes: The geopolitics, the
12 political military mission, and some political
13 limitations.

14 The geopolitics: This is the value of
15 having bases and forces abroad, showing the flag in
16 terms of commitment, deterrence, preventing war and
17 conflict in the first place. No doubt in
18 circumstances where protecting U.S. interest has a
19 military component, being abroad permanently can be of
20 great importance -- this, in particular, (when)
21 deterring adversaries and reassuring allies, as with
22 Korea and Japan perhaps most obviously today; where

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1 being in harm's way is a critical part of both
2 deterrence and reassurance.

3 This also means facilities to support the
4 routine, crisis and combat roles for American sea
5 power, demonstrated capacities to come or to return in
6 force, and in showing post-conflict that the U.S. will
7 not leave friends and allies in the lurch.

8 Put very simply, bases and deployments
9 mean influence, and below some level influence drops
10 disproportionately. These are fine judgments, but
11 they help to set a baseline to overseas presence.

12 Forces that have a constabulary function
13 are still of great value if they prevent conflict, as
14 in Europe for 40 years, without having to fire a shot.

15 Second is the political military mission.
16 The role of the overseas presence, forces connected to
17 basing structure, to make the total mission of U.S.
18 power and influence, which is increasing a political
19 military mission, as we are seeing especially with the
20 global war in terrorism.

21 I call this "the total mission concept",
22 which is not just the total force concept of the

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1 standing military and the Guard and Reserves. This is
2 where the interaction of the military and the non-
3 military is critical to achieve our objectives.

4 We see this now in particular in Iraq and
5 Afghanistan. It is the interaction, the working
6 together of the military and the civilian. This will
7 mean more, rather than fewer, overall personnel in
8 some places, bases of the right kind in some places,
9 as nation building goes up.

10 Not only does this mean having forces
11 abroad help with access to territory in a crisis,
12 patterns of relationships with people in other
13 countries that must be created in advance, but they
14 can have a positive effect on their own, promoting
15 democratic control of forces, national guard type
16 civilian actions, reform of institutions, and the
17 role, not just of civilian personnel of the United
18 States, but of the day to day, person to person
19 building of relations and trust in the United States.

20 A great example: The stunning success of
21 the U.S.-led Partnership for Peace which I helped to
22 create, which is now extending even beyond Euro-Asia.

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1 The role of U.S. personnel in PACOM where sometimes
2 the force commander has been called the Mayor of the
3 Pacific; SOUTHCOM's role in Latin America -- the anti-
4 drug role -- but also projecting American assistance
5 and American values, one of our greatest exports and
6 where the American military are in a very real sense
7 ambassadors of the United States of America; the
8 extraordinary reach and role of EUCOM now all the way
9 across Eurasia and south as far as the Cape of Good
10 Hope, taking to a great extent the lead for the United
11 States policy in west Africa now being done by EUCOM;
12 and on and on.

13 I can attest from personal experience in
14 Europe and elsewhere in dealing with combatant
15 commanders, present and past, and with allies and
16 friends across the continent, U.S. forces abroad, U.S.
17 bases abroad, properly configured, properly utilized,
18 are a total mission multiplier.

19 It is also clear that retaining
20 significant forces in Europe is important, not just
21 for purposes of power projection from closer
22 distances, from here to there, calculations that can

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1 be made, but also to demonstrate to the Europeans, as
2 we ask them to be more fully engaged out of area,
3 especially in the Middle East -- as we ask them to
4 provide more military capabilities -- we are not
5 losing interest in Europe, bypassing it, treating NATO
6 like a toolbox.

7 Today we bear the lion's share of Middle
8 East and Southwest Asia military tasks, but at the
9 same time, I regret to say, we are playing little role
10 either in the NATO response force or the NATO-led
11 International Security Assistance Force in
12 Afghanistan. These are "penny wise, pound foolish"
13 actions which reduce our influence within NATO.

14 Let's also be clear. Relationships, once
15 severed because too many bases are closed and people
16 have come home, are relationships that are very hard
17 to build later. That, too, is a cost, though it has
18 no calculable price tag.

19 The fact that more than 12 million
20 Americans have lived in Europe because of U.S.
21 military deployments is a coin of invaluable worth.
22 That won't happen again, but something else needs to

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1 be in place. You can't project this from CONUS
2 (Continental U.S.).

3 Finally and very briefly, we have to
4 understand that there are some limitations we have to
5 accept. This is particularly important in places
6 where the presence of U.S. bases can be seized upon by
7 those who do not wish us well.

8 This has sometimes happened in the Middle
9 East. That is why we used to have an over-the-horizon
10 strategy that, when I was in the Carter NSC (National
11 Security Council) in charge of the Middle East, I
12 helped to manage and implement. It is why I opposed
13 keeping major visible U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia
14 after the 1991 war which had, I believe, highly
15 disastrous consequences in terms of serving as a
16 lightning rod for the Islamists.

17 We have to be sensitive to the signals we
18 send by basing structure. In particular today, in
19 regard to the Russian Federation, I support NATO
20 enlargement, but I am also sensitive to the need for
21 the United States to develop a basing concept in a way
22 that takes Russia's and others' interests into

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1 account.

2 Mr. Chairman, in sum, as you consider
3 overseas basing along with force deployments, it is
4 critical to see the deployment of U.S. strategy in
5 terms of our overall interests in the combined
6 mission. This requires judgments encompassing a broad
7 definition of your mandate, deployments as well as
8 bases, a hedge for flexibility in political, military
9 -- as well as military -- terms, and deferring some
10 judgments in base closures until there is a clearer
11 sense of just what will face us out there in the years
12 ahead.

13 I salute you for your service, and I am
14 glad you are making the decisions and not me. Thank
15 you.

16 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, sir.
17 Dr. Hamre?

18 DR. HAMRE: Chairman Cornella, and to all
19 of the Commissioners, thank you. Thank you for
20 inviting me. Thank you for inviting me to be here
21 with my fellow South Dakotan, Robert Hunter, but
22 especially thank you for doing this.

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1 This is a very big issue: how the United
2 States bases its forces overseas. It is hard to think
3 of a bigger issue, frankly, for the long time -- long
4 term -- national security of the country, and we have
5 not had a national debate. The Congress has not done
6 its job. They should have been holding this debate
7 for all of us to decide what is needed for our
8 country, but they did at least create you and ask you
9 to do this.

10 So, frankly, you are carrying a very large
11 responsibility on behalf of the country, to hold this
12 debate about what we are doing in re-basing our
13 forces, that we should be having at the national
14 level. We have not had it. So I really do want to
15 echo what Ambassador Dr. Hunter said, a sincere thanks
16 to all of you for taking time from your personal lives
17 to dedicate genuine attention to this very critical
18 issue.

19 The serious advantage of following
20 Ambassador Hunter is that he has said everything, and
21 I have very little left to say, and I did provide a
22 statement, and I don't want to repeat that. So let me

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1 make just a few very cursory observations.

2 When we position troops overseas, we have
3 both tactical objectives and strategic objectives.
4 Obviously, we have the tactical objective of putting
5 them someplace where they are better positioned for a
6 fight we think we may need to undertake.

7 They also, as Ambassador Hunter said, have
8 a strategic role. They are normative in shaping the
9 international security environment over time. That is
10 exactly why we left troops in Europe after World War
11 II, because we wanted to keep a place in the world
12 that would be free, so that the rest of Europe, when
13 it finally could reunite, had that to fall into, and
14 we knew we were in a very adverse posture to win a
15 tactical fight, but the strategic victory was
16 guaranteed if we had the stamina to stay there.

17 So it had this large normative quality.
18 Now that normative quality works so long as there is a
19 shared consensus between us and the host country. We
20 all know why we are doing this together. We knew why
21 we were in Germany. We knew why we were in Japan and
22 Korea, and we knew it and shared that vision with the

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1 people who were the hosts of our troops.

2 I think my reservation about what we are
3 doing now -- I really think it's good that Secretary
4 Rumsfeld has opened this debate, the Department is
5 holding this debate. But far too much of the thinking
6 is just about the tactical nature of our basing, not
7 the strategic dimension of our basing.

8 What is the normative quality for how we
9 want to shape the international environment over the
10 next 30 years by where we put our forces? I think we
11 are spending far too much of our time simply looking
12 for the tactical advantage that DoD could have in
13 using those forces, not the strategic dimension of
14 where we are putting them.

15 Now there is a problem here, two problems
16 actually. Our interests in re-basing is largely to
17 enhance our flexibility to use the forces. We want
18 them in a place where it is easier to use them. The
19 host country is, frankly, looking for stability: I'm
20 willing to have them here if they represent an
21 enduring commitment to me in my region. And there is
22 an inherent tension between our desire to use it as a

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1 platform for something else and their desire for it to
2 be a binding and lasting commitment for them.

3 That's intention, to be candid, and I
4 think it is going to be a long term problem as we are
5 trying to work out the very detailed engineering
6 details of where you base troops.

7 The second issue is: Is there really a
8 strategic framework that we and our host countries
9 share? Now we are quite convinced that the so called
10 global war on terrorism is that strategic framework
11 but, frankly, the rest of the world doesn't see it
12 that way.

13 My colleague, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, has
14 said frequently that this is like declaring a war on a
15 tactic. This is like saying World War II was the war
16 against blitzkrieg. You know, World War II was a war
17 against Fascism, not against a military tactic on the
18 battlefield, and global war against terrorism is
19 really declaring our war against a tactic, not the
20 cause of these problems.

21 The rest of the world doesn't see it the
22 way we do. They don't see this in the same dimension.

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1 If we don't have that shared durable framework where
2 we and our host countries see the world the same way,
3 a basing agreement doesn't have durability, frankly,
4 and I think we have to be very concerned about that.

5 We need to spend this time really building
6 that strategic framework so that, when we do move our
7 bases -- and I think we should, by the way. I'm not
8 opposed to moving the bases. I am far more confident
9 on how we should do it in Europe than I am in Asia, to
10 be candid.

11 I have more reservations about what we are
12 doing in Asia, but we should do it. But we have to
13 base it on a very lengthy and open dialogue with these
14 host countries to develop that durable framework of
15 national interests that are in theirs and ours so that
16 it has this lasting, normative quality that you want
17 for when you are making a major commitment as a
18 country to put your troops overseas.

19 I think we should put our troops overseas.

20 I think it is far better, because I am interested in
21 shaping the global environment over time, and I think
22 this is the one of the best ways to do it, as

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1 Ambassador Hunter said.

2 It certainly has its costs, and it
3 certainly does entail burdens, but it is certainly
4 worth it in the long run, if we build it on a strong
5 foundation of shared perceptions.

6 I thank you for what you are doing. I
7 think this is extraordinarily important work. I do
8 hope that you will think as a Commission about how you
9 will take your views and carry them for
10 implementation.

11 Please don't just end when you -- or stop
12 when you finish your report. You've got to think
13 about how you are going to take this back to the
14 Congress, force them to consider and have that debate.

15 They should be doing it, at least you are doing it,
16 and I'm grateful that you are. Thank you.

17 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, Dr.
18 Hamre. At this time I will call on Commissioner Less
19 to begin questioning.

20 COMMISSIONER LESS: I appreciate your
21 comments on taking -- for the repositioning of forces
22 to take on the tactic. That is a very interesting

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1 concept.

2 Talk about a risk, if you would. We are
3 talking in terms of taking on the tactic when we start
4 talking about moving forces, and the way this thing
5 comes across is that we are talking about bringing
6 forces home. So there are risks involved. I think
7 you are talking more in terms of repositioning.

8 Would you be so kind as to cover what you
9 see in the way of risk associated with bringing forces
10 back, as this debate unfolds and we get into that
11 particular part of it? I think that's where we are.

12 DR. HAMRE: Admiral Less, there are many
13 ways that the United States projects its presence
14 around the world, and it doesn't always have to be on
15 fixed bases. You know quite well from your personal
16 experience that the role of the Navy in providing
17 presence is both a strategic symbol of our commitment
18 as well as our tactical capacity to move quickly.
19 These are all part of it.

20 We do this now increasingly with the Air
21 Force. We do it with Special Operations Forces. We
22 do it with the Army. So it doesn't mean that there

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1 have to always be large, fixed American-style cities
2 overseas in order to sustain our strategic commitment.

3 There are probably some places where that
4 makes a difference, a positive difference, and there
5 are probably some places where, frankly, it has some
6 real burdens, and it is counterproductive.

7 I don't think, in the long run, that we
8 are going to be in a safer world if we just have the
9 United States as a safe mothership and then we launch
10 expeditionary parties from this mothership. I think
11 we very much want to have a network of bases around
12 the world.

13 I think we want to operate from them. We
14 want to routinely be there. We want to be seen. We
15 want to be forced to understand our host partners and
16 our host countries. If we simply are trying to base
17 our national security and our force projection
18 capabilities from a home platform, we are going to
19 lose consciousness about how the other world operates
20 and thinks and sees and how to work with them.

21 So being overseas -- The greatest risk I
22 see of pulling back into a continental platform is the

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1 texture and the context of knowing how to work with
2 others, and we are going to want to work with others.

3 We will want to work with others extensively. It
4 will make it harder to do that, and there is going to
5 be a growing gap between our tactical operation with
6 others and our strategic commitment to working with
7 other countries.

8 So I think, for those reasons, we really
9 need to have a -- I personally would favor a very
10 serious basing commitment in the long run overseas.
11 And as the Secretary said, that doesn't mean it has to
12 be of the same character of the past. It doesn't have
13 to mean having 130,000 people living in the
14 Kaiserslautern-Ramstein area.

15 I completely agree with that. But it
16 probably needs to be something more than a lily pad,
17 you know, where you are just jumping around from
18 feeder to feeder or kind of, you know, beaming
19 yourself in and out of a region. You know, that
20 doesn't have the durable nature that creates the
21 normative conditions over time that help shape the
22 environment in a way that is favorable to our

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1 interests.

2 So it isn't clean. It isn't neat. But
3 there clearly is an overwhelming need for us to have
4 an enduring presence overseas that represents a
5 lasting commitment of our interests to their security
6 as well as ours.

7 AMBASSADOR HUNTER: May I defer to that,
8 agreeing with everything Dr. Hamre said.

9 The relationships that we build on a day
10 to day basis with other militaries and other countries
11 is an incredible mission multiplier. You can't
12 calculate it. You know it when you lose it, but you
13 don't know the point at which you are going to lose
14 it.

15 It is like pulling the bricks out of a
16 child's pile of blocks, and you don't know which block
17 you pull out that is going to cause the whole thing to
18 collapse.

19 It is also, I guess, technically
20 strategically important, because it shows American
21 commitment and interest in engagement. It is a
22 visible expression more than any political rhetoric or

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1 anything else that America is there, and particularly
2 when a record of American forces abroad is
3 extraordinary in the interaction with other societies.

4 We could all who work on policy and
5 diplomacy learn an awful lot from our military people.

6 That says quite a bit. In fact, part of it is how
7 you change. It is clear we have to change
8 deployments. The ones we had in the Cold War just
9 don't make any sense in the future, except, I think,
10 in Korea where I do have some reservations about
11 moving troops south from Seoul in terms of appearing
12 to be taking less of a risk than the South Korean
13 people themselves, and I think that that is probably a
14 mistake in trying to deter a war and to reassure an
15 ally.

16 Part of it is how you do it. For example,
17 if you are working closely with allies and in the
18 process of working with them showing them that you
19 continue to be committed, as in Europe, then they are
20 reasonable people. It's if they hear something in the
21 newspaper one day, America is going to change, that
22 makes them nervous and, frankly, you begin to lose

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1 some of this shaping function which Dr. Hamre, I
2 think, underscored which , in some ways, other than
3 the actual combat in places like Iraq or the Special
4 Forces functions in the war on terrorism, is going to
5 be the most important function of American deployments
6 abroad, and you don't do that by just appearing one
7 day over the horizon.

8 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: You touched a bit,
9 Dr. Hunter, on NATO and maintaining a seat at the
10 table. What sort of capabilities do we need overseas
11 in order to be able to do that?

12 AMBASSADOR HUNTER: Mr. Chairman, I think
13 that is a critical question. The most important thing
14 is America's continuing commitment abroad in our
15 interest and the shared interest we have with allies.
16 That is the fundament.

17 If you don't have that, you could have a
18 million people deployed abroad, and it's not going to
19 be worth anything. We used to say during the Cold War
20 where we had 326,272 troops by Congressional mandate
21 abroad that you could cut it in half, and it wouldn't
22 matter. You could double it. It would matter very

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1 much, depending on how the United States was
2 positioning itself, what we were saying, what we were
3 doing.

4 Having said that, I think there is a very
5 good case for looking to Europe as a platform for
6 projecting power elsewhere where that is not
7 outrageously silly in terms of costs that are
8 involved, because that engages the Europeans. It is
9 an incentive for them to be involved with us.

10 It gives us an opportunity to push them on
11 doing their own work in the military aspect and, in
12 another area, it helps to create a platform of
13 engagement for training, for common doctrine, for the
14 ability to increase the level of military force if we
15 do face something in a major way, and also to do
16 something which has not yet been touched upon but,
17 where bases are only a secondary issue but still not a
18 nugatory issue, which is the ability to be
19 interoperable with other countries.

20 We are fast losing that ability. The
21 United States races ahead with technology. Many of
22 the Europeans, practically all, lag behind. There are

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1 ways in which they can plug and play with what we are
2 doing, but we have to be prepared to share high
3 technology.

4 They have to be prepared to protect the
5 technology, and we have to be enough in place so they
6 will say working with the United States, seeing our
7 destiny within NATO and the American leadership,
8 that's the way to go rather than trying something
9 else, and ultimately abdicating shared responsibility.

10 Our leadership and our commitment -- and
11 nobody wants us to leave Europe -- is what, more than
12 anything else, keeps these people working with us
13 militarily and politically.

14 DR. HAMRE: Mr. Chairman, could I -- just
15 to reinforce something that Ambassador Hunter said,
16 our military is considered the gold standard in the
17 world. I mean, every military in the world looks to
18 the United States as really -- It's the gold standard.

19 It is what you want to be. It is how you want to be
20 measured.

21 This is an unbelievable attribute of
22 national power to have that capacity. Frankly, we are

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1 eroding it by how poorly we are handling the post-
2 conflict situation. I guess it's not really post-
3 conflict, but our failure to follow through and win a
4 durable peace in Iraq has frankly eroded our military
5 capability. But that is another issue.

6 It still is the gold standard. Now you
7 want to leverage that capacity, for the rest of the
8 world's militaries to want to emulate you. But that
9 means you've got to be with them. You've got to be
10 out there. You've got to be interacting with them.

11 It does not have to be, as I said, great
12 big American cities in foreign countries. It doesn't
13 have to be that, but it has to be a durable and
14 enduring commitment of interaction with them that is
15 grounded on their needs, not just ours. Huge
16 opportunity in east Europe right now.

17 The entire east European military
18 establishment is looking for guidance. They very much
19 would be shaped by their capacity to work with us, if
20 we had a very good and positive posture in working
21 with them.

22 What a tremendous asset it's been for us

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1 to have had 45 years where every single officer in
2 west Europe at some point in time has served under an
3 American officer. The most incredible thing, when you
4 think about that, and we have that opportunity in the
5 future, not of the same dimension because NATO is
6 changing, but to help use this remarkable institution
7 and have it to become the lead agent for integrating a
8 very positive dimension for our national security with
9 allies, and we really ought to be designing this
10 rebasing around that idea.

11 AMBASSADOR HUNTER: We could not have
12 stabilized Europe in the post-Cold War era and
13 enlarged NATO if it had not been for Partnership for
14 Peace which had a lot to do with average American Joes
15 going into these countries, teaching them the
16 democratization of the military, teaching them the
17 skills, teaching them all the things they needed so
18 they could begin to be producers and not just
19 consumers of security.

20 When I was Ambassador, I remember on a
21 typical year the United States Air Forces in Europe,
22 people there, officers and enlisted, spent more than

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1 50 percent of their time away from home, mostly in
2 eastern Europe, central Europe, helping these people
3 develop the skills and the relationships with us which
4 are absolutely golden for the future.

5 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: I know there are
6 some that question the relevancy of NATO, and I think
7 you have kind of negated some of that. But as you see
8 the emergence of the European Union and NATO, how does
9 all that fit together?

10 AMBASSADOR HUNTER: I will pick up on
11 something Dr. Hamre said. The United States military
12 is the gold standard. The United States is the 800-
13 pound gorilla. It is our leadership, our commitment
14 to which others look, including all the Europeans.

15 The European Union is developing its own
16 fledgling foreign policy, its own fledgling military
17 forces, but if we were to say one day, thank you, you
18 have yours, we are coming home, they would panic.
19 They really see this as ancillary and supportive of
20 what we are doing, not as something that is
21 fundamentally competitive.

22 I think we have sometimes in this town

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1 gotten a little too excited about what they have been
2 doing, in part because it is extremely difficult to
3 understand it, the common foreign and security policy
4 and the European security and defense policy. It is
5 already 37 syllables, I think. But in general, what
6 we do together with the Europeans is going to be the
7 future.

8 You know, I think one thing we learn --
9 and I'll see if Dr. Hamre agrees -- in the last three
10 years, we can do an awful lot by ourselves. We have
11 unprecedented power in the world. But the American
12 people, I think, would like us to do it with others,
13 and when it comes to shaping events, an awful lot of
14 other people have skills that can be extremely useful
15 to them and to us.

16 I personally believe we should develop a
17 new U.S.-European Union strategic partnership, which
18 is mostly non-military. It is in health. It is in
19 education. It is in development. It is using the
20 fantastic capacities of the United States and European
21 Union nations to transform and to shape environments
22 in order to reduce the possibility of having to use

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1 military force.

2 There is a major military component in
3 this, but provided we demonstrate to the allies that
4 we are prepared to share influence and decision as
5 well as risk and responsibility, I believe we can
6 build this relationship effectively for the next 50
7 years as it worked for the past 50.

8 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Dr. Hamre, a kind of
9 a follow-on to some things that both of you have
10 discussed here.

11 Of course, the current global basing plan
12 that OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense) has put
13 out -- there's a lot of involvement in some areas
14 where we have traditionally not had a large
15 involvement before, at least the discussions, in
16 Africa, Central Asia.

17 What are the pros and cons of this, risks,
18 challenges? What would be your comments about that?

19 DR. HAMRE: Well, first of all, I think
20 that there are great opportunities of our working in a
21 much more engaged way in Africa and Central Asia. I
22 think it is a positive thing for us to be working on.

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1 And indeed, in Africa very modest investments could
2 have enormous implications in the years ahead -- very
3 modest investments by historic standards.

4 When President Bush issued his national
5 security strategy about two and a half years ago, you
6 know, all the attention was devoted to the preemption
7 doctrine. That actually was only about three
8 paragraphs, you know, in the third chapter. Frankly,
9 they were more interested in that than they were the
10 rest of the strategy. Nonetheless, it was -- The
11 document really was really quite a composite. It was
12 really quite good.

13 It talked about the imperative of helping
14 to build competent governments around the world. I
15 think the role of the military, and especially in
16 Africa, could be enormously influential in this
17 regard, to help bring functioning structures to a part
18 of the world that, frankly, struggles quite a bit.

19 Again, with a military that is deeply
20 committed to civilian control, that would be a very
21 positive symbol to send as well in Africa, because it
22 is a country that's torn by a lot of coups.

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1 So I think it is different from Central
2 Asia. Central Asia has probably got a different
3 quality to it. Central Asia, of course, is
4 inextricably tied to a much more turbulent space and
5 one that has more strategic moment to it.

6 It is less clear to me what the strategic
7 design is for all of the bases through this region.
8 Right now, I think they are largely there for tactical
9 support they can give to operations, for example, in
10 Afghanistan. But there isn't such a large strategy,
11 and I do worry that we are in a period where American
12 bases -- I mean our attitude now about American bases,
13 we more think about force protection and how to cocoon
14 them from the rest of society than how to use them as
15 a platform in the country for spreading western
16 values.

17 I'd want to look pretty closely at what
18 that broad plan is for how you use the bases through
19 the Central Asian region as a platform to expand
20 democratic values, stability in the region, economic
21 growth, leadership development in society, all of
22 that. Frankly, I don't see as much of that as I think

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1 we should, given that we are going to make a
2 commitment to be in that region.

3 AMBASSADOR HUNTER: Two points,
4 Commissioner, on that. We are looking at the U.S.
5 European Command is now doing in Africa, the Gulf of
6 Guinea and elsewhere, which is an all-service effort.
7 We sometimes think when we shape environment the U.S.
8 Navy has less to do, but it's not true.

9 The role of the U.S. Navy in its relations
10 with other navies and the like is of extraordinary
11 value, and it has an added value that it sails away
12 afterwards. It doesn't look to people like here come
13 the Americans, they are going to come and take over
14 the country. They came and helped. They worked with
15 us, but then they go home at night. Great virtue in
16 this.

17 It also helps what it is being done,
18 because it increases the chances that NATO and
19 European Union countries will work with us. I know
20 that General Jones, the European Commander there --
21 you might want to chat with him about some of the
22 things he is doing.

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1 Let me say, I do share also Dr. Hamre's
2 concerns about bases to have bases. You always look
3 and say do we get to a point where just having it
4 there is the objective itself rather than what is it
5 going to do for us.

6 Now sometimes you say, okay, we are going
7 to need one there for the long term, because we may
8 have to come back, need the relationships, want to
9 preposition. Then you also have to say, are we
10 perhaps getting ourselves in bed with some people we
11 don't want to be in bed with.

12 I would say, for example, in Uzbekistan,
13 right now it is useful to be there, because of
14 Afghanistan and the like. But I would hate to see our
15 relationship with Mr. Karimov, who is somebody right
16 out of Stalinist central casting, become our good
17 friend just because somehow we want to keep a base
18 there.

19 We have to look very, very carefully at
20 that. Also, as I indicated before, this region, the
21 Caucasus and Central Asia, is one where the Russians
22 do not yet have a settled perspective. It is very

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1 important, I think, as we did in Europe, as we
2 balanced enlargement with Partnership for Peace, with
3 what is now called the NATO-Russia Council, with all
4 of those things, to reassure the Russians that what we
5 were doing to stabilize Europe was not against their
6 long term interests.

7 What happens down the road when the
8 Russians get back to the point where they are feeling
9 their oats, not necessarily in an aggressive way but
10 just saying we have felt humiliated, how do we strike
11 back? What is the United States doing to push us in
12 the direction of humiliation?

13 What happened after the Second World War
14 in Europe as the United States led with a great
15 lesson? After World War I, Germany was totally
16 humiliated, and it helped produce Hitler. After World
17 War II, we lifted Germany up, brought it into our
18 community of nations, and we haven't faced that not
19 that Germany is totally sovereign.

20 We want to make sure with Russia that we
21 don't take too much advantage where it is not
22 something that is immediately useful to us, so that

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1 down the road they say, what is America doing in our
2 backyard? In fact, there are a lot of things we could
3 do together with them when it comes just to
4 stabilization, but not bases just to have bases.

5 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Just to add that we
6 had a marvelous visit with General Jones in his
7 Command and two or three hours talking with him, and
8 went into great detail over just what you have been
9 talking. So that was -- I appreciate you bringing
10 that up.

11 Mr. Chairman, that's all I have.

12 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you.
13 Commissioner Martin.

14 COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Thank you very much,
15 Mr. Chairman.

16 I am hearing that, as we would all like to
17 think that we would make our decisions from the high
18 ground and the long view, the bases of our forces in
19 placement and relationships, I want to take this down
20 to the weeds a little bit with a specific question;
21 because it will come up. It will come out of the
22 weeds. It will come out of this country and other

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1 countries.

2 Do you believe that factors such as
3 property values, environmental issues, and other
4 issues of that nature have a place when deciding where
5 bases will be placed or consolidation, expansion,
6 reductions? That is a weeds question, and I don't
7 know how we can avoid it, but I'm interested in your
8 opinions. Dr. Hamre?

9 AMBASSADOR HUNTER: You used to be
10 Comptroller. You talk about it.

11 DR. HAMRE: They are very important points
12 of view that you have to bring into the calculus.
13 First of all, we have to -- When we make our decision
14 to base overseas, we have to have a fairly clear
15 understanding of the legal framework that is going to
16 govern problems that come up that we can't foresee.

17 We anticipated that when we had status of
18 forces agreements, when we based troops after World
19 War II, and I think we are going to have a lot of
20 difficulty getting SOFA agreements with new countries,
21 because we have had a tendency over the last 50 years
22 to project our extra-territorial view of our own legal

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1 structure, and there is a lot of resistance to that.
2 But we do need to have predictable legal arrangements
3 so that we can protect both our property as well as
4 our people.

5 Similarly, we have to -- When we base, I
6 think we have to understand, we have to be good
7 neighbors, and I used to say when I was in the
8 Department, we can't possibly pretend that we can
9 behave in a way different in a foreign country than we
10 would in our own neighborhood back home.

11 You know, the notion that we would train
12 in a way that keeps people awake at two o'clock in the
13 morning is not tolerable in the United States. Why do
14 we think it is perfectly acceptable for foreigners?
15 We've got to be seen as a thoughtful and good
16 neighbor, both at home and abroad.

17 That means being sensitive to those
18 issues. So you want to pick a location that gives you
19 flexibility because of the geography. Frankly, that
20 is what we are trying to do it here. That's one of
21 the great reasons why we want to move our
22 installations in Europe is that, because of the

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1 conservation of western Europe, it's very difficult to
2 do realistic training anyplace in west Europe.

3 We are looking for places where we can do
4 realistic training, but you are not going to go into
5 an area that's just so poor and so desperate thinking
6 that you are going to weigh past their interests,
7 their social interests in the community as well, and
8 we have to be sensitive to that.

9 I think those are all issues you can work,
10 and every one of them is crucial. That's why it is
11 going to take a long time to get this stuff worked
12 out, and I would be -- We got to start right now
13 working on SOFA agreements, if we think they are going
14 to be in place in five years. And I think we need to
15 have them, by the way.

16 They are not going to be of the same
17 nature as they were 50 years ago. They are going to
18 be different. But we do have to have them, and that
19 has to be a priority in getting it settled fairly
20 early.

21 AMBASSADOR HUNTER: You know, in the
22 United States there's sometimes economic impact

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1 problems. You put in a place; you have to build more
2 schools, and who pays for them. In many countries,
3 particularly in the less affluent world, having an
4 American base means more money coming in.

5 The base in Hungary that we had for
6 operations in Bosnia and Tazsar we are in the process
7 of closing. The Hungarians want us to have it as a
8 permanent base, not just because of friendship for us
9 but because it is economically useful.

10 I myself don't see much military utility
11 of putting a large part of our basic structure in
12 Europe in Bulgaria and Romania, but you can train
13 there, and you can fly there, where you can't in
14 western Germany without having -- fearing all your
15 noise abatement laws like closing National Airport,
16 you know, at ten o'clock at night, a good reason to be
17 there.

18 The downside, of course, is can you get
19 American service people to volunteer for these jobs if
20 their families are going to be not going into Munich
21 to shop but to Sofia? These are very real
22 considerations.

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1 One reason the Koreans have been
2 ambivalent about the way in which we are positioned
3 with our headquarters is that the U.S. military owns
4 some of the finest, most expensive real estate in the
5 entire world in downtown Seoul. It used to be about
6 \$7 billion worth. I don't know what it is now. It's
7 probably a good deal more.

8 So these are considerations to be reached.

9 I would start, however, with what are the military
10 rationale? What are the broad political military, and
11 then work onward from there.

12 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: The second question
13 -- I think we may just have a brief answer, because
14 I'll try to put it this way. Hidden, is there
15 anything hidden that we should be looking out for that
16 is not obvious to us as a nation as we look to
17 transform, restructure, expand, relocate? Is there
18 anything in the woodpile that has not been getting
19 appropriate attention that you would, from your
20 experience, encourage us and the nation to be looking
21 at?

22 DR. HAMRE: Well, boy, I'll tell you, that

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1 is an interesting question, and I don't know that I
2 thought adequately about it. I guess, as you pose it,
3 one of the things that, to my mind, especially in the
4 Central Asia region -- It seems to me that these
5 installations are going to become magnets for
6 insurgency attacks over time.

7 So having very close collaborative working
8 relationships with domestic law enforcement and
9 intelligence, I think, becomes a pretty important
10 factor. As I said, there was a time when our bases
11 were great symbols of stability, and now they are
12 becoming islands of force protection.

13 I think we have to -- You know, if we are
14 going to make that work, we have to have very, very
15 close working relations with law enforcement and
16 intelligence services in those host countries. In
17 the past we have always had military to military, but
18 we probably haven't had a strong -- you know, the
19 intelligence connection was through Washington, you
20 know, and we probably need to have a better working
21 arrangement at the local level for understanding these
22 ties to domestic law enforcement and intelligence.

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1 AMBASSADOR HUNTER: Let me underscore that
2 even more with regard to the Middle East where already
3 we have seen that the presence of outsiders -- it just
4 happens to be us at the moment -- fits within
5 attitudes toward colonial powers going a long way
6 back, and having the capacity to work with the locals,
7 to project power in the region can be very useful, but
8 it can sometimes have downsides, especially if we are
9 visibly seen to be allied with regimes seen by their
10 people as repressive, as part of the problem and not
11 part of the solution.

12 I indicated earlier my concern that we
13 kept troops in Saudi Arabia after 1991. Life isn't
14 fair. It was used by a lot of people to stoke the
15 fires of terrorism against us. That is one reason,
16 prior to that, we used to have over the horizon a
17 presence to come in when we had to. People knew we
18 would come in. The cavalry would come to the rescue,
19 but we weren't sitting around there causing problems
20 for people in the interim, not because of who people
21 are, but because anybody who is an outsider,
22 especially anybody from western countries, there are

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1 added calculations.

2 So I think we need to think very carefully
3 about that. Incidentally, you can't separate out
4 basing structure from overall security structure. My
5 personal preference is to see created a new Middle
6 East security organization made up of locals that we
7 support largely from outside. I think that ought to
8 be our goal rather than staying there forever.

9 One final point, Mr. Chairman, I think
10 that what both Dr. Hamre and I are grappling for: In
11 some ways, one of your most useful contributions will
12 be to lay out a series of principles for making the
13 detailed judgments. Watch out for this, watch out for
14 that, here's a checklist of seven or eight or nine
15 different things. That would be a huge contribution
16 to the national debate.

17 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Thank you, Mr.
18 Chairman.

19 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you. Dr.
20 Thomson?

21 COMMISSIONER THOMSON: Thanks. First a
22 question for Secretary Hamre. As I -- Actually, it is

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1 for both of you.

2 As I listened to each of you speak, except
3 for a few exceptions, you have given a lot of reasons
4 why it is important that we have our forces and bases
5 overseas, tactical reasons, strategic reasons, the
6 importance of people interacting with our existing
7 allies, the possibility of building new relationships
8 with others, new places, Africa, caution regarding
9 central Asia, new alliances and so forth.

10 As I listened to all of that, I am
11 wondering why you are not advocating we don't have
12 more forces overseas. I mean, you have basically laid
13 out a case for us to increase our basing structure and
14 our military presence.

15 When you have alluded to the reasons to
16 come home, you have basically made a historical
17 argument, which is, well, they were Cold War and,
18 therefore, they must not be good. But you could say,
19 well, there's some of that already; so why not add
20 some more. So what is your reasoning for why we
21 should cut back?

22 DR. HAMRE: Well, I probably share a bit

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1 of Secretary Rumsfeld's feeling in this, which is I
2 don't want to -- I probably differ with him in that I
3 don't want to cut back, but I don't know that we need
4 to do it the way we have been doing it with a large
5 footprint that is a big administrative burden.

6 I think very active, forward presence,
7 engagement by our military forces is a very good
8 thing. If the best way to do that is on a rotational
9 basis -- and a deployment basis, as with the Navy --
10 great. If it is better to do that by actually having
11 boots on the ground, great. I mean, I think there
12 isn't a uniform solution to it.

13 Much more active engagement of our
14 military around the world is, I think, a very positive
15 attribute. Now what you -- You now have the very
16 difficult engineering detail of how do you take a
17 person's commitment when they are overseas and still
18 keep it in the context of a full career where they
19 have to go to schools, they have to go to training
20 programs, they have to hit basic key spots in their
21 professional development? This gets to be very
22 complicated.

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1 I frankly think we are way overdue on
2 taking a very fresh look at how we manage our officers
3 and NCOs anyway. I mean, we have a kind of a
4 "stations of the cross" approach to personnel. You
5 know, you hit these things in order, you know. I
6 think, frankly, it is way overdue that we take a look
7 at that, and I think we are running our people just
8 ragged.

9 You know, they come off a deployment and
10 then they come back home, and they spend 80 percent of
11 their time going off to schools and training and
12 everything else to get back up on the queue, so that
13 they can stay on a career path, as though that two-
14 year deployment wasn't the best training in the world
15 they could get.

16 So I mean, we really do need to take a
17 fresh look at it. In our current approach, it is very
18 burdensome on the military personnel, in the current
19 way we manage them, to do overseas deployments and
20 then come home, because you got to fit everything else
21 into the time when you are back home.

22 So the dimension of complexity really is

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1 that. It is really, in my view, not the decision to
2 have them overseas or have them at home, but it is
3 embedded in the way in which they are connected with
4 the rest of what they have to do in military life.

5 And I would start with that.

6 AMBASSADOR HUNTER: That would be a
7 problem wherever they are, absolutely, here or abroad.
8 Maybe in one of your recommendations, to go back to
9 kind of a zero based deployment approach, look at the
10 other way around.

11 If we didn't have anybody abroad, what
12 would we want to do? There are a number of functions.

13 One is forces abroad for deterrence, Korea, for
14 example, and elsewhere. War fighting: Is it better
15 to project from here to there or to be there in order
16 to -- all the things we have talked about and others
17 have talked about. The kind of peacekeeping or other
18 kinds of things pre-conflict, post-conflict in which
19 the American military has, to a great extent, a large
20 part of it transformed itself from something that 30
21 years ago would have been almost unheard of, and you
22 farm that out to other countries with more experience,

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1 until today where the average American fighting man
2 and woman is just as good as just about anybody else.

3 Then the diplomacy or shaping function,
4 what I call the mission multipliers. If you add all
5 those up, what the number would be, I have no idea.
6 It might be more. It might be less. But it certainly
7 would be different.

8 The Secretary of Defense has correctly
9 thrown a big rock into a big pool, and the ripples
10 fortunately are going to touch a lot of things, and I
11 hope we get that right. But that is something I think
12 very much to put on your agenda. It's got to be seen
13 in this corporate way, what are we trying to achieve
14 and how the military do it.

15 COMMISSIONER THOMSON: Mr. Chairman, I
16 have a couple more, one for Secretary Hamre, one for
17 Dr. Hunter.

18 I have a question, Secretary, about
19 timing. You outlined what you see as many
20 difficulties lying in front of us as we go through
21 this global reposturing and rebasing, with defined --
22 We've talked about new places. We may need

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1 infrastructure in those places.

2 You have stressed and, I think quite
3 rightly, the importance of agreements, access
4 agreements, status of forces agreements and the like,
5 which may even be the long pole in the tent. There is
6 also hardware transport in particular, in order to
7 have the infrastructure for making a new posture work.

8 As you said, this is going to take a long
9 time. The BRAC is coming soon after us, and people
10 are thinking about what's happening overseas in terms
11 of the BRAC. How are we going to balance out the
12 nearer term demands of the BRAC with these longer term
13 problems of getting this job done?

14 DR. HAMRE: Well, that is --

15 AMBASSADOR HUNTER: With great difficulty.
16 Now he will answer it.

17 DR. HAMRE: That is the central problem
18 here, and this is part of the reason why we have not
19 had the debate, the honest debate, up here in Congress
20 that we should have, is that this is seen in the
21 backdrop against saving bases, saving vulnerable
22 bases.

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I'm absolutely with the Secretary on this. We need to close excess base structure. We got a lot of bases here that, frankly, aren't terribly useful, for the same reason that they are not useful in West Germany. You know, you can't do much at them. But the domestic politics is absolutely fierce, and there are a lot of people that are hoping that they can grab things from overseas, pull it back home, and save a base.

Here's where I think we have to -- By the way, I don't criticize a member of Congress for fighting for his base. For crying out loud, that's why you elected him. I mean, how would you feel about your member of Congress if he came to Washington and said, well, I don't care about back home, you know; they elected me, but I don't care? Of course, you wouldn't want that guy.

So I do not fault them at all for being highly parochial about their interests back home. But our institution has to balance national need and parochial need, and we need to have the structures here that put the national issues before us, not just

1 the parochial issues of back home.

2 That is really what the base closure
3 process -- I mean, Commissioner Cornella was on it. I
4 mean, he knows what that is like. That was his mob
5 when he was on it, and we set up a process where,
6 frankly, you could keep in balance those parochial
7 needs and those national needs.

8 I am very worried that we are in an
9 environment right now where the parochial needs
10 dominate. We don't have enough of a national voice on
11 the importance of basing overseas, and that's why I am
12 so disappointed that the Congress has not held
13 numerous, multiple, manifold hearings on this issue
14 during the last two years. It should have, because
15 that is what is at stake because the parochial
16 pressures are overwhelming, and they will be there;
17 and by the way, they should be there. I have no
18 problem with them being there, but I do fault them for
19 not putting the national imperative in front of the
20 country. And that is, frankly, what you have to do.

21 AMBASSADOR HUNTER: We also need -- it
22 doesn't relate to what you are doing -- a look at the

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1 overall national mission requirements, a lot of which
2 are nonmilitary and are underfunded and, hence,
3 increase the chances that we may have to fight certain
4 places.

5 COMMISSIONER THOMSON: Mr. Chairman, one
6 last question for Ambassador Hunter about Germany.

7 There is an old rule maybe, and I'm
8 beginning to see in military basing, that you are more
9 wanted where you already are than you are where you
10 are planning to go.

11 This goes to the issue of reductions in
12 Germany. Ambassador, are you aware of any
13 difficulties during the Iraq war of any movement
14 through Germany?

15 AMBASSADOR HUNTER: Commissioner, I think
16 that is an important question. We had a lot of
17 trouble with our allies, the administration did, in
18 terms of the Iraq war and what could be done and
19 couldn't be done. But even with a country like
20 Germany, when the rubber hit the road, the U.S.
21 military, as far as I know, had no problems
22 whatsoever.

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1 It's what allies do. In fact, you get an
2 awful lot of forbearance and a lot of latitude for
3 doing things people may not like and totally agree
4 with, as Dr. Hamre was saying earlier, if you have
5 longstanding relationships. They work. These
6 longstanding relationships, as all of you in your
7 experience know, can smooth over a lot of problems.

8 The Germans may not be with us on certain
9 things, but you go down into the practicing people,
10 and particularly in the military, and you have an
11 incredible amount of friends there and people will do
12 whatever they can to support us.

13 The danger, of course, as Dr. Thomson
14 knows, is that increasingly people in Europe aren't
15 serving with the American military anymore, because we
16 don't have a lot of folks there.

17 So I would argue that, given that these
18 are the countries who are going to be most able to do
19 things with us and most willing to do things with us,
20 the more we are able to keep our folks who are abroad
21 there or the more it is cost effective and everything
22 else, can keep them there, that is going to be of

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1 tremendous value to us when push comes to shove.

2 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you.

3 AMBASSADOR HUNTER: Can I tell one quick
4 anecdote on that?

5 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Please.

6 AMBASSADOR HUNTER: When the Cold War came
7 to an end, I visited with a German member of
8 Parliament for one of his surgeries, as they call
9 them, I guess, you know, with his constituents on a
10 Sunday night. His constituency had more U.S. American
11 military personnel in it than anywhere else in
12 Germany.

13 There were two people there who were
14 extremely unhappy that we might go. One was the head
15 of military intelligence for the region. The other
16 guy was a Peacenik who had twice been arrested for
17 lying down in front of the base at Kaiserslautern, you
18 know, against it. He said, please don't go; what are
19 we going to do in terms of our economy, what are we
20 going to do -- Maybe we won't be protected if you go.

21 I think it illustrates the point.

22 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, sir.

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1 Commissioner Curtis?

2 COMMISSIONER CURTIS: I would like to
3 bring the conversation back to the administration's
4 and DoD's public proposal that they have discussed. I
5 would like your opinion, Dr. Hamre and Ambassador
6 Hunter, on the impact of it.

7 Basically, do the numbers of troops coming
8 back and being replaced by rotational troops feel in
9 the right range to you? And what message are those
10 changes sending to our allies on our strategy and the
11 impacts it may have upon our relationships?

12 For example, do they endanger an American
13 SACEUR position or the involvement of the Americans in
14 the multi-national staffs that we sit in? Dr. Hamre?

15 DR. HAMRE: Well, and Ambassador Hunter
16 having been at NATO really should speak to this
17 question of the impact it has on our role and our
18 functional responsibilities in NATO.

19 I would start, first of all, with a little
20 bit of a different starting point, which is to say I
21 personally think that we have not yet stabilized the
22 security environment in east Europe and that I would

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1 want to base my troops in a way that help solidify the
2 political evolution of eastern Europe into the
3 European community.

4 My sense is that that is going to be a
5 larger standing presence over time than the
6 administration anticipates. I think they see this
7 very much in small rotational units into very austere
8 bases, just for training purposes, and I frankly
9 personally think -- this is just me personally -- that
10 we ought to be engineering our basing with a more
11 strategic focus about needing to solidify the
12 liberation of Europe.

13 I am frankly quite worried about what is
14 happening in Russia right now, and you look to see
15 what is happening in the Ukraine and Belorussia and,
16 you know, you got to be concerned about this.

17 I think our allies and friends in east
18 Europe are worried, and I thin we ought to be thinking
19 about our basing as representing a strategic
20 commitment on our part to make sure that the end of
21 the Cold War really represents an end and a durable
22 strategic framework for the future, and I think that

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1 is going to take more troops, frankly, on the ground
2 than we have, so that we reassure and we also provide
3 the integrative focus for the political and military
4 establishments in eastern Europe that, in this
5 interoperability sense, build on the foundation of
6 Partnership for Peace, but make it much deeper and
7 much more functional at the military level, the same
8 thing that we did in west Europe and the great
9 accomplishment of NATO, which was to build this
10 interoperability, which is the code word, you know --
11 this interoperability which does not yet exist in
12 eastern Europe.

13 We should be making that the strategic
14 focus, in my mind, and I think that is a larger
15 presence on the ground than we are planning to have,
16 personally.

17 In Asia, I think it makes sense to
18 consolidate our footprint along the DMZ. I think that
19 makes a lot of sense. I think strategically pulling
20 numbers out and making it appear that we are
21 minimizing our vulnerability in a dangerous theater is
22 not a good thing to do right now, personally.

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1 The great problem for me in Korea is
2 needing to create a durable consensus with a
3 population that no longer has the consciousness that
4 the generation had that lived through the Korean War,
5 and we now have a political leadership in South Korea
6 that does not have that consciousness.

7 Sixty percent of the Koreans think the
8 United States divided Korea. It wasn't the
9 Communists, you know, in the north. It was, they
10 think, we did it, for crying out loud.

11 Well, if that's the consciousness among a
12 lot of them, the last thing you want to do is to
13 reinforce their prejudices, which are wrong, with
14 movements and actions which haven't been adequately
15 explained.

16 So I think we ought to really be careful,
17 very careful, in Korea on what we are doing. I think
18 we also have to have a very clear vision about what
19 our strategic imperative is in Asia.

20 It seems to me our strategic imperative is
21 to provide that stabilizing presence as China rises,
22 and that it is not an intimidating presence or force

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1 as it relates to our allies, Korea and Japan.

2 A precipitous change in that for tactics
3 would be quite counterproductive, in my view. So I
4 think we ought to be very careful about how we change
5 our posture in Asia, and I don't think that is all
6 engineered as well as it ought to be. I think we
7 ought to be very careful about what we are doing.

8 So I think this first phase in Korea makes
9 sense, the first phase which is to lower our footprint
10 in Seoul and to reposition our forces along the DMZ
11 into a more modern posture. I think that all makes a
12 lot of sense.

13 Other steps, it seems to me, have a much
14 larger strategic dimension to it, and we had better
15 think our way pretty carefully before we go down that
16 road. That's where I am personally.

17 AMBASSADOR HUNTER: I am most worried
18 about Korea. We are now -- Whether we are in the
19 middle of the game or the end game with North Korea,
20 nobody is going to be able to tell until it's over,
21 but we certainly don't want to send signals to the
22 Koreans, to the Japanese or the Chinese that somehow

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1 we are less resolute or that we are somehow confused
2 about what we see our strategic goals there.

3 That relates, among other things, to
4 giving enough reassurance to the Japanese so they will
5 not exercise at some point a nuclear option. So I
6 think we have to be extremely careful about that.
7 This is not an engineering question. This is an
8 American will and commitment problem.

9 In regard to Europe, I think the number of
10 forces we have is somewhat flexible as long as we
11 don't reduce them too far, that the task we have to
12 perform in central Europe is less about mass than it
13 is about talent and the engagement.

14 I must say, I do share with Dr. Hamre
15 concern right now that, as Mr. Putin goes through his
16 internal gyrations, that the people he has to deal
17 with or he himself don't have any misunderstandings
18 about our continued concern with stability in that
19 region.

20 The current election process, which they
21 are halfway through right now, in Ukraine is very
22 ominous in terms of the potential backsliding of that

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1 country and of the inroads being made by Russians to
2 try to tilt it in a way that will increase their
3 influence.

4 What is happening in Belarus? There are
5 some people in Russia who would like to see a soft
6 empire, which could later become a reestablishment of
7 a harder empire. The Russians have to understand what
8 the limits are, but one way is to get on with the
9 business of integrating people within NATO and
10 bringing them into the full corpus of western
11 standards, which the Russians themselves should one
12 day aspire to.

13 The word came up, SACEUR -- striking for
14 our European allies. When they renamed the Commands,
15 Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk projecting
16 American technological power, and Allied Command
17 Operations in Europe, the Europeans asked, one, keep
18 an American as SACEUR.

19 We always used to say -- Commissioner
20 Thomson will understand this -- one to two divisions
21 by having the American commitment in the form of
22 SACEUR, and they insisted on keeping the name. They

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1 wanted Strategic Allied Commander -- Supreme Allied
2 Commander Europe, demonstrating an American commitment
3 to Europe, and said you've got to have an American
4 still in that position.

5 The question comes down to timing in part.

6 The United States is going through a radical
7 reorientation, a rethink of what we are going to do
8 abroad. There's no question about it. It would have
9 happened, no matter who was President, whether we had
10 a war in Iraq or not following 9-11, or maybe even if
11 we hadn't had 9-11 -- increased concerns strategically
12 with the Middle East with projection "out of area," as
13 they say in NATO terms. It was coming ineluctably.
14 Probably came faster than it might otherwise have
15 come.

16 At this point Europeans, who we need to
17 work with us, want reassurance that, as the United
18 States goes through that, we are thinking clearly
19 about the broader strategic posture, about the overall
20 circumstance we are going to be in, and they want to
21 do it with us and do it effectively.

22 In fact, in some ways this is the worst

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1 time in the last several years for a BRAC to come up
2 and for talking about changing things in Europe.
3 Timing is bad. If you do it right, timing can be less
4 important.

5 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you. Well,
6 gentlemen, thank you for being here today. You
7 brought up the subject of South Dakota. So I do have
8 to say something in that regard.

9 I think the two of you, through your
10 meaningful and distinguished careers, make South
11 Dakota proud, and our nation. And I know that what I
12 am comfortable in is that you will continue doing that
13 for the rest of your lives. I think you will always
14 make meaningful contributions to this nation.

15 So we sincerely thank you for your time
16 away from your busy schedule to join us today. Your
17 insight will be invaluable to this Commission as we
18 move forward.

19 I would like to reserve the right that we
20 might come back to you as we have questions and get
21 your feelings on those questions. So thank you very
22 much for your participation.

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DR. HAMRE: Thank you.

AMBASSADOR HUNTER: Thank you.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: At this time, we are going to take a five-minute break, and then we will proceed with the next panel.

(Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off the record at 10:24 a.m. and went back on the record at 10:35 a.m.)

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: I would like to describe the procedure we have been following, and then I will introduce the panel. Each panelist will receive up to 10 minutes for an opening statement. At the conclusion of all opening statements, each Commissioner will have up to 10 minutes to ask questions.

We will use lights as a courtesy reminder. When the yellow light appears, you have two minutes remaining. When the red light appears, time has expired. However, I would ask the panelists to take all the time necessary to answer any questions. Please continue your comments.

Joining us today on our second panel are

1 three distinguished former military leaders:

2 General Charles Horner, United States Air
3 Force, Retired. General Horner served as the former
4 Combatant Commander of North American Aerospace
5 Defense Command and U.S. Space Command. He also
6 served as Commander of 9th Air Force and U.S. Central
7 Command Air Forces during Operations Desert Storm and
8 Desert Shield.

9 General Montgomery Meigs, United States
10 Army, Retired. General Meigs is the former Commanding
11 General, U.S. Army, Europe and 7th Army. General
12 Meigs also served as Commander of the Multinational
13 Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

14 General Charles Robertson, United States
15 Air Force, Retired. General Robertson is the former
16 Combatant Commander for U.S. Transportation Command
17 and Air Mobility Command.

18 It should be noted that General John
19 Tilelli was also announced as a witness, but was
20 called away unexpectedly.

21 Gentlemen, welcome, and thank you for
22 appearing before the Commission today. We are pleased

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1 and honored to have such a distinguished panel.

2 My fellow Commissioners and I would
3 appreciate hearing your frank and professional views
4 on suggested focus areas for the Commission to
5 investigate in its review of overseas basing,
6 potential unintended consequences of returning large
7 numbers of troops stationed overseas to the United
8 States, and, from an overseas and U.S. perspective,
9 your thoughts on issues and concerns surrounding DoD's
10 integrated global presence and basing strategy, and
11 any other issues or alternatives that the Commission
12 should consider.

13 So at this time I would call on each
14 panelist to make an opening statement, if they would
15 like, and I will start with General Horner.

16 GENERAL HORNER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

17 I'm not particularly good at flowery language. So
18 don't expect great compliments about your service, but
19 I understand the difficulties of your task and the
20 great remuneration you are gaining from this work.

21 My experience in this area is colored by
22 my being stationed overseas and then deploying on a

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1 temporary basis frequently overseas. My judgments are
2 subjective, but I think the kinds of things that you
3 will agree with, resonate with, in making your
4 determinations and decisions.

5 First of all, we can't ignore the change
6 in our threats to our national security from the Cold
7 War to where we are today. Well understood. I'm sure
8 it's been brought forward to you many times. I won't
9 go into detail. But it does mean that we have to
10 focus on things like weapons of mass destruction,
11 ballistic missiles, and areas of the world of
12 instability like Africa, the Middle East, the Korean
13 Peninsula, and the rim of South America.

14 With regard to our strategies, we have to
15 change fundamentally. We require flexibility of our
16 forces that's never been needed before. Before, we
17 had forces of sufficient size and sufficient
18 orientation that we could dedicate them to one
19 particular area, one particular task, one particular
20 threat. We no longer enjoy that. So any decisions we
21 make with regard to basing must consider those
22 changes.

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1 Also, while you are looking at overseas
2 bases, there is an impact, obviously, on what happens
3 under BRAC and the United States in CONUS and Hawaii.
4 The only thing I would say there was it was my last
5 experience as NORAD, and then also I had the training
6 responsibility and equipping for the ballistic missile
7 force, and I was always appalled of the fact that we
8 had located our forces in the center of the United
9 States because of the threat of the subtrajectory
10 missiles being launched from submarines, and in this
11 new world, certainly during Desert Storm, deployment
12 must be the consideration.

13 So I have been arguing that we need to
14 deploy our CONUS based forces in such a way that they
15 are very rapid in being able to reach both South
16 America, Africa, Europe and the Pacific Rim. That
17 would be what I like to call the four corner strategy,
18 trying to steal one from North Carolina, and also
19 Hawaii and Alaska become very important.

20 We have another thing we have to do, and
21 it is very difficult, but it is rebalancing our
22 forces. I think Operation Iraqi Freedom shows that we

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1 have a mix that is inappropriate with a lot of forces
2 that are involved in stabilization -- the Reserve
3 forces -- and a lot of heavy fighting forces in the
4 Guard or in the Active forces, when in fact we are
5 finding that our forces nowadays need to be very good
6 at both, but with particular stabilization or Phase
7 IV, some call it, being vital. So that has to be a
8 consideration.

9 We also have a growing impact of unique
10 forces. I think here, for example, of the
11 intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, which is
12 vital to anticipating crises and being able to act
13 before war, if you are successful.

14 Here now, we no longer have the huge
15 denied areas that we had in the Cold War. We have
16 things like Global Hawk that are replacing space
17 assets because they are more flexible and more
18 responsive, and we have things like Special Operations
19 which emphasize the need for access to overseas
20 seaports and airports, but not necessarily large
21 overseas basings.

22 We also have a requirement for our

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1 littoral forces, as the Navy changed its doctrine very
2 well after it became apparent the Cold War was over in
3 1990, and those must be taken into consideration.

4 One of the things that was brought up in
5 the session before this one was the need to train.
6 Our forces no longer -- We still have service-unique
7 training that is fundamental, but more and more and
8 more, our training has to be in conjunction with our
9 total forces and our allies.

10 That is going to require very large areas
11 with adjacent sea and air and land forces spaces, and
12 those areas, with some exceptions, are becoming fewer
13 and fewer overseas. No longer can an army afford only
14 Grafenwoehr or Hoensfeld. They need to have areas
15 like we find at the National Training Center. No
16 longer can air forces that fly supersonic airplanes
17 have very small air training ranges. They need the
18 ranges we find in places like the Gulf or the
19 Atlantic.

20 We have some areas, obviously, in the
21 former USSR, Africa, and Australia that might be very
22 accommodating to these kinds of training air spaces

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1 and land and sea spaces.

2 We need to build this highly specialized
3 force, because we have found that technology does have
4 an impact on warfare. Certainly, the Joint STARS
5 (Surveillance Target Attack Radar System) and the
6 JDAMs (Joint Direct Attack Munitions) during the Third
7 Division drive toward Baghdad was fundamental. The
8 integration of those three forces was the key to
9 success in that battle.

10 So I think we need to make sure that we
11 have the kind of capability to test and train with
12 these advanced systems and, obviously, we may have
13 reluctance to put the heavy investment, say, in time,
14 space, positioning equipment on the ranges overseas.
15 So that's only something to crank into your thinking.

16 Obviously, force protection was brought
17 up, and I think that is self-explanatory.

18 Proximity to coalition capability: I had
19 the unusual experience of being in a job as the
20 functional commander in Central Command for over five
21 and a half years, and the length of tour there was
22 most unusual, but actually it was very useful because

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1 it gave me a chance to work a model that was different
2 than, say, our European model or our model that we use
3 in Korea with regard to how we work with our allies.

4 We had, really, no forces. We had the
5 Middle East force, which is a destroyer and a command
6 ship in the Arabian Gulf, and it was very successful
7 because it was very low profile, but it was present,
8 and it gave us a way of communicating with the locals
9 with port visits and ship visits and things of this
10 nature.

11 I would routinely go to the area, and we
12 would conduct classes in the local professional
13 military education. We would teach in Pakistan. We
14 would teach in Saudi Arabia, Oman, the UAE (United
15 Arab Emirates), Kuwait. That gave us a kind of a
16 professional relationship without the baggage that
17 goes from heaving large forces in a region, and
18 particularly when the region has such cultural
19 differences as we do, say, with Islamic countries.

20 So we were able to maintain a relationship
21 and, yes, we could go there when they needed us -- for
22 example, the AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control

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1 System) during the Iran-Iraq war and then later on the
2 escort operations -- and we were welcomed. But also I
3 had a relationship with the -- inside Arabia that,
4 when the escort operations was over with, I could
5 withdraw those forces immediately, and I did so.

6 Turns around, several months later, I show
7 back up in the door and say, I'm here to help, and
8 there was great reluctance on many of the senior
9 leaders in Saudi Arabia to have the foreigners on
10 their soil. Nonetheless, because of my personal
11 relationship with these people, keeping my word just a
12 few months before, I got all the support we needed,
13 and we very rapidly built up the huge 500,000-man
14 force that eventually prosecuted Desert Storm.

15 So we can do it through training teams.
16 We can do it through exercises, and we can do it
17 through things like naval forces offshore.

18 Finally, with regard to the rotation base,
19 we have to consider the fact that our military forces
20 has been drawn down drastically. It started in 1986.
21 It's not a political issue. It is an issue of funds.
22 It is an issue that we need fewer people, because we

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1 have more lethality in our precision weapons, our ISR
2 (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance), our
3 SATCOMs (Satellite Communications), all the
4 capabilities we bring to war. But the smaller force
5 and the increased tempo they face today means that we
6 must somehow accommodate the rotation base that will
7 support an overseas force. So that is something that
8 is imperative in everything you do, in all the other
9 considerations.

10 Finally, I would say the thing that
11 characterizes modern warfare is rapidity, speed, to be
12 able to get there and get the job done very quickly.
13 Since we no longer face the massive forces of the
14 Soviet Union and it is unlikely for the foreseeable
15 future we will face a significant Chinese land force -
16 - and we certainly need to work that -- then we need
17 to really look at how we get our forces around the
18 world: prepositioning, sealift, fast sealift, fast
19 airlift.

20 So we need to be able to keep those ports
21 and airports open, but we don't need to have large
22 footprints on the ground.

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1 Finally, I would say your task is most
2 difficult because it is going to advocate change, and
3 if I've found one thing -- the only thing -- that is
4 harder to change than the military services is the
5 Catholic church.

6 I believe we must change, and I think the
7 problem that makes it difficult is people raising the
8 threat of risk from that change, and I believe we can
9 afford to take that risk. So you have an opportunity
10 to bring about needed change. That window may never
11 open again for the near future.

12 So I ask that you be bold and perhaps go
13 too far in your recommendations.

14 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, sir.
15 General Meigs.

16 GENERAL MEIGS: Thank you very much for
17 inviting me to testify today. It is indeed an honor
18 for a muddy boots soldier like myself who spent no
19 time as a flag officer in Washington, though was happy
20 to, to be here in front of you today.

21 I think you are going to find that my
22 input will reflect a certain amount of inside baseball

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1 that you haven't seen yet this morning. You will find
2 that General Horner and I differ significantly on a
3 number of these factors.

4 For instance, training quality in Europe
5 is every bit the same, if not better, than in the
6 United States for Army forces, and I'd be happy to go
7 into that in detail with you.

8 The idea that somehow the forward forces,
9 at least in Europe, are not totally integrated with
10 both the host nation governments in the countries in
11 which they are stationed and the countries in which
12 they train is just not correct, and I'd be happy to go
13 into that for you in questioning.

14 The thing that used to and continues to
15 bother me the most about U.S. European Command and, in
16 particular, its Army component, is the idea that
17 somehow it is still caught in a Cold War trap in terms
18 of doctrine, training, and its ability to be
19 strategically flexible.

20 I note that was in the Secretary of
21 Defense's comments yesterday and the campaign
22 rhetoric. It's just not true, and I would be happy to

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1 pursue that in questioning.

2 In addition, one of the things that one
3 needs to understand is that early in operations a lot
4 of the work is done FOGO (Flag Officers/General
5 Officers). It's not done as a result of a complex,
6 integrated planning process.

7 For instance, when United States Army
8 Europe was asked to prepare a contingency operation to
9 extract NATO personnel from Sepra Gorach in Srebrenica
10 in 1995, it was done based on a verbal commitment and
11 instruction by the Secretary of Defense to General
12 Crouch in Naples, and a significant amount of
13 planning, work, staging and other things occurred as a
14 result of that.

15 You can only do that with in-place forces.

16 You can't do that with forces in the United States.
17 But in order to try to help you with your
18 deliberations, in addition to helping to try to
19 correct some of the factual bases that you ought to
20 consider, I believe, in your deliberations, if we are
21 going to talk about a strategic platform, it seems to
22 me you ought to have a set of criteria that one agrees

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1 on to which we hold the services' feet to the fire,
2 and I am going to give you some criteria that I would
3 have invited you to hold my feet to the fire as a
4 MACOM (Major Army Command) Commander for U.S. European
5 Command.

6 The forces prepositioned must be the
7 entering wedge, and a very flexible one, for any kind
8 of operation in that theater and in adjacent theaters.
9 Those forces must have tremendous strategic and
10 operational agility. They must make a difference in
11 the engagement strategy of the nation and the
12 countries involved in that area of operations as well
13 as adjacent area of operations.

14 Their training must be as good as or
15 better than that training available to forces in the
16 Continental United States, and they must be efficient
17 in terms of their cost, environmental exposure, and
18 quality of life. And as Dr. Hamre mentioned, of
19 course, you've got to have the appropriate SOFA
20 agreements, and they must not inordinately contribute
21 to the operational tempo for service units and
22 families.

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1 Now in order to sort of kick this off, let
2 me explain to you what United States Army Europe did
3 in Iraqi Freedom, as forward based forces positioned
4 to respond to the needs of one or two combatant
5 commanders.

6 Fifth Corps Headquarters, which is the
7 Corps Headquarters in Europe, did the planning for and
8 provided the early forces who were pre-stationed for
9 and then conducted the operation that got us to
10 Baghdad in 16 1/2 days, as well as a very large
11 portion of what we generally call in the planning
12 community "below-the-line" forces: combat support,
13 combat service support forces.

14 In fact, attack aviation elements of Fifth
15 Corps were prepositioned in Iraq very early -- or in
16 Kuwait very early on. And the command and control
17 equipment, the suite of C4ISR (Command, Control,
18 Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance,
19 Reconnaissance) in Fifth United States Corps was, at
20 the time, the most modern in the United States Army.
21 The Blue Force tracking system that was used by V
22 Corps and by IMEF (First Marine Expeditionary Force)

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1 was developed in U.S. Army Europe.

2 The First Armored Division was the, if I'm
3 not mistaken, the third division in the deployment
4 sequence into Iraq. The First Infantry Division
5 reformed itself and was the headquarters and provided
6 the forces for the joint rear area that was going to
7 be established in Turkey and, in fact, they had
8 already prepositioned and were preparing that
9 operation when the Turkish government decided not to
10 go forward.

11 The 173rd Airborne Brigade jumped into
12 northern Iraq and played a very large role in
13 stabilizing Kirkuk and Mosul, and was followed by an
14 immediate reaction force of heavy armor that provided
15 a reserve backbone for that force up in the north. It
16 was the only heavy equipment that was there, and it
17 was flown in from Ramstein on wide body aircraft.

18 At the same time, the Southeast European
19 Task Force, which is a two-star headquarters in Italy
20 under which the 173rd operates, was taken by General
21 Jones and provided the Joint Task Force that worked
22 with ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African

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1 States) off Nigeria to bring forces or -- sorry,
2 perform a NEO (Non-combatant Evacuation Operation)
3 operation bringing civilians out of Nigeria.

4 I suspect very few of you understand that
5 level of commitment and contribution, not only to
6 Iraqi Freedom but to another operation that was very
7 delicate and difficult, and was a joint operation;
8 because SETAF (U.S. Army Southern European Task Force
9 (Airborne)) every year gets an annual exercise in
10 which it is certified as a joint capable headquarters
11 by Joint Forces Command.

12 Interesting enough, when the 173rd
13 returned from its tour in Iraq, several months later
14 it conducted Torgau 2004, a brigade-level exercise, in
15 Russia with Russian forces from Russian ground forces,
16 with the SETAF Commander and the brigade commander
17 involved in that exercise.

18 I would submit to you that that satisfies
19 most of the criteria that I gave you that I think you
20 should be fairly rigorous about.

21 Now there is no question that we need to
22 reshape our forces that are forward based. There is

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1 no question that we need to make them leaner, more
2 strategically agile, and to some extent, we need to
3 re-station them and perhaps reduce where necessary.
4 In fact, we were giving those kinds of plans to
5 members of OSD informally since 1998.

6 Sadly, the Army in its own wisdom decided
7 never to offer OSD an alternative to the plans that
8 were forwarded as part of the QDR (Quadrennial Defense
9 Review), and which still it on the table. That was an
10 unfortunate mistake in deciding to opt out of the
11 dialogue.

12 The other misapprehension I'd like you to
13 consider is this idea of expeditionary. The Army
14 agreed with the Commandant of the Marine Corps in 2002
15 never to use the word expeditionary for its own
16 forces, and the *quid pro quo* was the Commandant would
17 support the Army in shared ground force issues.

18 So when an Army officer hears that it is
19 now becoming expeditionary, it is somewhat of a not
20 bittersweet irony. If you look at -- and I encourage
21 you to do this -- look at days away from home on
22 exercises and commitments like Bosnia and Kosovo for

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1 Army units forward deployed in Europe, and compare
2 them to any other part of the force structure, and I
3 think you will see what I mean.

4 I look forward to your questions.

5 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, sir.
6 General Robertson.

7 GENERAL ROBERTSON: Mr. Chairman and
8 members of the Commission, thanks for having me here
9 today. I am not from South Dakota, but perhaps we can
10 trade "South" stories. South Carolina will have to
11 do. Did have a great base in South Dakota a few years
12 ago. Still there, Grand Forks, one of our major air
13 refueling bases, and truly a great, great capability
14 that we have.

15 It is interesting as I look at the group
16 you have invited here today -- General Horner and
17 General Meigs and me, and General Tilelli,
18 unfortunately, couldn't be here -- it would be
19 interesting to trade war stories. You have an
20 interesting mix.

21 As I had listened to General Horner, as a
22 military officer, former military officer, and Air

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1 Force officer, I would say basically, "Me, too" to
2 everything he said, and I won't reiterate those except
3 to say that the concern about rotation base is
4 something that needs to be high on your agenda of
5 things to consider, and rebalancing of the forces is
6 something that has concerned me since my time in the
7 mobility business.

8 Given the fact that 55 percent, nearly 60
9 percent of our air refueling forces are in the Guard
10 and Reserve, nearly 80 percent of our theater air lift
11 forces, C-130s, are in the Guard and Reserve, and well
12 over 90 percent of our air medical evacuation forces -
13 - and I'm doing this off the top of my head, so forgive
14 me if my percentages are a little off -- 90 percent of
15 the air medical evacuation forces are in the Guard and
16 Reserve, and the posture that we put those forces in
17 since 9-11, in my humble view, is stressing them to a
18 level that we will see the consequences someday if we
19 don't provide them some relief. But I will say, "Me,
20 too" to everything General Horner said.

21 General Meigs and I -- Interestingly, in
22 the mobility business I crossed paths with lots of

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1 folks. I came into the job as the Commander of
2 TRANSCOM and Air Mobility Command with the painful
3 lessons of deployments to Bosnia and Kosovo, and bound
4 to try to help the other forces -- well, all forces,
5 Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps -- streamline
6 their processes, streamline their deployment
7 procedures to make it easier in the future.

8 Little did I know that General Meigs in
9 Europe had already launched off from a three-point
10 stance to do that with European forces, and everything
11 that he said about the deployment to Enduring Freedom
12 and Iraqi Freedom is exactly right and the result of
13 the work that he did to streamline the Army's
14 processes to deploy out of Europe into whatever AOR
15 (Area of Responsibility) they were directed to respond
16 to.

17 You introduced me -- My remarks, and I did
18 have a little intro, a couple of page paper that I put
19 together to frame my thoughts -- almost uniquely
20 transportation, mobility, deployment, distribution
21 related -- because, echoing Dr. Hamre's comments about
22 the importance of what you do, the importance of

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1 transforming the Cold War global basing posture -- and
2 I have to be careful not to just say global mobility
3 basing posture but the global basing posture -- into
4 something that will respond to the national security
5 requirements of the post-9-11 world is very, very
6 important, and you have taken on a very important
7 task.

8 You must tie it into the Base Realignment
9 and Closure Commission to create for U.S. forces a web
10 of bases through which and out of which -- through
11 which they can deploy and out of which they can
12 operate in whatever environment they are thrown in
13 into the future.

14 Okay. So a half a dozen comments, and I
15 will be quiet. I won't read my statement, but I would
16 like to extract a couple of comments.

17 First, whatever you do -- Dr. Hamre and
18 Ambassador Hunter said it very eloquently -- should
19 come out of a broader posture overview, national
20 security strategy overview or whatever. We have to
21 have a strategic direction, not just a tactical
22 direction, a strategic direction around which we base

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1 the decisions you are about to make.

2 The last Base Realignment and Closure
3 Commission was in '95. I would say that all of the
4 BRACs up to '95, although very emotional at the time,
5 really had an easy job of it because the excess basing
6 structure that we had they could salami slice across
7 the world and not do a lot of -- not have a lot of
8 impact on our operational abilities, capabilities.

9 As the balance between basing structure
10 globally and forces and manning globally becomes more
11 in balance, where we peel back -- and there is still,
12 I believe, room to peel back -- becomes a little more
13 critical. So the decisions are important and should
14 be based on some kind of overarching strategy.

15 Everyone has used the word flexibility.
16 General Meigs used the word agility. It is critical
17 to all military commanders. I won't say it is more
18 critical to the mobility commander, but he has to have
19 it. As we worked our way in the early years of my
20 tenure in the mobility business around crises such as
21 earthquakes in China and floods in Africa; as we
22 worked our way through the multiple incursions of

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1 Saddam Hussein into the no-fly zone; as we worked our
2 way into Bosnia and Kosovo, the fog of war is always
3 there for the mobility commander, just as it is for
4 every other commander, and the flexibility of basing,
5 the flexibility of forces, and the flexibility offered
6 by highly trained professionals is critical to work
7 around access issues, to work around diplomatic
8 clearance issues, to work around construction issues,
9 you name it. They are all there.

10 So flexibility is critical, and it is
11 critical not just in wartime, but it also critical to
12 the mobility commander in peacetime because, as he
13 tries to support forces in one AOR while transiting
14 multiple AORs, things like 24-hour operations can
15 significantly -- or the lack of 24-hour operations --
16 can significantly hamper the flow of forces into an
17 AOR.

18 So access to rail, runways -- access to
19 transportation networks, working in synergy with each
20 other -- all of those together contribute to a much
21 smoother flow and increased flexibility for the
22 mobility commander and should be taken into account in

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1 whatever decisions you make.

2 Prepositioning has already been mentioned.
3 The more robust our prepositioned stocks, in my view,
4 the more effective their basing, the quicker then that
5 the forces that are planned to fall in on those
6 prepositioned stocks will be able to respond.

7 I think that, as we work our global basing
8 posture from a mobility perspective, what you do will
9 allow another examination of the basing of our
10 prepositioned forces and prepositioned stocks either
11 to fragment those into more combat loaded and more
12 widely distributed areas so that the speed of response
13 can be increased proportionately.

14 Fourth point: All of the elements of a
15 successful overseas basing posture have to be pursued
16 in synergy and with equal vigor: not just
17 construction on the bases that we identify, not just
18 the prepositioning of fuels which are inherently a
19 military function, but the establishment of government
20 to government relationships -- as Dr. Hamre and
21 Ambassador Hunter pointed out -- SOFA agreements -- as
22 has already been pointed out -- legal agreements need

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1 to lead to site surveys by trained mobility
2 professionals, usage rights, basing rights, exercise
3 rights, *et cetera*, to allow the forces to operate
4 through those bases, maybe on a very infrequent basis,
5 but in times of crisis.

6 Then the appropriate combatant commander
7 for that region needs to build a reasonably robust
8 exercise program or some kind of joint/combined
9 activities through that structure, so that they don't
10 forget that we are there and that we will need them in
11 some time of crisis.

12 I remember the days, my early days, when
13 we sat down and tried to figure out how to get into
14 central Africa to respond to -- heck, to respond to
15 Somalia, to respond to flooding, to respond to
16 Rwanda's crisis or how to get into -- how someday we
17 might have to get into the "-stans."

18 As we worked our way through Bosnia and
19 Kosovo, we used to sit in our quiet time in the middle
20 of the night trying to decide, if we ever had to get
21 into the "-stans", from a mobility perspective, that
22 would really be a challenge, and it was.

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1 As we worked Enduring Freedom and Iraqi
2 Freedom, the availability of basing structure was not
3 there. Access rights became a problem, and all of the
4 problems that we have encountered over and over again
5 were aggregated to cause me and John Handy, my
6 successor, to really get innovative in the fog of war
7 to try to move forces in.

8 What you do should facilitate an easier
9 way for commanders that follow in the mobility
10 business.

11 I would say that, as you reach your
12 conclusions, you shouldn't ignore all the previous
13 mobility studies that have -- and mobility basing
14 studies -- that have gone before. In the aftermath of
15 the 1995 BRAC, we sat down in the mobility business
16 and looked at the global basing structure and said,
17 okay, we are drawing down, what is the minimum that we
18 need, from a mobility perspective, to operate at least
19 through to whatever place the national command
20 authority would like to send us in the future.

21 We selected six bases in Europe and seven
22 in the Pacific and said, those will be the lily pads

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1 through which we will operate, and we will invest -- I
2 can't remember the numbers, somewhere between \$500
3 million and \$1 billion -- to robust those bases up to
4 serve as the throughput basing structure that we would
5 operate from in the future, and it has served us well.

6 We may need to do another study for the
7 second part of the lands through which the mobility
8 machine operates, but what you do should take into
9 account the work that has gone before.

10 Finally, as the work of OSD's recent
11 global basing study suggests, it will allow, I think,
12 some redistribution of forces around the world. It
13 portends to suggest that it will allow some withdrawal
14 of forces, and you've had an interesting debate this
15 morning as to whether that is a good idea or a bad
16 idea. I will only talk about moving those forces
17 right now back to the Continental United States from
18 their forward deployed locations.

19 The only thing that I would remind as that
20 happens is that the mobility requirement will change
21 as you do that. I would stand here today -- I said it
22 three years ago when I was sitting in John Handy's

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1 seat -- we don't have enough strategic mobility forces
2 to move them the way they are postured today. That
3 will likely further increase the requirement for
4 strategic airlift forces.

5 Recapitalization of those forces has
6 started with the procurement of C-17s, the
7 modernization of C-5s and C-130s. That will likely
8 need to continue to be examined in light of the
9 changing environment.

10 There are dozens of mobility studies
11 underway right now. I sit on the DSB (Defense Science
12 Board) Task Force on Mobility, and I have been exposed
13 to them. They need to come together, but the
14 recapitalization of air assets -- strategic air
15 refueling, theater airlifts, C-130s -- and, lest we
16 forget, what is becoming an aging and inherently
17 slower strategic sealift fleet need to be kept on the
18 front burner as we consider how to more rapidly
19 respond with today's forces into tomorrow's
20 environment.

21 So I look forward to your questions.

22 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, sir,

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1 and I would ask Commissioner Taylor to begin the
2 questioning.

3 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Sir, you answered
4 the first question I was going to ask in your
5 statement: Do we have the forces necessary to put
6 them back where they need to be if we do move them?

7 The current plan kind of presupposes that
8 we do, because it talks about capability and then that
9 we can move the forces back to the Continental United
10 States, and we have the capability to insert them back
11 wherever we need to. You gave a very clear answer to
12 that.

13 What are the other options? What can we
14 do through prepositioning of equipment for some of our
15 heavy forces? And I would ask both you and General
16 Meigs to comment about that, some of the rotational
17 plans that they have talked about. Of course, that
18 takes lift as well. What are some of the other
19 options to be able to execute a plan similar to the
20 one that's been proposed, or some alternatives to it?

21 GENERAL ROBERTSON: Prepositioning is
22 reviewed on a cyclical basis. I don't know that it is

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1 predictably cyclical, but it is reviewed. The
2 services, especially in the last half dozen or so
3 years, have come to realize the critical importance of
4 prepositioned assets.

5 I would say that what we did wrong
6 initially -- that is being corrected, and I can't tell
7 you the degree to which -- is we put a lot of
8 prepositioned assets out there, and I won't talk about
9 forces as much as I will stocks, and then didn't take
10 care of them. So they sat out there and aged, and
11 when we had to draw them out periodically for use, we
12 discovered that they required ready attention.

13 I don't want to put words in the mouth of
14 the modern Army, but we also learned that packing
15 ships to the gunnels with equipment without regard for
16 rapid offload, what is popularly called "combat
17 loading" now, would be a better way to do business,
18 although it may require more assets to do that.

19 The assets are not there. Therefore, they
20 are not to the optimum posture yet, I don't think; but
21 there are people looking at improving the efficiency
22 of the ships that we are loading, the capacity to

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1 which we load them, fragmenting the loads so that we
2 can put them in more places and not have to deploy
3 over such long distances, unloading offload troops
4 while the ships are en route.

5 All of these are great ideas, anything to
6 meet the new strategic timing requirements that are
7 coming out of OSD -- properly coming out of OSD -- and
8 then more. But more means more money, and so you have
9 to make those balanced decisions of how much you can
10 sustain from a forward deployed perspective,
11 especially as you modernize your forces.

12 The Future Combat System for the Army is
13 going to have some folks trained, I think, on new
14 systems and new ways of doing business, but having to
15 fall in on old equipment that they really maybe have
16 not trained on as well as some of the new stuff.

17 I give you the transportation mobility
18 perspective. I would let General Meigs talk about the
19 operational requirement.

20 GENERAL MEIGS: The first thing we ought
21 to do is fill out the proposed sets and, as Tony said,
22 if you have an old ship and you've got to use that for

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1 prepo because that is all that is available, and you
2 don't have a ship that you can get the appropriated
3 funds for, that you can build optimized combat loading
4 and fast roll-on/roll-off, you ought to fix that.

5 Clearly, the prepo equipment that is in
6 Belgium and Luxembourg needs to be put somewhere else.
7 We tried. We did the studies to see how that could
8 come out, and the Belgiques and the Dutch were very
9 upset with us for breaking agreements that had been
10 made previously; but that gear shouldn't be sitting in
11 the BENELUX (Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg). That
12 needs to be put to better use somewhere else, and that
13 is going to be a political issue to back up SACEUR as
14 he goes in and tries to wedge those out.

15 Let me make two pleas for what services
16 can do to help TRANSCOM. One, service capabilities
17 need to be harmonized with the allocation of scarce
18 resources that go on when a combatant commander begins
19 an operation.

20 To that effect, after Task Force Hawk, we
21 took a Corps headquarters, the one that went to Iraq,
22 that took 55 wide bodies to move, and we reorganized

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1 it so that it could move on 36 C-130s and two C-17s.

2 Now we did that in U.S. Army Europe,
3 because the Task Force Hawk experience was not a very
4 pleasant one, and through the use of CONOPS (Concept
5 of Operations) funding to support Bosnia and Kosovo, I
6 could do that legally. But service chiefs need to
7 understand that they must not develop capabilities in
8 exclusion of the transportation requirement to get
9 them where they need to go.

10 I suggest that one of the things you could
11 do is take a couple of big operations -- for instance,
12 Iraqi Freedom or perhaps the original deployment to
13 Bosnia -- and look at the TPFDDL (Time Phased Force
14 and Deployment Data List), not the TPFDD. Look at
15 lists of how the forces were deployed and see who
16 takes up most of the wide-bodied aircraft early in the
17 flow. I think you would be surprised.

18 You ought to do that as a matter of
19 record, because -- in my view -- because if a service
20 can streamline its packaging to make the sorting of
21 scarce resources that TRANSCOM has to do in supporting
22 the combat commanders more efficient, they should do

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1 that.

2 Secondly, we don't have enough wide-body
3 aircraft. I mean, if we are going to pull a lot of
4 forces back from overseas and we are going to have to
5 go twice as far to get to where they have to fight
6 from where they are now, that has an impact on your
7 capability for ton miles.

8 If we are going to do that, we should pay
9 the bill for the extra air frames up front as part of
10 that strategic plan. I suggest to you that -- if you
11 look at the reshaping of TRANSCOM and the added
12 resources that ought to go to it to support a strategy
13 to withdraw from Korea and Germany -- that the money
14 is not there.

15 GENERAL ROBERTSON: One more small point,
16 if I could, on the -- from a shipping standpoint. One
17 of the things that I have seen in the global basing
18 posture study out of OSD is a move toward potentially
19 making available smaller ports for offload of
20 prepositioned and sustainment stocks for the war
21 fighting commander.

22 That is important, but it is only useful

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1 if you have smaller ships to use those smaller ports
2 and -- Hence, my comments about breaking down the huge
3 loads that we have on the prepositioned ships that we
4 have now that can only access a small number of
5 strategic ports, which could not be available in time
6 of crisis, as we have seen very recently.

7 So it is an important factor as you work
8 through port spaces and facilities that we understand
9 that the posture of war fighting has changed, and we
10 don't need these huge offloads of stocks sometimes as
11 much as just need packaged forces that can go in,
12 brigade size versus huger Army formations, to work the
13 problems that we will face in this global war on
14 terrorism.

15 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: One additional
16 question to General Meigs. You mentioned in your
17 opening comment about -- that the U.S. Army Europe and
18 the Army had another alternative, at one point in
19 these discussions, that was -- at least you implied
20 that it might have been quite different than the
21 current alternative that is being discussed. Would
22 you care to share that with us?

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1 GENERAL MEIGS: I can, to a certain
2 extent, from memory. At the time I left the service,
3 it was only a U.S. Army Europe position that had been
4 brought up a number of times and been quietly put in
5 the dustbin, and we were told never to mention it
6 again.

7 We did the work to look at the level at
8 which you go -- the level at which the force is no
9 longer sufficiently sustainable overseas; and, in
10 terms of the training base you need to maintain the
11 facilities, if you go below three brigades the cost
12 per brigade per unit becomes inordinate.

13 There is a good case that says that there
14 is no question that you can bring some stuff home from
15 Europe. We were looking at the -- Well, let me start
16 over again.

17 The way U.S. Army Europe is designed today
18 is to be the front portion of a major campaign like
19 Iraqi Freedom. You have a -- as General Taylor can go
20 into in detail, if you want to go into other
21 discussions on this -- you have a Corps headquarters
22 with all of the combat support, combat service support

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1 a Corps needs. It's a very robust, below-the-line
2 force contingent that does not require RC (Reserve
3 Component) augmentation to get moving.

4 In addition, it's got a very heavy Army
5 aviation package. So the whole idea that -- when
6 General Maddox set this up -- was to give two CINCs
7 (Commanders-in-Chief; i.e., Combatant Commanders), not
8 just one, the ability to put this force on the ground
9 very quickly and have an operational capability at the
10 Corps level, and then add other forces to it from the
11 United States.

12 Now the mission has changed. You don't
13 need all of those below-the-line forces that far
14 forward. What you do need is an entering wedge force
15 that has a range of capabilities so that, if you need
16 a heavy wedge, you can do that. If you need an
17 airborne force that's backed up with civil affairs,
18 you can do that.

19 So you could put together a composite
20 force under a Corps or Corps Forward matrix with three
21 Brigades. I was going to have a Division headquarters
22 remain, because Headquarters are very, very important

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1 in terms of any kind of operation, especially if they
2 are Joint certified, and I can go into that in more
3 detail if you like.

4 So that you had three levels. You had
5 three Brigades: a light brigade, a heavy brigade, and
6 a Stryker brigade. You had a Division headquarters
7 that you can push forward as a forward for the Joint
8 Task Forces following behind and sufficient combat
9 support forces to open the theater.

10 Remember, it is not TRANSCOM that opens
11 the theater. If you want ports opened, the port
12 opening was done in the European Theater by U.S. Army
13 Europe. So if you have those forces back in the 7th
14 Transportation Battalion at Fort Eustis, it's the old
15 tyranny. You are twice as far away. It takes you
16 twice the ton miles to get there.

17 If they are in Europe, a lot of times they
18 can move by rail. You are not requisitioning
19 airplanes from TRANSCOM in order to do the mission;
20 because remember: if you are on the European land
21 mass, the rail networks are very good. You don't need
22 airplanes.

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1 So if I can deploy to the Caucasus by rail
2 with a sufficient force, and the combatant commander
3 is trying to bring other things from the United
4 States, it is not a zero sum game. But if they are
5 all back in the United States, you have to go to the
6 TRANSCOM Commander and say, okay, we got to fly all
7 this stuff.

8 So that was the strategy that we had in
9 our proposal and, unfortunately, it never got off the
10 ground.

11 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: General Horner, I
12 don't want to be ignoring you. You obviously have
13 been very much involved in deploying forces in an
14 earlier war. Would you care to comment?

15 GENERAL HORNER: Well, my experience with
16 preposition is that it was excellent, but we worked
17 hard to maintain it. I had people on site, and they
18 did all the inspections and all the counting and
19 changing time, and not only was it better than we
20 thought -- because we thought we would use it once and
21 throw it away -- but it's been used over and over and
22 over again. It gets redone and restored and put back

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1 in storage and pulled out again because of the
2 turbulence in the Middle East.

3 With regard to deployment of force: it
4 was interesting in Desert Storm, for whatever reason.
5 The 18th Airborne Corps was the one we came to rely on
6 to be there on time, and then when we had time, the
7 7th Corps out of Europe deployed down.

8 So each situation is going to be
9 different. It is going to be a function of geography.
10 It's a function of what kind of forces are required.

11 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you.
12 Commissioner Martin?

13 COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Thank you, Mr.
14 Chairman. General Meigs, you had made some previous
15 comments -- I spent 32 years behind a microphone; I
16 don't think I need them now, but we'll try anyway.

17 You had made some previous comments
18 regarding the wisdom of drawing down or turning our
19 back on the existing alliances, friendships in the
20 military contact and basing structure in favor of new
21 friends who might be more transitory and not
22 necessarily there when we need them.

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1 I'd like to hear that for the record, sir.
2 GENERAL MEIGS: Okay. In Iraqi Freedom,
3 if you dig into the role the Germans played in the
4 deployment of European based forces, and the Italians
5 -- By the way, you will find that they were extremely
6 supportive. And remember, the Germans weren't
7 necessarily thrilled about the whole issue. In fact,
8 their Chancellor was elected on a platform of no
9 participation in the war, but they assisted
10 tremendously in the deployment of V Corps and other
11 forces out of Germany to Iraq.

12 Hungary would not allow overflight or
13 movement of forces through Hungary to Turkey. Now I
14 worked a lot with the Hungarians. I don't mean this
15 as a criticism. But the constituent politics for
16 Hungary were much, much more difficult than in
17 Germany, even given the presence of the Green Party
18 and the SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany)
19 Coalition and the fact that the Foreign Minister of
20 Germany is a Green. He is a member of the Green
21 Party, now SPD, but originally he was a Green Party
22 member.

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1 So the rules, the procedures, the
2 consensus behind what U.S. forces do out of Germany
3 and Italy is a given, in a sense. I mean, it's never
4 completely a given, but I mean it's all understood.
5 It is consensus.

6 In the new European nations, it can be
7 less so -- not necessarily as a function of the
8 position of the Prime Minister in terms of what he
9 would like to do, or his service chiefs, but his
10 constituent politics and the weakness of his coalition
11 in these new democracies.

12 I note for the record that some of the new
13 European countries that have come with us to Iraq are
14 now starting to have to pull out, and I suspect that
15 is due to a combination of up-tempo and constituent
16 politics. However, when people used to ask me whether
17 we are going to re-station a brigade farther east, my
18 answer was always, absolutely, makes a lot of sense to
19 me; if you guys will write me the check, I'll start
20 doing that tomorrow.

21 If I could, I would just make a quick
22 comment about training bases. General Horner

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1 correctly underlines that this is an issue. There are
2 four training bases in the Czech Republic that are
3 over ____? square kilometers.

4 There are four training bases in Poland
5 that are of larger size; and, in fact, Drasco
6 Pomorskie, the training base we used for Victory
7 Strike, is over 400 square kilometers. That is a big
8 training area, and it is in an air space that is
9 relatively uncluttered -- much less cluttered than the
10 air space in western Europe -- and you can maneuver
11 off-post in Germany as well as in Poland and the Czech
12 Republic, with appropriate permission.

13 So there is a tension here. You want to
14 make sure that wherever you put your forces, you can
15 get them to go do whatever the nation's business is.
16 That's very important. If you leave forces in
17 Europe, you certainly want to be able to take
18 advantage of these very, very large, relatively empty
19 training areas that are just there for the using.

20 COMMISSIONER MARTIN: My second question
21 is to all, and I'll be interested in the joint service
22 comments on this.

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1 If we have a great map, a great plan, but
2 a force that is too stressed or not adequately
3 configured to man that map and support that plan, what
4 do we have? My question is the pressure of rotations,
5 the recruiting. And I used the term R&R, and I didn't
6 mean rest and relaxation; I meant recruiting and
7 retention in some comments the other day.

8 Let me start with you, General Horner.
9 Your sense and experience of where do we stand, and
10 how seriously do we need to take those considerations
11 as we go about our thinking?

12 GENERAL HORNER: Well, obviously, there is
13 no doubt about it, our force is stressed because of
14 the high tempo. We were that way in the mid-Sixties.
15 We are not going to get bigger. We can't afford the
16 forces we have, and I would expect in the next rounds
17 we will see cuts in our forces in terms of manpower.
18 But we have also changed how we fight war.

19 For example, in Iraqi Freedom we saw us
20 needing a -- stating a need for a very large force,
21 then a smaller force, and then even that smaller force
22 couldn't all deploy to be in the battle, and yet the

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1 battle was very quick. Now that may have had
2 ramifications in the post-conflict operation.

3 So it isn't all clear what the needs are,
4 but I think we tend to use historic battles to figure
5 what it takes to do something, and we've got to learn
6 to live with this more lethal, fast, more
7 knowledgeable force, and take advantage of those, and
8 also we must have room for our coalition partners,
9 because without it, it is American arrogance, and we
10 can't afford that.

11 In fact, we were talking about the
12 coalitions. I was thinking about in Desert Storm. I
13 had people in my coalition command who I never had
14 worked with before: the French, the Syrians. Yet it
15 went fine. In the case of the French, we had the
16 Minister of Defense fired, Chevenement. He hated
17 Americans. But they got Jacques in there, and then
18 that -- Once he got that cleared up, the military to
19 military worked fine.

20 Now all those forces depended upon the
21 United States for their command and control, their
22 intelligence, their reconnaissance, all the high tech

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1 stuff that we bring to the battle. But in terms of
2 being able to shoot and fight and work with us, we got
3 along just fine.

4 So I think our smaller forces are going to
5 be smaller. They are going to be more lethal, and we
6 have to figure out ways to build those kinds of
7 relationships on an either *ad hoc* business or a
8 continuing basis to make sure that we put a field of
9 force out that is not only joint but coalition.

10 GENERAL MEIGS: Let me give you a couple
11 of data points about, again, Europe -- because that is
12 where I spent most of my career, and almost all of my
13 career as a flag officer -- to give you a sense for
14 the type of commitment that has to be made to do what
15 General Horner is talking about.

16 I am not sure that you understand the role
17 of the Patriots in Europe in terms of the capabilities
18 that they provide to other countries in the AOR and in
19 the CENTCOM AOR. If you put those Patriots at Ft.
20 Bliss, then every time you want to run an exercise in
21 Israel or Southwest Asia, you are going to pay an
22 extra price.

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1 Secondly -- and I can't get into this in
2 too much detail in an open session; if you go into
3 closed session, you can get the information on that.
4 Secondly, every year EUCOM would come to me with a
5 bill of about 70 to 80 exercises for the European
6 Command and inside of NATO, and I would go to the
7 combatant commander and say, "Look, with the Army
8 training requirements that I have for our battalions,
9 I can only do about 45."

10 Now some of those exercises required
11 cadres; some of them required units. That bill is not
12 going to go down. That bill is going to go up as the
13 eastern European armies want more of our time, which
14 is one of the reasons I mentioned Torgau 2004 to you.

15 Imagine the 173rd coming home from Iraq to
16 the United States and then having to go to Russia for
17 its exercise, and all of the preplanning conferences
18 that occur, because an exercise starts in the planning
19 cycle a year to six months ahead of time. Those of
20 you that have participated in that on the Commission
21 can explain that to the Commissioners.

22 So that the way I see it, if you are

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1 seriously interested in engagement, look at the
2 engagement bill to support the strategy and then see
3 the most efficient way of resourcing it as a function
4 of operational tempo, which right now is at a premium.

5 General Taylor, I don't know if you know
6 this, but all the Op Force are in the deployment
7 cycle, which gives a sense -- I mean, to an Army
8 person, again they can explain to you what that means
9 for the way the Army does its business, and that bill
10 is not going to go.

11 GENERAL ROBERTSON: I partially answered
12 this question when I started, and I will only -- I
13 will let General Horner and General Meigs' comments
14 stand for themselves. But I do want to go back and
15 readdress the Active/Reserve mix as a gut concern, and
16 this is only personal gut concern. Modern -- or
17 today's -- commanders, I think, are not as concerned
18 about it as I am or was.

19 I was -- When the Berlin wall came down, I
20 was in the old Strategic Air Command. We owned the
21 KC-135 fleet. We thought this was an optimum time to
22 change the posture of the fleet, because the Cold War

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1 was over, and we could take a significant portion of
2 that force and put it in the Air National Guard and
3 Air Force Reserve; and we did, nearly 60 percent, and
4 they are still that way today.

5 The same was true with other forces as we
6 drew down the Active force, as General Horner
7 mentioned, and put a lot of those assets in the Air
8 National Guard and Air Force Reserve, from an Air
9 Force perspective.

10 The air war over Kosovo was, for the most
11 part, an air refueling exercise, and we not only used
12 almost every Active asset that we had, short of taking
13 down the schoolhouses, but we had to do my first
14 selective recall of the Guard and Reserves to have
15 enough air refueling assets to do that operation.

16 That was a traumatic experience, and I
17 have long held that it is unfair for us to call the
18 Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve, the reserve
19 components, to active duty for very, very long periods
20 of time when that is not exactly what they signed up
21 for at peacetime jobs and peacetime lives, and we
22 should have enough -- We should relook the structure

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1 of our forces to accommodate that.

2 Now the world is changing, and I
3 acknowledge that we are in another world war that may
4 have changed that paradigm. I think we probably need
5 to look at changing the make-up of the forces because
6 I don't know how much longer -- I've watched the
7 recruiting numbers. They seem to be doing okay. I
8 just am not sure how much longer we will be able to
9 sustain this.

10 I say that in light of the fact that, when
11 we did Kosovo, as my example, we were at a time of
12 robust airline hiring and a lot of folks trying to get
13 off of Active duty and get those high paying jobs in
14 the airlines. So it was a stressful time for the
15 Active force, and it was a stressful time for the
16 Guard and Reserve to pull those into Active Duty for a
17 long period of time.

18 Now that sine curve has bottomed out, and
19 folks are more than eager, who don't have airline jobs
20 now, to serve time in the Guard and Reserve so they
21 can get a full time paycheck.

22 I suspect that cycle is going to swing

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1 again someday and, if we don't do something about the
2 mix and stay in the posture that we are in, a massive
3 forward deployment, that we are going to have a
4 challenge on our hands with recruiting in the Air
5 National Guard and Air Force Reserve.

6 So that's a long way of describing it,
7 weaving in economics and the world posture, but it
8 causes me concern.

9 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you.
10 Commissioner Thopson.

11 COMMISSIONER THOMSON: General Meigs, you
12 made an interesting set of comments about the role of
13 the V Corps and Iraqi Freedom, which I thought --
14 laying out for us all of that.

15 A simple question: Why weren't -- Why
16 choose the forces from Europe to do this? Why not
17 forces from within CONUS?

18 GENERAL MEIGS: We had exercised with
19 CENTCOM in Egypt, and I mean V Corps was exceptionally
20 well trained. It had the best trained aviation
21 component of any of the U.S. Corps except for --
22 elements, except for Army Special Operations Command,

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1 and it was General Franks' call, and it gets there
2 quicker, you know, because of the time/distance
3 factors. That's about the best I can give you. Those
4 are the major parameters of the decision.

5 COMMISSIONER THOMSON: Thanks. General
6 Robertson, in your job, your last job before you
7 retired at TRANSCOM, you were in a job which I now
8 realize, having been out there now, is a highly
9 political job, and there is a lot of politics. What I
10 mean is there is a lot of international politics that
11 has to be done at TRANSCOM and a lot of diplomacy
12 involving access and moving through places and so
13 forth.

14 In the global posture that is being
15 proposed by the Pentagon, and in extrapolating from
16 some of the bones and trying to put some flesh on it,
17 that is going to require access to some places where
18 we are not all that used to going through and some
19 places where we are but has been infrequent, and now
20 it will be more frequent, places in Africa, Southeast
21 Asia. I don't need to mention these places, but they
22 are just the regions, southeast Europe, South Asia.

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1 How do you -- and we have to work out
2 agreements that we are going to be happy with.
3 Presumably, we will be able to work those out. Two
4 questions. How long will this take us, and how would
5 you feel as -- the first question -- as a commander
6 about relying on places where, let's call it, the
7 adherence to the rule of law is not as strong as the
8 American tradition?

9 GENERAL ROBERTSON: Let me tell you how we
10 did it. As I left and John Handy came in -- I'll
11 start at the side and work my way in and back up again
12 to your questions. When John came in after the
13 challenges that we had had, and recognizing that what
14 you said is exactly right, John brought in a high
15 ranking State Department person to serve as his
16 TRANSCOM ambassador and *entree* to the State Department
17 for purposes of access, diplomatic clearance and those
18 kinds of things, which was a good thing.

19 No one, like you, had ever recognized
20 TRANSCOM's requirement for access being more of a
21 State Department mission than anything else, and what
22 I and my predecessors had done was basically rely on

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1 the combatant commanders in the AOR to work those
2 issues for us.

3 So I would get on the phone with Tommy
4 Franks and say I can't get in. He would call somebody
5 and call me back a couple of hours later and say,
6 Okay, try it again. That is how we did business. It
7 probably is much more effective and efficient today,
8 being able to work those at a lower level.

9 How long is it going to take? It is going
10 to take forever or, maybe better said, never in some
11 of the places that we will try to get access. In some
12 places, depending on the environment at the time, it
13 will go fairly quickly.

14 The good news is in my quick scan of the
15 areas that we are looking at expanding that posture
16 into, certainly into the small, occasionally used
17 places, it is broad enough that the flexibility that I
18 mentioned when I started will allow General Handy and
19 subsequent commanders the ability to work around, and
20 that is exactly -- That is the nature of the mobility
21 business. You work around walls, access issues,
22 diplomatic clearances.

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1 Peacetime is almost more of a problem than
2 crisis, because the urgency and the adrenalin that is
3 pumping through our own diplomatic structure and
4 defense structure moves mountains a lot faster than
5 they do in peacetime, and I remember many days trying
6 to get into Southwest Asia to sustain forces when I
7 was only given -- You can only have 50 diplomatic
8 clearances a month and, if a minor crisis erupts and
9 you have to use 25 of them in a spurt, then you've
10 only got 25 left, and you got to sustain all the
11 forces in that AOR, but you can only take 25 airplanes
12 in and out. So figure out another way to do it.

13 That is a peacetime challenge that I hope
14 that we take into account as part of this group,
15 because as we work our way into that, peacetime is
16 like wartime for the mobility business. You are
17 moving 80 percent of your forces all the time into
18 places that people don't even know exist.

19 The other issue that will need to be
20 worked even after we establish these, and the constant
21 problem, is making sure that you have the equipment
22 prepositioned from a mobility perspective. You don't

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1 need a lot: a couple of loaders and fuel -- clean
2 fuel, which is a challenge in many parts of the world,
3 and we had to ferry our own fuel or use precious ramp
4 space to preposition tankers to provide the fuel that
5 we need so we could go in, dump a load, take off, hit
6 a tanker because the fuel on the ground was not
7 adequate.

8 We have done a lot of that in the major
9 mobility bases that I mentioned earlier --
10 prepositioned fuel in huge stocks to be able to move
11 it. But in the forward locations where we will need
12 to do that, we will have to work our way through those
13 kinds of issues.

14 So how long is it going to take? It will
15 take forever or never in some cases, and some will
16 come quickly, and I hope the balance will provide
17 TRANSCOM the flexibility that it needs.

18 You asked about comfort level operating
19 into some of those locations, and I assume you are
20 talking mostly security and those kinds of things. It
21 is interesting. After the Cole was bombed, I had to
22 come over -- I probably sat in this room -- and had to

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1 testify with Vern Clark about the security of U.S.
2 forces in foreign ports -- he from a Naval perspective
3 and me from a person who moved forces through those
4 ports on a regular basis.

5 I will tell you what I told the committee
6 that I testified before then -- and I knock on wood
7 when I say -- we had a fairly robust threat awareness
8 group in U.S. Transportation Command and its
9 components that monitored every mission that was being
10 flown or sailed on a daily basis a day, week or month
11 in advance, to make sure that we were adequately
12 postured: either as that aircraft moved in with
13 security forces, as that ship moved in with security
14 forces or that the combatant commander was able to
15 provide security forces for the movement of that asset
16 in and out of the port.

17 I'm sure that system is even more robust
18 today than it was when I established it, and I am
19 fairly comfortable that, with defensive systems now
20 being proliferated across the airlift fleet, with
21 defensive systems now being made available even on
22 some of the sealift fleet, with the increased

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1 awareness provided by better intelligence and
2 preplanning, that we will be okay.

3 COMMISSIONER THOMSON: We are moving into
4 -- this is for any of you. We are moving into a
5 period -- again, although some think it may be more
6 than a sine wave situation -- where the issue of
7 recruiting and retention is coming very much to the
8 fore. Part of this thinking in our global reposturing
9 involves a shift from fairly long accompanied tours to
10 shorter, six-month rotation tours.

11 That inevitably raises some questions
12 about the effects of these kinds of rotational tours
13 on recruiting and retention. I wonder if any of you
14 have any thoughts about that.

15 GENERAL HORNER: Well, my own experience
16 was that rotation -- We used to pull rotational tours
17 for nuclear alert, and the problem was you would be in
18 Green Squadron and you would go -- and you would go
19 back and Red Squadron was short of people. So you
20 changed patches, and two days later you are back over
21 there again.

22 So any rotational base has to be made in

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1 the cold light of what can be supported, not what the
2 requirements are; because you will drive your force
3 into the ground.

4 GENERAL MEIGS: This is one of the major
5 problems I have with this lily pad idea. Forces in
6 U.S. Army Europe were in peacetime -- before Iraqi
7 Freedom -- spending somewhere between 200 and 250 days
8 away from home. Part of that is the annual Army
9 training schedule, especially when it included a six-
10 month tour in Bosnia or Kosovo.

11 The Army's training plan for a battalion -
12 - in order for it to have the level of collective
13 ability that is needed for combat -- is fairly
14 rigorous. If you are going to do that and have six-
15 month tours in a bare bones facility, and some follow-
16 on presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, that is just not
17 going to wash.

18 What is going to happen is that the
19 European Command Commander is going to be told by the
20 Joint Forces Command Commander that he can't service
21 45 to 70 exercises a year out of the CONUS base and do
22 the CONUS base training and provide the forces for

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1 other commitments around the world. It's just not
2 going to work.

3 So, one, the engagement strategy is not
4 going to be supported, whatever that strategy is.
5 Secondly, if you try to do it, not only are you going
6 to run the families ragged, you are going to put a
7 bigger bill on TRANSCOM; because, remember, if you
8 want to go to Bulgaria to run an exercise from Ft.
9 Hood, it's a heck of a lot harder transportation-wise
10 than putting a bunch of people on the train at
11 Grafenwoehr and railing them down there.

12 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you.
13 General, did you have something you wanted to add? Go
14 ahead.

15 GENERAL ROBERTSON: Real quick. I tend to
16 take a little bit more optimistic attitude. First, I
17 would say current commanders are better able to answer
18 that question probably than we are, because the force
19 continues to transform.

20 When I left Active Duty, the Air Force
21 had, for about a year or more, been in its new Air
22 Expeditionary Force concept where we tried our best to

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1 provide our troops predictability. In other words,
2 you are going to be gone this much time over the
3 course of your career, but we will let you know that
4 you will be in this bucket, you will deploy at this
5 time, and you can plan your family life around that.

6 I would say that, if we can ever get back
7 to a semblance of predictability -- and I can't speak
8 for the Army, Navy or Marine Corps -- but if we can
9 maintain that predictability and tailor the forces in
10 those modules to be able to have the flexibility to
11 respond to crises wherever they may occur and have
12 forces adequate to sustain that, that the troops will
13 be able to handle it a lot better than, "Go now.
14 We'll tell you when you come home when it is time to
15 come home."

16 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you.
17 Commissioner Curtis?

18 COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Both you and the
19 previous panel were very articulate in the requirement
20 for the overseas basing structure to be founded in a
21 long term view and a long term strategic framework.
22 But there is also the issue of getting there.

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1 I would appreciate if each one of you
2 would share with us what you view are the risks and
3 considerations that we should take account of in
4 moving to the overseas basing structure while we have
5 active operations going on in both Afghanistan and
6 Iraq. General Horner?

7 GENERAL HORNER: Well, everything is risk,
8 particularly when you are in a draw-down of your
9 forces.

10 We have to rethink how we are fighting.
11 We are trying to fight World War II again, and we are
12 not the force to do that. We are a different kind of
13 force.

14 We need to have access, and we often
15 cannot have assured access. But it has been my
16 experience when there is a crisis, the neighborhood
17 changes attitudes very quickly. And we certainly saw
18 that in 1990 when we had great difficulty working with
19 many of the Arab countries, and then suddenly -- 27
20 divisions on the border of Saudi Arabia with an Arab
21 country being occupied -- we had free reign. I could
22 get in my F-16 and go anywhere in the AOR. Before

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1 that, it would take months just to get the flight
2 clearances.

3 So I think that sometimes we try to lock
4 in the future rather than learn to live with
5 uncertainty, and I think we are going to have to do
6 that more and more because we are not spending the
7 money on our defense that we have in the past, because
8 the impetus of the Cold War is not present.

9 We always -- and we have to learn to rely
10 on things more. I know the aircraft -- the fighter
11 guys are always upset with the Navy, because the Navy
12 is always pounding smoke about an acre of sovereignty.
13 But I can tell you this, as an air component
14 commander, I hope the Navy buys 100 carriers because
15 air power is air power, and I don't care what's
16 painted on the side of that airplane.

17 So those are all the kinds of
18 considerations that we are reluctant to make, if we
19 have a service bias or a functions bias or a regional
20 bias, and we have to get over that.

21 GENERAL MEIGS: I take a little different
22 view. Look at the family in the First Armored

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1 Division which was sent to Iraq for 12 months and
2 actually stayed 16, which is now preparing for yet
3 another tour, as we speak; who knows that their
4 Division is going to be redeployed, and who face the
5 possibility of the unit going to Iraq with the
6 redeployment of the families issue still up in the
7 air.

8 That's likely to happen. And tying this
9 whole process to BRAC, as was announced in the
10 campaign rhetoric, makes this a very uncertain and
11 debilitating problem for soldiers and their families,
12 and it doesn't have to be that way.

13 Now I occasionally quiz buddies that I see
14 about how the retention is holding up, because that is
15 the crack in the armor for the Army. If you start to
16 see mid-term noncommissioned officers not reenlisting,
17 you see the promotion points for lieutenant colonels
18 and colonels migrating to the left, you see captain
19 retention going down, we have a very serious problem.

20 In the Active force, we haven't started to
21 see that quite yet. I wonder how it is going to look
22 after those families go through those second tour in

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1 harm's way -- or second year-long tour in harm's way.
2 And if the economy doesn't tank completely and the job
3 market for the young captains stays fairly robust,
4 that is a -- that becomes a very real problem for the
5 Army.

6 So in terms of trying to -- I won't use
7 the word "transform" because it's become one of these
8 terms that has no referential index. I can't figure
9 out what it means anymore. In order to restructure
10 the Army, fight a war, and re-station the Army at the
11 whole time, I think you have overloaded the horse.
12 You know, that's the straw that could break the
13 camel's back.

14 I know we ought to do this. Don't get me
15 wrong. I mean, I know we ought to make some changes,
16 but we've got to meter that very, very carefully, and
17 tying it strictly to BRAC has two disadvantages.

18 One, uncertain timing; two, it is going to
19 create tremendous pressure to bring the maximum amount
20 of stuff home, to station it in bases which will then
21 be more protected against closing them down. In fact,
22 there is not a whole lot of room in Army posts right

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1 now to put those units in.

2 GENERAL ROBERTSON: I was not part of the
3 inner circle, this global basing posture study, and we
4 are talking two things here: We are talking about
5 repositioning of forward deployed troops, drawing down
6 some, bringing some here, robusting here; and we are
7 also talking about what I think is a robusting of our
8 global basing posture to allow more flexibility to
9 operations in this new environment we are in.

10 Regarding the first -- the repositioning
11 and streamlining of our forces around the world to
12 meet today's challenges, as opposed to yesterday's
13 challenges: I trust the leadership that followed
14 that -- if the service chiefs and Secretaries have
15 studied this and given it their approval -- that -- if
16 the CINCs have studied this along with the Chairman
17 and given his blessing -- in my cursory glance at it,
18 that it would probably relieve some of the tension,
19 hopefully, that General Meigs suggests, that we ought
20 to get on with it because we need to do what we can to
21 reposture ourselves and, if we can relieve tension in
22 the process, then so be it.

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1 Regarding the second half -- increasing
2 the flexibility of operation of forces throughout the
3 world by robusting our posture in a tiered way -- big
4 bases, middle size bases and occasionally used bases:
5 I'd say get on with that, too, because it is something
6 we have needed to do for a long time.

7 COMMISSIONER CURTIS: Thank you very much.

8 That's all I have.

9 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you.

10 Commissioner Less?

11 COMMISSIONER LESS: General Horner -- four
12 and a half acres of sovereign U.S. territory on an
13 aircraft carrier rather than that one acre, or
14 whatever it is you are talking about there. For you,
15 sir -- and for the other gentlemen, we'll get to it --
16 but I'd like to talk about host nation, if we could,
17 and the price that you in your earlier comments talked
18 about; the Middle East and where we are going to be
19 handling the global war on terrorism, and we are not
20 going back to fight wars that we fought in the past,
21 and all of that sort of thing.

22 Will not the host nation pay a high price?

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1 Or what is your take on how the host nation is going
2 to react in providing access as we expand, as we move
3 these 70,000 troops around, and/or whatever; and what
4 do you see as the impacts, both beneficial and
5 negative, in allowing U.S. access?

6 Then I'd like to get to General Meigs on
7 the same thing in the European theater; but I'd like
8 you, sir, to cover that area out there in the Middle
9 East.

10 GENERAL HORNER: Well, you know, host
11 nation access and support was always a concern in
12 Central Command because of the cultural differences,
13 because of the lack of longstanding relationships like
14 we had in NATO or with Japan and Korea.

15 As it turned out, shared interests become
16 very, very important. Quite frankly, our involvement
17 in a conflict or a crisis in large measure should be
18 driven by interests, not just because we want to be
19 there, or things of this nature.

20 So in 1990 we met in Camp David with the
21 President, and he turned and he asked Colin -- He
22 asked Baker first, and he couldn't answer the

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1 question. So he asked Colin, "Well, what do the
2 Saudis think about all this, the invasion of Kuwait?"
3 And nobody could really answer the question.

4 So he sent Secretary Cheney and myself and
5 Schwartzkopf and John Yosock, and we went out to Jedda
6 and we went to the King and said, "What do you think
7 we ought to do?" And there was discussion within the
8 royal family, because they didn't know exactly what to
9 do, but the King made a very courageous decision. He
10 says, "I've seen my country come too far to have it
11 destroyed; would you come help us?"

12 Right then, the doors opened in a way that
13 I could have never imagined. I think we have to keep
14 that kind of a practical view of the world; that if we
15 are in an area where our interests are at risk, there
16 are probably going to be like people who hold the same
17 kinds of values, same kind of interests. They are in
18 the global economy. They are not some isolated feudal
19 state. They are going to have the same interests at
20 risk.

21 So I have less concern. I think often the
22 arguments about access are strictly inside the

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1 Pentagon trying to squeeze another \$10 million out of
2 one budget into another, which never happens anyway.
3 So I think we need to consider that.

4 In saying that, we also should do things -
5 - like where we have bulk logistics like munitions,
6 fuel -- we ought to put those on ships if we can,
7 instead of ashore and keep them in various places --
8 Guam and Diego Garcia or wherever -- so that they can
9 be cross-referenced into any theater, any area of the
10 world, to the extent that we can make our military
11 capabilities flexible across the board.

12 I recall when I worked for George Crist,
13 Camp Zuma in Japan had all these empty munitions
14 storage areas, and I had tons and tons of munitions,
15 because we thought we were going to fight the Russians
16 in Iran. So I suggested to George Crist that I put
17 them in Camp Zuma, since it was empty, and he blew a
18 stack. The reasons was, he says, well, if I put them
19 in PACOM's AOR, I'll never get them. I'll never have
20 access to them.

21 Well, that kind of thinking goes with, you
22 know, Custer's last charge. We have reached the point

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1 now where we can't afford a force for this theater or
2 that theater or that theater. We have to have a force
3 that can go wherever it's needed and whatever size
4 that's needed.

5 So I'm really not overly concerned about
6 host nation; because my experience is, when you need
7 it, it's there.

8 GENERAL MEIGS: Let me just give you a
9 couple of examples. If we were going to put a base
10 for the brigade I mentioned in Bulgaria, Rumania,
11 Hungary, they would love it. The only issue would be
12 the cost, and I think Speedy Martin -- I don't want to
13 speak for him -- but I watched him do the same thing,
14 looking at prospective airfields in Bulgaria and
15 Rumania, and it's basically the same.

16 The cost in fixing up an airfield to U.S.
17 standards can be -- You know, he can spend a pretty
18 penny for that. Then the host nation issues in terms
19 of legal issues, and Ambassador Hunter has fairly
20 eloquently laid that out for you.

21 I was involved in planning operations in
22 Bosnia that never went, and then the deployment to

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1 Bosnia eventually under Dayton, and then the
2 deployment to Kosovo. When you have a crisis area, it
3 is normally a place -- Oh, by the way, in Rwanda --
4 it's normally a place where you never thought you were
5 going to go.

6 I mean, if you had told me that we were
7 going to put USAREUR (U.S. Army Europe) forces into
8 GOA (Gulf of Aden) in order to get them into Rwanda, I
9 mean, I would have, you know -- what cartoon did you
10 get that out of? If you had told me we were going to
11 deploy through Albania -- into Albania in order to
12 provide a threat to the Serb army in Kosovo, you know,
13 with an airfield of a MOG (Maximum Aircraft on the
14 Ground) of one -- I mean, this is a little aside. The
15 job that was done by USAFE in Air Mobility Command is
16 absolutely astounding. But it wasn't the entrance,
17 the access issues that were a problem. It was the
18 capability issues that were a problem.

19 John Jumper, who was my counterpart at
20 that time, used to say that that airfield was like the
21 scene out of Star Wars. You know, the bar scene in
22 Star Wars. It was crazy, but, you know, they made it

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1 work. It was amazing.

2 So that's really not the issue, if you
3 have a friendly country that wants your presence or
4 things have all fallen down and you've got a total
5 mess, and you are dealing with a country that is
6 either willing to give up sovereignty or mitigate it
7 or there is no sovereignty, as in the case of Bosnia.

8 GENERAL ROBERTSON: Just a quick add. I
9 agree with everything that they said. The only
10 difference I would take with General Horner is the
11 peacetime versus wartime.

12 The King doesn't get involved in peacetime
13 operations. Bureaucrats work peacetime operations,
14 and unless someone pays attention to access agreements
15 in peacetime, it is a challenge sustaining forces in
16 peacetime through bureaucratic dip clearance,
17 dislocations and the fog of war that exists in
18 peacetime.

19 COMMISSIONER LESS: One more then, General
20 Robertson, for you. And General Meigs has mentioned
21 the lily pad strategy that -- and I've seen some
22 articles that really don't speak overly favorably of

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1 it.

2 My question to you is on Vernon Clark's
3 sea basing strategy. Will not that, with high speed
4 connectors and getting into the ship arena, expand on
5 your mobility capabilities study to the point that it
6 should provide you to accommodate more ton miles with
7 existing forces than would be without this particular
8 sea basing strategy? And your thoughts or comments on
9 the sea basing -- the Clark sea basing strategy.

10 GENERAL ROBERTSON: Sea basing, from the
11 folks that I have talked to about it and the briefings
12 that we have given, is -- It's like the blind man and
13 the elephant: In many cases, it depends on what part
14 he touches as to how he describes it.

15 So that is the -- I will leave that aside
16 as a slight negative. But for the most part, the
17 answer to your question, depending on how it is
18 ultimately postured, I think the answer is yes. It
19 will require some fragmentation of the -
20 "fragmentation" may not be the right word -- resizing
21 of what we use to fit on what you describe as high
22 speed response vessels.

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1 They don't carry a lot, but they carry
2 enough. They are not suited for bad weather, high
3 seas, anything above sea state 2 probably. They are
4 very hard on troops to go a long ways, as we have
5 seen. Troops arrive dehydrated because of the trip.
6 But the concept is attractive, and I think in some
7 parts of the world, from a theater lift perspective,
8 that it will certainly relieve some of the pressure on
9 a very overstressed strategic airlift fleet.

10 COMMISSIONER LESS: General, thoughts or
11 comments?

12 GENERAL MEIGS: No, I think General
13 Robertson pretty well laid it out.

14 COMMISSIONER LESS: Thank you. I have no
15 further questions.

16 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you. I was
17 looking through some notes yesterday from our visit to
18 EUCOM, and one was on a question during a briefing
19 that we were receiving in regard to how much input the
20 command had had in regard to the plans that were being
21 proposed in regard to global basing.

22 The briefer said, well, General Meigs

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1 started this stuff five years ago. So I take it there
2 have been a few iterations since then, and I just
3 wanted you to know that your wisdom and input is still
4 appreciated over there.

5 I appreciate your patience, and I am just
6 going to close with one question, rather than the 10
7 that I have written down here, but I will just close
8 with one.

9 That is: Do any of you have any concern
10 about the global posture that is being proposed in
11 regard to it being geared more for a global war on
12 terrorism versus the ability to respond to a
13 traditional threat? That would be my question.

14 GENERAL HORNER: I'll start. You can have
15 the last word, Tony.

16 The global war on terrorism or terrorists
17 is what we have. So we have to respond to that.
18 Korea, as was pointed out, is an issue, but it is a
19 different kind of issue with the nuclear weapons
20 appearing in the north and the economic strength of
21 the south.

22 Even the whole focus of the world is

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1 shifting to the east. It is shifting toward China
2 because of the growing economic power, and I don't
3 think there is any doubt about it. At some point in
4 time, we will see either China become a firm nation in
5 the world nation and growing in power or they could
6 take a very aberrant turn to expansionism, military
7 strength, all the rhetoric about Taiwan.

8 That's not been decided yet, but at some
9 point in time it is going to happen, and we are
10 seeing, for example, their R&D efforts, fielding
11 systems beginning about 2006 that are going to be
12 significant.

13 So that is, to me, the concern with regard
14 to massive military operations, and that is primarily
15 Taiwan being the focal point, and it is going to
16 involve things like naval submarines, B-2 bombers,
17 things of this nature, if we are going to deter
18 conflict in that region. We can't afford conflict in
19 the region. It would be an economic disaster for the
20 world.

21 Other than that, we are stuck with this
22 war that is really a civil war within Islam between

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1 the radical and moderate Islamists, and they are using
2 us to generate support for the radical cause. That is
3 going to be a very difficult battle to win, and, in
4 reality, it is going to have to be the moderate
5 Islamists that win it. They just need to get off
6 their rear and get going. And until now they have
7 been on the sidelines, but they can't afford to be on
8 the sidelines.

9 So the battles we are going to fight in
10 the world are going to be very confusing and very
11 complex, but not particularly live or die for our
12 nation. Painful perhaps, but not necessarily national
13 survival. But we always have to keep in mind there is
14 a large problem out there during the Middle East,
15 because of the uncertainty, not necessarily the
16 intent.

17 GENERAL MEIGS: I don't see a clash there.

18 And again my experience is primarily with U.S. Army
19 Europe, but we were dealing with the major
20 contingencies the nation had until Iraq. I mean,
21 Bosnia, Kosovo, crazy things going on in Africa.

22 That -- In a region -- The fact that the

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1 forces are in the bases that they occupied in 1950
2 when we reestablished NATO is not really relevant, if
3 they are strategically agile. Admittedly, having
4 below-the-line capability in Europe, we don't need (to
5 be) that close to possible crisis spots. It's stuff
6 that ought to be brought home.

7 What I worry about is, if you take too
8 much of the command and control capability, the
9 initial logistic capability needed in a campaign, and
10 too much of the combat capability out of your forward
11 based forces, that is a bigger problem. And that's
12 what worries me about the lily pad strategy.

13 If you bring too much back to the CONUS
14 base, and I am speaking particularly of ground forces,
15 and you are not going to pay the bill to give the
16 extra capability to TRANSCOM to get the forces where
17 they need to go, you are making a huge mistake, not to
18 mention the engagement issue that you are going to
19 undermine.

20 Quite frankly, I think much of the shape
21 of what we are seeing is the same as the shape of the
22 curve we saw in the previous election, not this latest

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1 one, and the rhetoric that was going around before the
2 QDR process even started the last time.

3 I don't think that will do the job of
4 doing the things we have to do in both the European
5 Command and Southwest Asia. Now I am bucking the wind
6 of two combatant commanders, but based on my
7 experience, that's the way I see it.

8 GENERAL ROBERTSON: I think I already -- I
9 have already made my position fairly clear. I think,
10 if done correctly -- and I speak not for boots on the
11 ground combat capability because I was sort of the
12 itinerant farmer that went around from one location to
13 another and never stayed in any place very long -- but
14 from a mobility perspective, the more options
15 available to the command to move forces in response to
16 whatever, humanitarian crisis, natural disaster or
17 shooting war, the better off we will be.

18 So, done correctly, maintaining the MOB
19 (Main Operating Base) infrastructure as it exists, or
20 in some form or format, and re-baselining that MOB
21 format, perhaps forward in one or two selected
22 locations, and then a lesser structure at a few other

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1 bases in some concentric ring out from that point, and
2 then, perhaps, probably, unmanned -- because mobility
3 carries with it its own opening packages, certainly
4 from an air perspective and from a sealift
5 perspective, as required, but with appropriate ramps,
6 prepositioned material, handling equipment and fuel --
7 it will certainly increase the flexibility of U.S.
8 force -- or the U.S. transportation force -- to move
9 U.S. forces wherever the country thinks they need to
10 be moved. So I think, done properly, it is a good
11 thing.

12 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you. My
13 fellow Commissioners and I thank you, all of you, for
14 your military service, and thank your family, as well,
15 and not only for the sacrifices you have made but
16 those that you continue to make. Your insight has
17 been extremely valuable, and thank you for taking this
18 time to be with us here today. We would hope that we
19 could call on you again, if we have some questions
20 that we would like your answer to. So please keep
21 that in mind.

22 I might ask Pat, 1:30 is when we

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reconvene? Okay. So this hearing is going to stand
in recess until 1:30.

(Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off
the record at 12:17 p.m.)

A F T E R N O O N S E S S I O N

Time: 1:30 p.m.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: I thank you gentlemen for appearing today. In a moment I will introduce you, but first I would like to describe the procedure for today's hearing.

Each panelist will receive up to 10 minutes for an opening statement, and at the conclusion of all opening statements each Commissioner will have up to 10 minutes to ask questions.

We will use lights as a courtesy reminder. When the yellow light appears, you have two minutes remaining. When the red appears, time has expired. However, I would ask all the panelists not to worry about the lights. Take as much time as you need to answer any questions.

On our third panel we will hear from three leading defense policy experts. From the U.S. Naval War College, Senior Strategic Researcher, Professor Thomas Barnett; from the Center for Defense Information, Senior Analyst Marcus Corbin; and from the Policy Research Center Institute -- excuse me, I

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1 put Center in there; let me rephrase that -- From the
2 Foreign Policy Research Institute, research fellow and
3 National Security Program Director Michael Noonan.

4 Gentlemen, each of you have broad
5 experience in analyzing defense issues, and we look
6 forward to your frank and professional views on
7 suggested focus areas for the Commission to
8 investigate in its review of overseas basing,
9 potential unintended consequences of returning large
10 numbers of troops to the United States, and those
11 consequences both for the U.S. and nations overseas,
12 your thoughts on issues and concerns surrounding DoD's
13 integrated global presence and basing strategy, and
14 any other issues or alternatives that you think the
15 Commission should consider.

16 So at this time, I will start with
17 Professor Barnett; if you would please begin with your
18 opening statement, if you have one, and we will move
19 across the table.

20 PROFESSOR BARNETT: Thank you. First, let
21 me thank the Commission for inviting me to testify
22 here today. Second, let me emphasize right at the

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1 start that I am not an expert *per se* on the U.S.
2 military's global basing structure.

3 I am essentially a grand strategist who
4 spends his time contemplating the long term objectives
5 of U.S. foreign policy with a particular focus on how
6 the employment of military forces around the world can
7 bring about not just increased security for our
8 country, but improve the global security environment
9 as a whole.

10 I have written extensively on this
11 subject, and I know that it is primarily on the basis
12 of my recent book, "The Pentagon's New Map," that I
13 was asked to testify today. So many of my comments
14 here will involve describing how I think this new map
15 informs future planning for U.S. overseas basing
16 realignment.

17 The concept of the new map began with a
18 simple geographic display of where America sent its
19 military forces since the end of the Cold War. In my
20 view, this distribution represents the natural demand
21 pattern for U.S. security exports since the Soviet
22 Union departed the scene.

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1 By the exporting of security, I refer to
2 the time and attention spent by the U.S. military on
3 any particular region's actual or potential for
4 incidences of armed conflict or mass violence, either
5 between states or within them.

6 By my calculation, U.S. military crisis
7 response activity over the past 15 years represents a
8 roughly fourfold increase compared to the 15 following
9 the end of the Vietnam War. I come to that conclusion
10 by adding up the combined total of the four major
11 services' cumulative days of operations in these
12 responses.

13 It was not only that America conducted
14 more operations over the last decade and a half, but
15 also that these operations grew tremendously in length
16 and complexity.

17 How did America deal with this tremendous
18 growth, especially as the Pentagon itself was engaged
19 in the long term downward glide path in terms of
20 personnel and resources? We essentially mounted five
21 major responses.

22 One, we denied the existence of this rise

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1 in demand by adhering as strictly as possible to the
2 tenets of the Powell doctrine which said, in effect,
3 pull out of any situation as quickly as feasible.

4 Two, we denigrated the importance and
5 utility of the bulk of these responses, dubbing them
6 military operations other than war, thereby justifying
7 the Pentagon's well-demonstrated tendency to
8 underfund, underprioritize, and underman the skill
9 sets associated with post-conflict stabilization
10 operations.

11 Three, we tried to technologize the
12 problem away, but unfortunately, we spent the vast
13 bulk of our money on the war fighting side of the
14 house, effectively providing to America what it has
15 today, a first-half team that plays in the league but
16 insists on keeping score until the end of the game.

17 Four, we outsourced as many noncombat
18 functions as possible, pushing them on to both allied
19 militaries and private contractors.

20 Fifth, we ran significant portions of the
21 Reserve Component ragged by turning them into *de facto*
22 Active Duty.

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1 In my opinion, the Defense Department has
2 effectively run out the string on all of these
3 responses. The Powell doctrine has been overtaken by
4 the events of this global war on terrorism. Military
5 operations other than war can no longer be counted
6 upon to remain in the category of lesser included
7 unless drive-by regime change is considered enough to
8 constitute mission accomplished.

9 The occupation of Iraq will invariably
10 transform transformation, shifting its focus from the
11 first half of war fighting portion of the force to the
12 second half or peacekeeping and nation building
13 portions of the force.

14 This global war has clearly strained the
15 ability of our traditional allies to mount sustained
16 operations in support of U.S.-led interventions, and
17 there is already credible discussion of the
18 possibility of reinstituting a draft in order to meet
19 the pressing needs of rotating our ground forces into
20 and out of the current theaters of operation.

21 In short, we have picked all the low
22 hanging fruit in our increasingly desperate responses

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1 to this burgeoning demand curve, to include our
2 relatively understated draw-down of military
3 installations across the United States in the 1990s.

4 If America is going to pursue a global war
5 on terrorism that many experts have logically argued
6 will extend not just for years but decades, then we
7 must be willing to dramatically reshape both the
8 structure of our forces, rebalancing them extensively,
9 and the direction of military operations other than
10 war and their positioning around the planet, the
11 subject of this Commission.

12 I believe these two changes are highly
13 interrelated, and here I present what I think are the
14 clarifying strategic concepts embedded within this new
15 map for the Pentagon.

16 Included in my submitted testimony is a
17 graphic of a global map whose shaded portions
18 encompass what I have dubbed globalization's "non-
19 integrating Gap" or those regions that are both least
20 connected to the global economy in a broadband fashion
21 and have accounted for approximately 95 percent of the
22 crisis responses by the U.S. military since the end of

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1 the Cold War.

2 That swath of territory includes the
3 Caribbean Rim, the Andes portion of South America,
4 virtually all of Africa, the Balkans, the Caucasus,
5 Central Asia, the Middle East, and much of Southeast
6 Asia.

7 Within this non-integrating Gap I can
8 locate basically all the wars, all the civil wars, all
9 the ethnic cleansing, all the genocide, all the
10 incidences of mass rape as a tool of terror, all the
11 situations where children are lured or forced into
12 combat units, all the active U.N. peacekeeping
13 missions, and the centers of gravity for all the
14 transnational terrorist networks we are targeting in
15 this global war on terrorism.

16 This non-integrating Gap marks both the
17 effective limits of the spread of globalization in
18 terms of deep social, political and economic
19 connectivity, as well as the spread of stable
20 governance that defines the lack of mass violence and
21 armed conflict throughout what I call the "functioning
22 Core" of globalization or those countries and regions

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1 not shaded on this map that have enjoyed both
2 collective peace and the rapid integration of their
3 national economies since the end of the Cold War.

4 This group includes North America, Europe,
5 Russia, China, Japan, India, industrialized Asia,
6 South Africa, and in South America, Argentina, Brazil,
7 Chile.

8 It should come as no surprise to this
9 Commission that the U.S. military has closed over 150
10 major bases across the Core since the end of the Cold
11 War, while adding more than two dozen and counting
12 inside the Gap.

13 The U.S. military is the world's largest
14 security consulting force and, like any consultancy,
15 it needs to be as close to the client as possible.
16 Since the end of the Cold War, our clients are found
17 almost exclusively inside the Gap and, hence, our
18 Defense Department has slowly but surely adjusted to
19 that defining strategic reality of our age.

20 Now the current and future administration
21 proposes a further and far more dramatic overhauling
22 of that global basing structure. If you check the

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1 contours of my non-integrating Gap, you will see that
2 this plan greatly conforms to the strategic security
3 environment depicted here.

4 In effect, all this administration is
5 proposing is to move as many fixed bases as possible
6 closer in toward the Gap, while experimenting with a
7 host of smaller temporary style installations, the so
8 called lily pads, sprinkled throughout the deeper
9 interior reaches of this Gap, most specifically in
10 sub-Saharan Africa.

11 As a whole, I heartily approve of all of
12 these moves to relocate the U.S. military's fixed
13 presence and operational centers of gravity away from
14 the past successes of the Cold War and nearer to the
15 future challenges of this global war on terrorism,
16 because I see this geographic rebalancing of the force
17 to be a prime prerequisite for my declared strategy of
18 shrinking the Gap by exporting security to the worst
19 pockets of instability and rogue regime activity found
20 therein.

21 Without such a long term commitment on our
22 part, I would find it impossible to contemplate how

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1 many of these disconnected countries and regions would
2 someday enjoy sufficient stability to count themselves
3 members of a deeply integrating and secured global
4 economy, and in my mind that is what America's grand
5 strategy for this century should be all about, making
6 globalization truly global and ending the
7 disconnectedness that defines the world's chronic
8 sources of mass violence and armed conflicts which, in
9 turn, breed transnational terrorists.

10 If there is to be a finish line in this
11 global war on terrorism, our progress toward it will
12 be marked by a succession of basing realignments in
13 the decades ahead.

14 That last statement constitutes the first
15 of my caveats regarding this administration's current
16 plans for realigning base structure globally, because
17 I do not believe this historic round of proposed
18 realignments will be our last.

19 I caution national security planners to
20 think as flexibly as possible about the nature of the
21 new, seemingly long term relationships we are
22 currently building as we move bases from western

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1 Europe to eastern Europe, from east Asia to west Asia.

2 Let me explain why I think such
3 flexibility in planning is in order, and by doing so,
4 describe what I believe is truly flawed about the U.S.
5 military's current unified command plan.
6 Specifically, let me describe what I think are the
7 three key boundary conditions that limit Central
8 Command's ability to conduct its share of the
9 operations in this global war on terrorism.

10 First, CENTCOM's tactical scene lies to
11 its south; meaning that, as the U.S. and its coalition
12 partners are successful in driving transnational
13 terrorism out of the Middle East, that fight -- fueled
14 as it is by a fundamentalist Islamic response to the
15 (quote/unquote) "West-toxification" imposed upon
16 traditional societies by globalization's creeping
17 embrace -- that fight will head out of the Persian
18 Gulf and into sub-Saharan Africa where we already see
19 the beginnings of such violent conflicts being
20 repeated.

21 So whatever realignments we pursue in the
22 coming years must take into account the possibility of

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1 that success in order to take advantage of its
2 unfolding. In my mind, that means that, when we
3 construct bases, both around and inside the region of
4 the Persian Gulf, we should view those facilities less
5 as a permanent feature of the strategic landscape and
6 more as the first step in what will be a long term
7 progression of military fronts deeper inside the Gap.

8 What complicates this likely scenario
9 pathway is, of course, the reality that CENTCOM's area
10 of responsibility does not encompass sub-Saharan
11 Africa, at least at this time.

12 Second, CENTCOM's operational scene lies
13 to its north; meaning that a key indicator of our
14 success in going on the offensive in this global war
15 on terrorism is seen in the return of today of the
16 same pattern of operational reach for Middle Eastern
17 terror networks that we once witnessed in the 1970s
18 and early 1980s.

19 Namely, they can strike at will across the
20 Middle East and extend themselves with significant
21 effort into the southern reaches of the European
22 continent, expanding now to include the near-abroad of

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1 the former Soviet Union, to Russia's significant
2 distress.

3 As in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, it
4 can be said that CENTCOM simply does not talk nearly
5 enough with those affected countries lying outside its
6 area of responsibility. But, of course, many of these
7 same countries are the ones the U.S. is counting upon
8 to supply it the close-in bases of the future.

9 Over time, CENTCOM's area of
10 responsibility will become the near-abroad of
11 virtually all of what I call the functioning Core of
12 globalization. So this war will be far less distant
13 than we might imagine, even as we continue to be
14 successful in our efforts to keep it far from our own
15 shores.

16 Thus, in our efforts to move bases closer
17 in to the action of the Middle East, we need to be
18 careful to avoid the impression that we are luring
19 unsuspecting new partners into the fray, in effect
20 causing them to draw fire.

21 Finally, CENTCOM's strategic scene clearly
22 lies to its east. Already, Asia as a whole takes the

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1 lion's share of the energy coming out of the Persian
2 Gulf, dwarfing what this country imports from the
3 region.

4 Our energy requirements will rise by less
5 than a third over the next two decades, whereas Asia's
6 will roughly double over the same time frame. In
7 short, we can expect India, China, a united Korea, and
8 Japan to all come militarily to the Middle East in a
9 much bigger way than their minuscule efforts today.

10 They will come either to join the growing
11 security alliances our current efforts in the region
12 will, hopefully, someday beget or they will come to
13 salvage what security relationships they can out of
14 the strategic disaster we have generated by our
15 mistakes. Either way, these Asian powers will be
16 coming, because their economic interests will
17 eventually compel it.

18 My point is this: Nothing we should do in
19 this realignment process should be construed by any of
20 these states as constituting a zero sum strategy on
21 our part to deny them military, much less economic,
22 access to the region.

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1 If anything, our base realignment process
2 should not only encourage stronger military ties with
3 all these states, but do so in such a way as to
4 facilitate their eventual entry into the region under
5 the conditions most conducive to our long range
6 objectives of transforming states there into stable
7 members of a larger security community that will be,
8 by definition of both geography and economic
9 transactions, more Asian in character than western.

10 Let me end with two final caveats, one
11 general and one specific. In my book, I argue for a
12 back to the future outcome in U.S. force structure
13 planning, one that admits that we already have a
14 transformed war fighting force without peer, or what I
15 call a Leviathan force, but also seize the need to
16 invest in and transform what I call the everything
17 else force or a major portion of the U.S. military
18 that is optimized progressively to conduct
19 peacekeeping, low level crisis response, humanitarian
20 and disaster relief, nation building and other post-
21 conflict stabilization operations.

22 I dub this latter force the System

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1 Administrator force. Shorthanding these two forces in
2 terms of service components, I would describe the
3 Leviathan force as coming primarily from the Air Force
4 and Navy, our fundamental hedges against the
5 resurrected possibility of a great power war, and the
6 Sys Admin force coming primarily from the Army and
7 Marines.

8 My caveat regarding this natural
9 bifurcation of the U.S. military is this: the bases
10 we position around the Gap but still inside the Core
11 should be optimized for the projection of war fighting
12 power. In effect, they should serve the needs of the
13 Leviathan force.

14 Conversely, the bases we generate within
15 the Gap should be optimized for the long term presence
16 of largely ground troops whose main activity will be
17 centered around peacekeeping and nation building.
18 This is an important point, in my mind, because it is
19 counterintuitive to most analysts, who would prefer to
20 see our bases circling the Gap, serve as permanent
21 forward deployments of massed combat force; whereas,
22 any bases we generate inside the Gap would remain

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1 largely empty storefronts or Spartan style facilities
2 designed merely to enable the throughput of
3 overwhelming force that would be employed only
4 sporadically and always leave the scene as quickly as
5 possible.

6 In effect, I am arguing for the complete
7 opposite. I think our forward bases surrounding the
8 Gap should be the empty shell's design for the rapid
9 throughput of war fighting assets; whereas, the bases
10 we build inside the Gap should get give off the
11 impression that we are in it for the long haul.

12 In my vernacular, the Leviathan force
13 comes and goes as required, but the Sys Admin force
14 represents those boys who will never come home. If we
15 are serious in committing ourselves to the long term
16 defeat of transnational terrorism, these are the
17 strategic signals we should send in our global basing
18 realignment process.

19 Finally, a more specific caveat: Any
20 efforts to move our forces closer in toward the Gap
21 will necessarily remain geographically uneven so long
22 as the two great insecurities grip east Asia --

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1 namely, the continued existence of the Kim Jung Il
2 regime in North Korea and the potential for conflict
3 between the United States and China over Taiwan's
4 potential moves toward independence from the mainland.

5 There is a huge Cold War victory to be
6 advantaged in Europe, basically represented by the
7 existence of NATO. No similar peace dividend exists
8 in Asia; meaning that the Achilles heel of any
9 realignment plan, and especially this one, is, in my
10 mind, that at least far too much strategic decision
11 making power in the hands of actors in both Pyongyang
12 and Taipei, neither of which should be trusted to act
13 rationally regarding their own interests, much less
14 ours.

15 I'll end my comments on that note, leaving
16 any others for the Q and A.

17 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, sir.
18 Mr. Corbin.

19 MR. CORBIN: Thanks. Thanks for having me
20 here. It is a pleasure. I believe you are playing a
21 vital role in assisting in the military's
22 transformation. That's where I come at this from. I

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1 have looked at these issues from the perspective of
2 broader national security strategy, military strategy,
3 and force structure.

4 I think that your process, to the extent
5 possible, should be part of the broad national
6 security strategy assessment as well as what has been
7 mentioned before, looking at it at the same time as
8 domestic base closures. In other words, I think these
9 issues are so broad that it is difficult to look at
10 some of them just from the perspective of the narrower
11 perspective of bases and base structure.

12 So I will step back a little bit and
13 provide just some concepts and how those might be
14 applied in looking at bases. A lot of my perspective
15 does deliberately not look at cost issues, and that is
16 a luxury I have, you don't have, because those are so
17 present in this morning's talk. We heard a lot about
18 costs for this and costs for that, and you can't get
19 away from it. But what I will try to do is just
20 provide a couple of strategic, maybe, touchstones that
21 can allow you to serve as a lens through which to look
22 at some of the more detailed issues, including cost

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1 issues.

2 I often try to look at things from the
3 perspective of a couple of great military strategists:
4 the ancient Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu and the much
5 more recent Air Force Colonel John Boyd who echoed and
6 built a lot on the themes from several thousand years
7 ago.

8 It might seem a little divorced from the
9 nuts and bolts of military bases, but I think it is,
10 in general, made most relevant just because our
11 enemies are using these strategies and approaches.
12 September 11 was perhaps the greatest example of it;
13 today in Iraq and probably increasingly so in the
14 future.

15 If I can describe the -- One of the basic
16 thrusts of their thinking, in a nutshell -- which, of
17 course, does a disservice to it -- I would say the
18 approach is to out-think and out-maneuver your enemy
19 so quickly and so disorientingly that they are subject
20 to an environment of chaos, and they become paralyzed.

21 The ultimate ideal, which is exceedingly
22 difficult to achieve in practice, of course, is to win

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1 without fighting. And the buzzword that sums up a lot
2 of these elements and ties them together -- something
3 we have heard this morning -- which is agility. That
4 is what a lot of it comes down to, and you can see how
5 that is relevant to some basing issues.

6 This is in contrast to a lot of the
7 thinking of another great military thinker, Karl von
8 Clausewitz, who is quite popular in military circles,
9 and he was focused more on sort of climactic battles
10 and getting all of your groups in one place at one
11 time to decisively defeat the enemy. But I think
12 Twenty-first Century warfare is going to be quite
13 different.

14 Another important element that
15 particularly John Boyd talked about a lot is really
16 the fight for allies. This is to win allies to one's
17 own side -- allies in the broader sense of people
18 willing to sympathize and support you in various ways,
19 and, in parallel, to subtract allies from the enemy's
20 side.

21 This came out a lot, of course, in the
22 probably exaggerated differences between the

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1 candidates -- the Presidential candidates -- on
2 unilateralism versus multilateralism, but I think it
3 does become an important issue. If you just look at
4 Iraq, NATO has 1.5 million troops in its ground
5 forces, active duty alone. That's just an enormous
6 pool. That might have been very useful in an Iraq
7 situation.

8 Now everybody immediately points out,
9 well, very few of those are able to actually go
10 anywhere and do anything, but I would suggest that
11 that is a matter that should be addressed and changed,
12 because otherwise having 1.5 million people in uniform
13 and not doing anything with them is a real waste of
14 everybody's time.

15 Another element of allies in the Iraq
16 scenario that might have made a big difference --
17 imagine if we had many Muslim troops on the ground in
18 the first days after the fall of Baghdad. That would
19 have had not so much a military effect, but political
20 impact.

21 So those are just a couple of things that
22 illustrate the importance, to me, in looking at

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1 broader national security strategy about getting
2 things lined up right.

3 What are a couple of general preferences
4 that those two concepts -- and they are just two;
5 there are many more one could go into -- for basing?
6 Well, these elements favor certain forces and, of
7 course, these are not absolutes, and I don't mean to
8 suggest that you can drop every other force or do
9 everything to an extreme. But they do provide some
10 directions that, if you buy the general strategic
11 concepts, tell you where to go.

12 Agility is favored by fast, small,
13 dispersed and decentralized forces in general. One
14 immediate caveat, of course, is that peacekeeping can
15 often require very large numbers of troops, not
16 necessarily heavy armored troops -- sometimes, yes,
17 but not necessarily -- but still large numbers.

18 Those forces are in general favored by
19 bases that are flexible and adaptable and expandable
20 and, as a general principle, having many nodes, small
21 nodes rather than just a few large ones. They give
22 you options. They ease your ability to deal with the

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1 unplanned and the unforeseen.

2 Also -- and this almost gets to the
3 philosophical basis -- large bases are, to some
4 extent, sort of defensive, and by definition sort of
5 slow, cumbersome, less easy to readjust and, of
6 course, to the extent they are fixed and large, are
7 more tempting terrorist targets.

8 This almost philosophical element extends
9 to the degree that -- We have heard a lot about how
10 difficult it is to do things from greater distances or
11 with less facilities in place forward, and while I
12 fully recognize these problems, there is a fringe
13 benefit that this is -- If you develop the skills to
14 handle that better, because you have to, because
15 that's what your structure is, you are better
16 preparing your entire institutions and organizations
17 to deal with that kind of flexible, agile warfare that
18 we are likely to see more.

19 Again, these are mindsets and not iron
20 laws, and the assumption behind it all is that there
21 will be an increase in unconventional war.

22 The relevance of the fight for allies to

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1 bases is both local and global, and I think you
2 probably heard a lot about the local issues. But I
3 would want to emphasize the global dimension.

4 Any base plan and proposals must make sure
5 that the base presence in various countries around the
6 world does not excessively irritate relations with the
7 United States.

8 On the global basis, I think now the
9 United States is suffering a crisis of leadership in
10 the world, and I don't think we really know the full
11 extent of this yet. But I am concerned. I think,
12 certainly, citizenries around the world are really
13 questioning the United States' motives and what they
14 plan to do.

15 I think this is because of an awful lot of
16 misinformation and rumor mongering and a general
17 attitude that the United States is a lot more powerful
18 than it is, in fact. But regardless of the merits of
19 the claims and the views, I think it is something that
20 really needs to be addressed.

21 To the extent that bases affect that, I
22 think that is an issue that should be taken into

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1 consideration as much as, you know, how much it costs
2 to fly them from here to there and so on.

3 In the Middle East, our bases, obviously,
4 have played a contributing role in generating some of
5 this antipathy to us that the radicals, *al Qaeda* and
6 others, exploit to try to turn their part of the world
7 against us.

8 There can also be problems from
9 withdrawing from bases, and I'm sure you have heard
10 commentators suggesting that, if we pull out of
11 Europe, for example, in some degree, or South Korea or
12 somewhere, that our relations can be damaged
13 politically.

14 I think that is not too much of a problem.

15 I think the key underlying issue is really whether
16 the United States is abandoning these countries, and I
17 tend to think that, if they are reassured that we are
18 not abandoning them, that this is being done for
19 certain specific reasons, that most of their concerns
20 can become sort of secondary issues like the economic
21 effects and joint training opportunity issues and so
22 on.

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1 What do just those two basic strategic
2 touchstones suggest for specific cases? Well, in
3 Europe, agility suggests taking out the heavy
4 brigades. If they are not going to be used in Europe,
5 then a central location is probably more
6 advantageous, recognizing, of course, that they can
7 still go from Europe to elsewhere, and that is
8 presumably their main role now.

9 Now this isn't necessarily to take out the
10 equipment. I mean, I think a lot of the
11 transportation issues that were discussed this morning
12 were in light of taking out all the equipment, too.
13 If you are going to do a training exercise and you are
14 just flying in the people, not the equipment, then you
15 don't have some of the greater transportation
16 difficulties and costs that were mentioned before.

17 Agility would suggest absolutely keeping
18 the transportation facilities in Germany, elsewhere in
19 Europe, the headquarters to maintain these joint
20 relations with foreign officers.

21 In the Pacific, the greater distances do
22 lead to less suggestion of pulling forces back, but

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1 there are bigger political problems there with the
2 presence of U.S. forces that might suggest spreading
3 out, diversifying a bit, to the extent possible, to
4 new countries, new locations.

5 These concepts suggest a network of access
6 as much as a network of fixed, large bases, and I
7 think you have probably heard a lot about that
8 already. The Afghanistan deployment was surprisingly
9 successful for something that hadn't been worked out
10 ahead of time. So imagine what would be possible if a
11 network of accesses is actually established ahead of
12 time.

13 Rotating troops in for exercises is also
14 an important concept to again keep the training and
15 personal relationships alive, and you don't suffer any
16 of the drawbacks of political permanent large basing.

17 Prepositioning: I think everybody loves
18 that. The only problem is cost, of course. And
19 airlift and sealift: I would support increases in
20 those -- substantial -- because it broadens your
21 options so much.

22 This gets back to the issues of, "Well,

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1 where are all the resources going to come from?"
2 Looking at things from a broader perspective than just
3 bases, I'll close with just saying that I hope, to the
4 extent possible, you can address that at least
5 notionally by suggesting that maybe there are some
6 other areas in the military force that can be cut.
7 You know, everybody has their own list, but I would
8 just lead off with some of the more expensive legacy
9 weapon platforms that are going to cost tens and
10 hundreds of billions over the next years.

11 In answer to the question, "Well, where
12 are you going to get all the money from?", I would
13 just suggest that we do need to take a broad view, and
14 I would prioritize addressing basing and
15 transportation issues as a very important priority
16 that should be, in fact, raised higher, so that
17 resources can be transferred to address some of these
18 issues.

19 Thanks very much for hearing me out, and I
20 look forward to questions.

21 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you. Mr.
22 Noonan.

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1 MR. NOONAN: Thank you very much to all
2 the Commissioners for having me here today, and also
3 for the service that you are doing, and I also hope
4 that as the new Quadrennial Defense Review stands up
5 that you will have a chance to brief that effort about
6 this very important topic and subject matter.

7 I have a very tough act to follow here.
8 Obviously, two very good presentations, but I'll try
9 to hopefully add something substantive to today's
10 discussion.

11 As we all know, President Bush announced -
12 - basically outlined his plans for the global posture
13 review at the Veterans of Foreign War convention on
14 the 16th of August in Cincinnati, and basically called
15 for the movement of 60-70,000 troops and about 100,000
16 civilians and dependents from Europe and also from
17 East Asia.

18 I think this was absolutely the right
19 thing to do, and perhaps probably took a little bit
20 too long in the coming. I think the shift is very
21 important for cultural across a force as well as for
22 geostrategic reasons, for American national security

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1 and also international security writ large.

2 Culturally, this needed to happen to get
3 out of the Cold War mindset, and it is kind of sad
4 that in 2004 we still have to preface sentences by
5 saying post-Cold War. I know it wasn't very long ago,
6 but the world has changed quite a bit and, as
7 Professor Barnett talked, he sees it as sort of a
8 disconnected part of the world and a connected part of
9 the world.

10 I think there is also some -- Below that,
11 there is also some cultural things that kind of cut it
12 up a little bit more finely than that, as well. I
13 like to think that there are kind of a -- In sort of
14 geostrategic terms, there is kind of one large arc of
15 instability going from Morocco to Indonesia and from
16 Kazakhstan down to Kenya, and basically there is a
17 cultural area, and Islam is a large part of it, that
18 is not to say that this is sort of a Huntingtonian
19 clash of civilizations, but at the same time if *al*
20 *Qaeda* is a global insurgency, then obviously they are
21 going to find most willing allies in that fight
22 amongst the sea of the people in this region.

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1 There is also sort of the East Asian
2 littoral region which is kind of its own distinct
3 area, sub-Saharan Africa below the Sahel, and then the
4 Andean ridge and Caribbean Basin -- aside from sort of
5 what I call sort of an arc periphery area from Spain
6 up across to Russia, minus sort of the Maritime
7 Provinces.

8 To sort of -- The empirics for this: IISS
9 (International Institute for Strategic Studies) said
10 about -- there are about 57 ongoing conflicts in the
11 world. Only four of these are armed international
12 conflicts. So, obviously, there is not -- The current
13 security environment is not really sort of a pure
14 competitor environment. It is more sort of low level
15 threats that the previous panelist discussed.

16 So the infrastructure that is in Germany
17 and South Korea, for instance -- where they are
18 talking about moving perhaps as many as three
19 brigades, three heavy brigades out of Germany, perhaps
20 a brigade out of South Korea -- there is a large
21 infrastructure there.

22 *Military Times* in the latest issue just

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1 had a supplement about military installations
2 worldwide, and I can leave this with the Commission.
3 But in Germany there are 30 installations of various
4 different sizes. In South Korea there are 40
5 different installations of various sizes, and this is
6 just -- It just seems to me that this is too much
7 infrastructure based upon sort of missions.

8 You are always going to have a presence in
9 both of those locations, but it obviously needs to be
10 much different, particularly in the case of South
11 Korea where they recently shifted one of their
12 brigades to Iraq.

13 One of the second and third order
14 consequences of shifting forces like that is that the
15 2d Infantry Division's two brigades in Korea are
16 individual replacement system brigades that are
17 unaccompanied tours.

18 So if you deploy a brigade from the
19 Peninsula, that means their family members could be
20 spread out from Bangor, Maine to San Diego,
21 California. It is not coalesced to a single location
22 in the Continental United States or outside the

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1 Continental United States where a family support
2 network, *et cetera*, can be set up.

3 But also, as the previous panel discussed,
4 just for geostrategic reasons, it makes a lot more
5 sense to move toward the areas closer to where the
6 most likely future operations are, not only of a
7 military variety but also presence, operations,
8 humanitarian assistance, foreign internal defense,
9 training missions, *et cetera*.

10 Across a force, culturally, there needs to
11 be sort of ingrained expeditionary ethos, which I
12 think the Chief of Staff of the Army, General
13 Schoomaker, has moved to make the Army a lot more
14 modular with the units of action and units of
15 execution, and really ingraining sort of an
16 expeditionary ethos that, not only for war fighting's
17 sake but also to take care of some of the things like
18 General Krulak, former Marine Corps Commandant, said
19 about the three-block war and being prepared to be
20 engaged in high intensity conflict on one block, sort
21 of constabulary duties on the next block, and then
22 also to be able to hand out Band-Aids and rations on

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1 the next block.

2 Our forces really need to sort of get into
3 the mental mindset that, when the shooting fires, the
4 war is not over; and, obviously, Iraq is proving that
5 today, that across a force -- I don't think there is
6 going to be simply enough money in the defense budget
7 to split up the force into various constabulary
8 portions vice war fighting.

9 I think that, even across a force, I think
10 many of the forces will have to be much more SOF
11 (Special Operations Force)-like in the sense that they
12 are much more comfortable dealing with indigenous
13 forces, with coalition forces. They just won't have
14 to be able to do a lot of the high-end skill set
15 missions that our special operations forces can bring
16 to the table.

17 Looking at sort of the global posture in
18 our basing structure, I wrote an e-note back in August
19 after the President's speech. Basically, the way I
20 split it up was that I sort of conceive of a three-
21 tiered system of basing.

22 On the one hand, you have -- This is --

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1 Pardon the Naval metaphor here. But you have sort of
2 boathouses on one level which are sort of the large,
3 heavy infrastructure locations, places like Camp
4 Lejeune or Ft. Bragg or Ft. Campbell or Camp
5 Pendleton, which have either port or air facilities
6 close by, that are able to shift forces from the
7 Continental United States out overseas.

8 An intermediary step you have is what I
9 call docks, which are places like Guam and Diego
10 Garcia where you have an infrastructure in place that
11 is able to support forces overseas, and you can store
12 things like prepositioned stocks, like the maritime
13 prepositioning ships that were in Diego Garcia and
14 that are at Guam.

15 Then you have the lily pads, places like
16 Djibouti and Uzbekistan and in the Pan Sahel
17 Initiative we had Special Forces. Then we have
18 Marines working with governments of Niger and
19 Mauritania and Chad, working with their forces in
20 order to -- on foreign and internal defense missions
21 to take care of some of the *al Qaeda* sympathizer
22 groups that are operating in North Africa.

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1 Sort of getting back to the cultural
2 issues here -- it just makes a lot more sense. If
3 doctrine is moving toward more distributed operations,
4 it makes a lot more sense to move to sort of these
5 more austere lily pad locations.

6 I would agree with Professor Barnett that
7 they can't be sort of just throughput locations, but
8 at the same time I think it sends a wrong message if
9 you start setting up permanent large facilities,
10 particularly with all the discussion of empire and
11 imperium today.

12 It reminds me of a joke from the Nineties
13 in the Balkans when somebody would say, you know,
14 there's only two man-made items visible by the human
15 eye from the moon. One is the Great Wall of China;
16 the other is Camp Bonsteel.

17 So you want to avoid, I think, building
18 sort of large permanent structures that sort of send a
19 message that the United States is there and we are not
20 going anywhere.

21 Now at the same time, when you have these
22 more austere locations, obviously, you want to do

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1 things like civic works and other things that spread
2 goodwill and our values, but also help out the local
3 populous and sort of build sort of noncombat
4 multiplier, diplomatic effect.

5 For instance, with our task force working
6 out of Djibouti, they have been doing a lot of civil
7 affairs projects in places like off Eritrea and Kenya
8 and places like that, which is building goodwill and
9 which is allowing people to sort of be more friendly
10 and give more advice about smuggling and other
11 movements of people and equipment, particularly from
12 places like Yemen, *et cetera*.

13 Also you want more dispersement of
14 autonomous places, because large locations -- and I'll
15 get back to this in my concluding remarks, too. If
16 you produce sort of large targets, then that just
17 opens you up to more sort of spectacular attacks. So
18 it just becomes a larger target.

19 To get back to our alliances and our
20 coalition partners, perhaps it is time to -- A lot of
21 discussion has come out about how this will affect
22 Germany, *et cetera*, if we pull out a lot of our

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1 forces. Well, one way or one idea may be -- to help
2 this process along -- is maybe bring back Reforger or
3 bring back Team Spirit and do sort of coalition
4 operations that are valuable coalition operations that
5 also exercise our capabilities, exercise the
6 capabilities of our allies, but also sort of bring --
7 sort of foster goodwill and foster our ability to work
8 overseas.

9 I think one of the benefits -- one of the
10 other benefits of these smaller locations is that it
11 gives you more initiative as well. You don't have
12 incidents like the 1987 bombing of Libya where you are
13 denied airspace. If you have more bases -- more
14 austere bases -- that you don't have a lot of fixed
15 costs sunk into, then you are much more agile
16 strategically to move around the map and use space as
17 is necessary.

18 To wrap up and to conclude, some caveats
19 here, caveats and opportunities. I don't want to
20 bring up a bad word -- a four-letter word -- but I'll
21 use an acronym here, BRAC (Base Realignment and
22 Closure). I think this is going to be -- obviously,

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1 probably, touches on, tangentially, at least -- some
2 of this Commission's work.

3 I think one of the warning signs, though,
4 is if we do reduce this overseas infrastructure, we
5 should be very careful about consolidating too much
6 inside the Continental United States, consolidating
7 too many units at too many posts, because I think that
8 there is a good geostrategic rationale for having more
9 dispersed bases, obviously more joint in nature; but
10 you also don't want to present large targets for
11 either chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear
12 attacks inside the United States and creating huge
13 installations here and centralizing too much of the
14 training resources, I think, could be a downside of
15 getting rid of some of the overseas base
16 infrastructure.

17 Now, that being said, I think there are
18 some very positive retention issues for families, for
19 careers of dependents in the military, of having more
20 forces in the United States or other locations and
21 then deploying them out to the docks and lily pad
22 locations.

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1 Finally, it's just a matter of training as
2 you fight. If we move toward a more expeditionary
3 ethos, it just makes more sense that -- if you are
4 going to use these more dispersed locations -- that,
5 in itself, is a training opportunity for our forces as
6 they move forward to other locations, exercises the
7 same skill sets they will need for a large scale
8 contingency, no matter what type of operations they
9 are undertaking.

10 With that, I'll wrap it up. Thank you.

11 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you, and we
12 look forward to the next period where we will ask you
13 some questions, and I would ask Commissioner Thomson
14 to begin.

15 COMMISSIONER THOMSON: Thanks, Chairman.
16 I apologize to the panel. I am going to have to leave
17 in about 40 minutes. So if I walk out in the middle
18 of one of your answers, it is not a statement of any
19 sort.

20 You have all spoken about going to the
21 small locations and increasing numbers of places while
22 we reduce the main infrastructure that we have in

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1 Europe and northeast Asia. But when we go to --
2 Whenever we think -- We haven't really opened all that
3 many bases in the last 60 years, or locations.

4 When you think about it, though, there is
5 a *quid pro quo*. It's their sovereign territory. They
6 have to -- They, whichever specific nation we are
7 talking about, have to give something up. So they
8 demand something in return.

9 Historically, what we have given in return
10 has been security. We've provided a security
11 guarantee, and that's a big step to provide security
12 guarantee. Usually, people want these -- They don't
13 like hedges on the guarantee. So they want an
14 unlimited security guarantee.

15 Now, clearly, these can be modified.
16 These are case specific. But I wonder, in your
17 thinking about this, how you think about that whole
18 nest of issues that flows from guaranteeing somebody
19 else's security, especially if it is somebody with
20 whom we have not previously been involved.

21 PROF. BARNETT: I guess I don't see the
22 problem with that. I see that as a plus when we go

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1 into any country. I think, because we no longer face
2 any sort of superpower rivalry in underdeveloped parts
3 of the world, there is not much risk at all of
4 escalation; and because state-on-state war has
5 effectively disappeared from across the system over
6 the last 10 to 15 years, when we go into a situation
7 in these underdeveloped regions, we are not typically
8 going to involve ourselves with a country that faces a
9 significant threat from a neighbor.

10 Typically, what we are going to end up, I
11 would argue, guaranteeing is internal stability. So I
12 would see the utility of our access there largely
13 being fairly specific to the country itself. That is
14 what I mean by don't put up empty storefronts that
15 say, all we're interested in your country for is the
16 ability to go somewhere else and do some mischief.

17 Instead, it should be a clear commitment
18 that we value this country, that we value its future,
19 and I don't think the presence we need to put in there
20 requires us to create large bases. I think, in many
21 instances, what we want to do is, as much as possible,
22 work side by side with the existing military forces.

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1 When we have success in terms of training
2 and in terms of subsequent operations by forces that
3 we have trained, it has typically come about when we
4 are highly integrated -- meaning we live, sleep, and
5 eat with these guys. That's when it works.

6 So I guess I don't see the problem you are
7 raising there in grand terms. I don't see -- As it
8 was noted by others, the regions that we are concerned
9 about, roughly 100 countries at any one time. There's
10 about three dozen experienced in some level of mass
11 violence. Typically, we are involved in seven or
12 eight at any one time.

13 So I think the ability for us to migrate
14 from incident to incident has been fairly well
15 demonstrated over the post-Cold War era. We haven't
16 typically gotten too bogged down, although, of course,
17 with the great commitment we have made in Iraq and the
18 rather spiteful attitude we took toward our allies
19 with regard to their participation in the war versus
20 their participation in the peacekeeping, clearly,
21 there you see the risk of a long term investment that
22 may go awry yet. That's what I'd say.

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1 MR. CORBIN: I think I would think it was
2 a slightly different model that can be pursued. I
3 mean, in the Cold War we sort of made a huge
4 commitment to defend the host country and established
5 formal bases and had lots of status of forces
6 agreements, and it was really a big production.

7 I'm not sure that we necessarily have to
8 keep doing that. Obviously, the legal issues are very
9 important, and you want to try to get as much clarity
10 on that as possible, but if it is less a formal base
11 with large numbers of permanent personnel and it is
12 more a model of rotating in for exercises,
13 establishing facilities that are really not under the
14 United States' sway or really are host nation
15 facilities and the focus of the agreement is on how we
16 can use them, and just using them in peacetime.

17 So if you do that, I think you get away
18 from some of the how much we have to give them. I
19 think that a lot of the countries we have in mind, I
20 think, would be pretty happy to get even this modest
21 type of U.S. participation, attention.

22 I think that, in the absence of any kind

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1 of *quid pro quo* or security guarantees, that building
2 them a brand new airport or something goes a long way
3 to improving our access. In terms of subsidies, you
4 know, again it's a cost issue, but we can help them
5 out in various ways.

6 I think we can, to some degree, buy our
7 way in without insulting them. You know, as long as
8 the basis of the relationship is clear, I don't see
9 huge negative consequences from having a less "you and
10 we are in step, democratic nations and wedded to each
11 other" but more a practical relationship can work.
12 And, obviously, it is case by case.

13 There is even the negative, of course.
14 You really don't want to give guarantees to, I think,
15 a lot of places where you might want to have bases,
16 because they are not democratic, and you don't
17 necessarily want to tie yourself too closely to the
18 government in place.

19 MR. NOONAN: Yes. I think that it depends
20 on the nature of the guarantee, of course. One of the
21 disconnects here, I think, we have to be careful about
22 is that State really approaches things from the

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1 embassy level, and the military really from the
2 Combatant Command level. So there are some -- There
3 is a seam there that sometimes can cause some
4 problems.

5 That being said, I think that one of the
6 lessons of 9-11 is that -- if we see territory and
7 sort of allow *al Qaeda* or another group to sort of use
8 it as a training or as an R&R location or as a command
9 and control node -- that there are serious
10 consequences that could be paid down the road from
11 there.

12 So I'm not quite -- Like I said, depending
13 on the type of guarantee that we give, I think that is
14 probably a better alternative than allowing a place to
15 become sort of a training facility. So that's what I
16 would say about that.

17 COMMISSIONER THOMSON: Could I ask you
18 maybe just briefly: If you think about the -- Looking
19 out many decades, because I think our basing
20 structures last a long time. I mean, basing postures.
21 The one we've got now lasted since the end of World
22 War II and the Korea War. So not just the end of the

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1 Cold War.

2 In thinking about threats to vital
3 interests. If you could set aside the issue of the
4 Islamic Jihadists and terrorism from them or their
5 possible access to weapons of mass destruction, what
6 is next after that? What should we be thinking about
7 after that?

8 PROF. BARNETT: I guess first I'd say the
9 reason why the basing structure lasted for so long
10 across the Cold War that stretched for many decades is
11 because it was essentially a static front.

12 The strategy with the Soviets, which we
13 felt were a competitive economic threat, and because
14 there was the overhang of the mutual destruction with
15 nuclear weapons, our strategic assumption was simply
16 that we would wait them out, and that no real
17 geographic victories were required, simply to maintain
18 a certain correlation of forces over the long haul.

19 I don't think that's the situation we
20 face. As I described that non-integrating Gap, there
21 is a major tendency to say, Let's put a fence around
22 it; let's let these people kill each other; we don't

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1 understand them. They are not connected to the global
2 economy except in very narrow fashion. It's like the
3 Middle East, exporting oil, and that's it. So let's
4 just cut our losses with the players there. They will
5 always be willing to sell us certain things, and let's
6 just firewall ourselves off from these horrible
7 experiences and these horrible ideologies and this
8 behavior that we find reprehensible, that we can't
9 imagine ever engaging in ourselves, even though our
10 history is littered with such things.

11 So my sense, in terms of the long term, is
12 that we can't let these regions kind of sit. So we
13 can't allow our basing structure to solidify in the
14 way that it did across the Cold War. We need to have
15 an active, fairly aggressive forward moving agenda in
16 effect to shrink that Gap over time.

17 Beyond that effort, I think the key
18 aspects that we face in terms of security will tend to
19 revolve around environmental degradation. There is a
20 strong genre of thinking in international relations
21 that says that competition for resources is going to
22 get you a lot of violence and war in the future.

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1 Historically, there is not a great record
2 for it, especially over things like water. Typically,
3 when people run short on resources, they don't tend to
4 fight. They tend to cooperate. So I'm fairly
5 sanguine on that score.

6 I think long term, again I would cite the
7 thing I worry about most is a confluence of interests
8 between a Middle East that has much energy and needs
9 to sell it and a developing Asia over time which
10 requires tremendous amounts of energy and may, based
11 on our foreign policy/national security strategies,
12 feel that it doesn't fit particularly well in a
13 western defined globalization process and, hence,
14 seeks to cut its own separate deal, in effect, with
15 the Middle East.

16 That's why I argue we should be very open
17 in terms of how we couch our positions in the Middle
18 East, in terms of understanding that fundamentally.
19 Whether we like it or not, it is largely their oil and
20 natural gas, and we want them to have it in a safe
21 manner.

22 So I worry about the movement of all that

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1 energy along sea routes in Southeast Asia, and we make
2 certain efforts in that direction. But I am, again,
3 over time, relatively sanguine, because to the extent
4 that one venue is more frightening for the Chinese or
5 the Indians, then they tend to go in the other venue,
6 which tends to be pipelines. And by and large,
7 pipelines make good neighbors. They require good
8 neighbors.

9 So I guess I don't foresee anything beyond
10 what we are dealing with for several decades. I just
11 caution the notion that it is going to be a rolling
12 problem. It is going to be a geographically sensitive
13 and moving problem. Hence, we have to avoid getting
14 set in any sort of permanent fashion.

15 MR. CORBIN: I would add, for what comes
16 after the jihad, the danger of regional conflicts or
17 maybe even just bilateral conflicts, which, although
18 they may not affect our national -- our vital national
19 interests, we might still feel obliged to get involved
20 and might want to -- Most obviously, of course,
21 Taiwan. I think that is really just a land mine that
22 can really derail a lot of forward progress.

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1 India-Pakistan: also a big long running
2 issue which, I think, we really have very little
3 preordained interest one way or the other; but it is
4 so important, so many people involved, weapons of mass
5 destruction involved, our historical role, we may feel
6 obliged to be included.

7 I would also maybe triangulate that by
8 saying India, China -- because there is a lot of
9 attention to China as a growing superpower, but I
10 believe India's population is projected to be larger
11 than China's in the not too distant future.

12 So India and China, I think, will have to
13 have good relations and, if not, that is going to be
14 something very concerning to us.

15 MR. NOONAN: The only things I would add
16 to that maybe are the spread of some sort of pandemic,
17 whether it be HIV, something that is not fully known
18 about at this time; demographic shifts -- whether that
19 would be large refugee flows -- demographic shifts in
20 Russia or in Europe that could change policy;
21 narcotics flow, global organized crime, and the East
22 Asian littoral region, whether it be Taiwan or the

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1 Korean Peninsula, and whatever ideology might come
2 next.

3 I mean, we have to remember that a lot of
4 people thought that Islam was a dead-end back in the
5 Sixties. People who studied it were kind of
6 lambasted, saying why are you looking into that, and
7 it just sort of came around. So it could just be
8 something else that is out there that could be the
9 next -- sort of the next big thing.

10 PROF. BARNETT: I would second Mr.
11 Noonan's comments to the extent that I think there is
12 a future thing that we worry about. It tends to have
13 to do with the sheer rise in connectivity in the
14 global economy or networks themselves. It's the
15 complexity of that.

16 I think pandemics is a great example of
17 that. If you look at where SARS spread out of China,
18 it basically formed an outline of that non-integrating
19 Gap that I described, and why that was true is because
20 -- Think about who does international business with
21 China. It's other, as I call them, Core nations.

22 So when it left China, it leapfrogged, and

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1 you didn't really see cases anywhere inside those non-
2 integrating regions. You saw them spread dramatically
3 and rather quickly to other very connected parts of
4 the global economy, which was stunning.

5 I think the region and the World Health
6 Organization and health officials generally across the
7 world took huge lessons from that kind of experience -
8 - which I think we got a first glimpse of with the
9 run-up to Y2K -- but I think we are going to see it
10 again and again and again, which creates huge
11 requirements for public/private cooperation.

12 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you.
13 Commissioner Less?

14 COMMISSIONER LESS: For all three of our
15 distinguished participants, all three seem to be in
16 favor of the transformation plan as we have understood
17 it from the President on down through the combatant
18 commanders and so forth: Bring 70,000 plus or minus
19 troops home, and redistribute the remainder for
20 influence, for relationships, for exercises and all of
21 those sort of things.

22 My question -- and I'll ask all three of

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1 you to respond -- is -- and Mr. Noonan, you brought up
2 that four-letter word -- when we talked about BRAC in
3 days past, and when BRAC was those BRACs that we have
4 exercised and instituted, there were —significant
5 financial aspects of the BRAC part of it, and I think
6 that there have been some thoughts about the financial
7 viability of bringing home 70,000 troops.

8 So I would ask you to discuss the
9 financial aspects of where we might be on this thing.

10 Are we going to realize savings? Is savings an
11 issue? Is costing significant? I just wonder if you
12 would touch that or give us your thoughts or comments
13 on the financial aspects of what is going on here.

14 MR. NOONAN: I will just preface this by
15 saying I'm not a defense economist. So I don't know
16 the financial details.

17 From what I've read, I think it is --
18 Probably in the short to near term, it is about a wash
19 on the financial side on strict finances of shifting
20 people over.

21 Now that being said, you have a situation
22 wherein, for the peacetime military, you had 60-75,000

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1 people per day either in schools or traveling or
2 moving from one post to another. I think by
3 consolidating some forces at installations in the
4 Continental United States, or in places like Hawaii or
5 in Alaska, that you may affect retention, particularly
6 if spouses can find meaningful employment in the
7 community, and people can stay at an installation
8 longer.

9 So in the long term that might feed into -
10 - and like I said, I don't have the empirics to back
11 this up, but it just seems to follow that -- if people
12 can stay at a place longer and people can have more
13 meaningful connectivity to their community and the
14 area, and their spouses and families can as well, then
15 that is going to be a plus on the retention side,
16 which is, obviously, a huge issue today.

17 MR. CORBIN: I think there have been a lot
18 of studies on this, the CBO one recently -- very
19 useful. I think a lot of the data is all well and
20 good, and their issues are short term versus long
21 term, and what your various assumptions are. But one
22 powerful thing for me is, you know, if these bases

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1 really don't provide so much benefit to where they
2 are, why is it that Germany, say, is so desperate to
3 keep them?

4 There is actually a representative of the
5 local communities in Germany who is here in Washington
6 to encourage the Congress to keep the bases in
7 Germany. So you know, the studies are nice, but I use
8 that as one thing to go by.

9 You know, the people there want them, and
10 there is a question as to why the people in Germany
11 should get those benefits that they perceive rather
12 than the people here in the United States.

13 PROF. BARNETT: I would just add to that
14 sort of tangentially. I do think it is largely a wash
15 when you close bases, when you move stuff, what you
16 save versus what you spend over the long term. I
17 don't think that is really the issue.

18 I think it is more a question of
19 rebalancing the forces in terms of people and
20 associating them correctly with the assets and the
21 facilities that you want them associated with, because
22 it's the people in the end that cost the most.

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1 In terms of the reality of the costs
2 involved with shifting the focus of transformation
3 away from the war fighting side more to what I call
4 the System Administrator side, I think the answer on
5 that one is the budget is plenty big enough, and the
6 number of people we have are plenty big enough.

7 We have been promised for years by the
8 revolution of military affairs crowd that they can
9 deliver a more lethal, more maneuverable, smaller,
10 cheaper force, and by and large they have delivered on
11 that, and we have seen that force displayed with great
12 skill, both in Afghanistan and in Iraq.

13 What they have shortchanged is the forces
14 that have to deal with the aftermath. So to resource
15 this second-half force, as I call it, the force that
16 will focus more on peacekeeping and nation building, I
17 think that largely comes out of the hide of that war
18 fighting force, and it is not a matter so much of
19 denying them particular weapons or platforms, but
20 simply buying those in smaller numbers, because we
21 don't face the kind of great power war threat that we
22 have been focused on since the beginning of the

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1 Defense Department back in 1947.

2 The movement in the direction of more
3 peacekeeping and nation building will not come about
4 because it is cheaper or because it is desired by the
5 forces. It will come about purely in terms of
6 failure.

7 So the predictions I make in terms of the
8 bifurcation of the military -- which is, frankly,
9 proceeding apace and it's been going on for years --
10 it is not going to come about because anybody wants
11 it. It is going to come about inevitably, because the
12 system simply demands that type of service more and
13 more from us.

14 If we don't do it well, we will fail, and
15 the American public will become upset with those
16 failures, as will our allies, and we will be shut out
17 of opportunities to improve the world that we would
18 otherwise have if we had those assets.

19 COMMISSIONER LESS: So then my follow-on
20 would be: We had the former Transportation commander
21 here this morning, and we visited TRANSCOM recently as
22 well. From all three of you then, again, an

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1 assessment on -- I realize in your strategic thinking
2 and so forth, and we are probably getting off into a
3 bit more of the technical. But your assessment of
4 whether or not, when we bring these forces back and
5 redistribute forces, is our logistics base, logistic
6 support effort capable of taking care of the potential
7 that exists with problems that we might have with
8 Taiwan, China, problems that might come up in
9 different areas that you have already talked about or
10 addressed here earlier? From a logistics perspective,
11 your thoughts or ideas on that, starting with
12 Professor Barnett.

13 PROF. BARNETT: I think it is a huge
14 issue, and it is worth looking at in great detail.

15 The first thing I would say is that we
16 spent a lot of money across the Nineties on what I
17 call strategic speed, and I think a lot of that money,
18 frankly, was wasted because I don't think we engage in
19 war at the drop of a hat.

20 Frankly, we took months to deal with Iraq
21 the first time around. We took, conceivably,
22 depending on how you want to count it, 12 years to

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1 deal with Iraq the second time around. We don't do
2 anything that rapidly.

3 So I don't think transportation needs to
4 be thought of in terms of this sort of absolute speed
5 that requires us, by circumstances that we define on
6 our own, to reverse acts of violence or reverse acts
7 of aggression instantaneously on the other side of the
8 earth. To wit: the tendency inside the Pentagon to
9 prefer the China-Taiwan Straits scenario -- basically,
10 to justify all sorts of strategic speed acquisitions,
11 as I would call them.

12 I think the key thing on transportation
13 for us is simply our ability to deliver things safely.
14 I think what our strategic tempo should be all about
15 is highlighting inevitability -- that if we decide to
16 do something, we can move. It can be done safely. It
17 can be done without challenge.

18 So I think in terms of air transportation,
19 we are fairly well-endowed. I think in terms of the
20 Navy -- I think you are going to see sea basing become
21 the preeminent legacy of the current CNO, Vern Clark.
22 I think that is the direction that the Navy will take,

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1 in terms of the war fighting force largely acting as a
2 force enabler, to move a Leviathan force that is going
3 to be built primarily around rapid insertion of ground
4 troops and strategic bombing.

5 I think in terms of the peacekeeping, the
6 transportation issue is also huge because, if the
7 United States doesn't show up with its transportation
8 assets, basically nobody shows up.

9 We have encouraged in the Sudan situation
10 the inflow of African peacekeepers. But, basically,
11 unless we provide that kind of C-130 support -- and
12 even that, in certain instances, can't be enough if
13 they don't -- Many times they are so under-resourced
14 that we not only have to provide them the
15 transportation, we have to give them the tents. We
16 have to set up their infrastructure.

17 So that capacity for the U.S. military to
18 provide the hub for peacekeeping operations is
19 enormous. Because without us, basically, no one else
20 is competent enough to show up. And frankly, that is
21 what the rest of the world's militaries are built to
22 do. They are not built to power project, frankly, at

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1 any great distance or with any sustained amount of
2 force.

3 They are built largely for internal and
4 regional policing efforts. So for them to engage in
5 any activity away from their shores requires that the
6 U.S. basically provide the transportation.

7 So I think it is not so much again speed.
8 I think under almost all circumstances that I can
9 envision, our ability to access a theater of
10 operations is going to be fairly benign, because the
11 threats we are going to face are going to be very
12 specific to the locality.

13 It is more a matter of just making sure
14 that we have a sufficient mix of the right kind of
15 transportation assets that allow us not only to get
16 our people on site in a reasonably fast time, but
17 enough assets so that they are available for the rest
18 of the world, in effect, to use us in those
19 peacekeeping efforts.

20 MR. CORBIN: Professor Barnett brings up a
21 good point about the allies. They are just nowhere
22 near where we are in terms of getting there and

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1 sustaining once they are there.

2 I raised the manpower pool they have, but
3 mentioned it is not particularly usable right now.
4 One of the first things they need to do is increase
5 their own transportation logistics capability.

6 I mention this in particular, because I
7 noticed you are mandated to identify direct and other
8 indirect payments and subsidies from foreign countries
9 for the U.S. bases. I think the point should be made
10 that there is an opportunity cost for those countries
11 to the extent they are subsidizing our bases and
12 helping out with our costs.

13 One place where potentially they could
14 better put that money is into increasing their own
15 capabilities to go places with us or instead of us. I
16 mean, I don't think we should do it all when they are
17 perfectly capable of it in terms of technology,
18 building aircraft.

19 You know, we are doing the main role, but
20 I think that is just because it's the way it's been,
21 and I really think it is time for Europe and Japan to
22 step up to the plate.

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1 Japan, I think, is really moving toward
2 having a much more interventionist approach and
3 ability and the political ability to go places. Step
4 by step, they are doing it more and more, and they, of
5 course, have a large and powerful military, and those
6 assets are not being used to the extent that they
7 can't sustain them. The same goes for Europe.

8 MR. NOONAN: Again, just to amplify on the
9 previous two statements -- Currently we are spending
10 about 3.7 percent GDP on defense. The United States
11 is. NATO as a whole is 2.8 percent GDP; subtract the
12 United States from that, it's about 1.9 percent GDP.

13 So, obviously, there is -- Funding has to
14 go forward from our NATO allies, particularly if they
15 want to have more say in our operations. They have to
16 kind of put their money where their mouth is or at
17 least put money there to be able to do some of the
18 second and third order things that have been discussed
19 with the rapid reaction force, *et cetera*.

20 I do think that one of our core
21 competencies is global power projection. There is no
22 other country in the world today that can project as

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1 many forces to different parts of the world that the
2 United States can.

3 Now that being said, obviously, our
4 strategic and our operational and our tactical lift --
5 be it airframes like the C-17, C-130 or fast sealift -
6 - are obviously important things. I think they are
7 important assets for us to have, especially in future
8 conflict.

9 Presumably, any adversaries have come up
10 with a sheet of lessons learned, and it is very long,
11 over the past decade, about our capabilities, and I
12 think forcible entry will certainly be a key mission
13 essential task that we will have to conduct in the
14 future. But there are some technologies out there
15 that might be able to sort of carry us forward, things
16 like Skycat and some of the lighter-than-air transport
17 that are discussed.

18 We are talking about huge amounts of
19 throughput that can be carried on them and have very
20 good movement on ground capabilities for offloading
21 assets. But, obviously, lift is a very important and
22 serious issue, and as current operations are going on

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1 in Iraq today, obviously, across the board we are kind
2 of strained at the moment. But logistics, obviously,
3 is the life blood of any type of military operation.

4 PROF. BARNETT: I'd like to follow up on
5 that, just a quick note. I would disagree with Mr.
6 Corbin in the sense that I am not eager to encourage
7 allies, or really anybody, to invest in transportation
8 assets.

9 I like the fact that they aren't able to
10 go places without, in effect, our say-so and our help.
11 I think that is one of the huge assets we have in
12 terms of the investment that we have made in this
13 military over time.

14 In many ways, it defines our Leviathan-
15 like status. It is almost impossible to wage war
16 successfully anywhere around this planet on a state-
17 to-state basis unless the U.S., in effect, okays it
18 or, even more to the point, enables it.

19 So I think it is a good thing for our
20 allies, in effect, not to have much in terms of
21 transportation assets. I'd rather see them focus on
22 the kind of peacekeeping/nation building aspect. I

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1 think it is politically better for them to do it. I
2 think their historical record of doing it is better
3 than ours.

4 So I think what we bring to the table is,
5 largely, capital; and we should encourage them to
6 stay, in effect, personnel heavy in their resource
7 allocations because I think it keeps them relatively
8 benign; and it keeps the disparity between our troops
9 and theirs, which I think is a good thing.

10 I don't either want to encourage them to,
11 in effect, spend more on defense -- sort of more to
12 Mr. Noonan's point. I agree. I don't think we are
13 spending a tremendous amount as a percentage of GDP,
14 but I think there is no such thing, really, as free
15 ridership in terms of global security.

16 I think people who believe in free
17 ridership, meaning countries that are underpaying
18 while the United States overpays, simply don't see the
19 connectivity between the United States and the rest of
20 the world economically.

21 For example: East Asia, Japan, China, the
22 Europeans, in general, buy our debt. A much greater

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1 proportion of our debt now is owned by overseas
2 players. We floated \$130 billion in U.S. Treasuries
3 in the first quarter of 2003, ostensibly to pay for
4 the Iraq war. Four-fifths of that was bought up by
5 foreigners. Japan and China were the two biggest
6 buyers.

7 That is, essentially, a transaction. You
8 can say they did it for structural reasons. I'll say,
9 I don't care. They basically bought a war. And I
10 would prefer those sorts of assets to remain in our
11 hands, and for those transactions to be forced upon us
12 rather than to see those other countries expend
13 efforts in similar fashions.

14 I would also point out the fact that we
15 tend to underpay relative to the rest of the advanced
16 world in terms of foreign aid. I don't think that's a
17 bad thing for us. I think we tend to specialize more
18 on the security side, and therefore, it is only
19 natural for other allies who don't emphasize that to
20 give more relative to us in terms of foreign aid.

21 So I think these are good things, by and
22 large, as long as we understand the connectivity and

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1 we understand the essential transactions that are
2 occurring.

3 We export security, and the world --
4 despite the predictions of international relations
5 theories over the last 15 years -- the world has not
6 responded to that predominance of American military
7 power by raising up peer competitors. It has not
8 happened. It is not happening. So I think that's a
9 good thing.

10 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you.
11 Commissioner Taylor.

12 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: I would like to
13 follow up on Commissioner Thomson's question about the
14 threats.

15 Your answers -- and he asked what comes
16 next, and you answered, in somewhat of a chronological
17 order, what comes after the global war on terrorism?

18 What comes while we are in the midst of
19 the global war on terrorism, like today? And what are
20 the threats? You know, how do you feel about the
21 possibility of having to commit forces -- not because
22 they directly threaten the United States, but

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1 certainly threatened our interests in places like
2 North Korea or Tehran and other places? Any of you?

3 PROF. BARNETT: I think that, in terms of
4 the second Bush administration, the near term
5 questions revolve around, fundamentally, two
6 countries: What do we do with Iran? And in effect,
7 how do we lock in as cheaply as possible, as early as
8 possible, a strategic relationship with China, which
9 will fundamentally be about dealing with North Korea,
10 in a security realm?

11 I think in terms of Iran, we are going to
12 end up, frankly, accepting the fact that our decision
13 to go into Iraq basically pushed them in the direction
14 of the bomb, and that they are going to acquire it,
15 and we are going to have to live with that.

16 I think it offers some interesting
17 possibilities. For the first time, in terms of Middle
18 Eastern peace, to actually have somebody on the Arab
19 side who will find itself and see itself in relatively
20 similar stature to an Israel which, frankly, has had
21 the bomb for a long time. So I think that offers up
22 some interesting and good possibilities in terms of

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1 generating local ownership for the security situation
2 there.

3 I think one of the fundamental problems in
4 the Middle East is that it is only the United States
5 that seems to feel tremendous ownership of the
6 security situations there, and in terms of finding any
7 sort of long term solution to Israel and Palestine,
8 there are no local sponsors on the Arab side or the
9 Muslim side to deal with the security implications of
10 a long term situation there.

11 So by taking down Afghanistan on Iran's
12 right and taking down Iraq on Iran's left, I think we
13 have, by definition, pushed Iran -- I think it was a
14 good choice on both sides -- into a situation that we
15 are going to have to learn to accept and try to turn
16 to our advantage.

17 In terms of East Asia: if you look at the
18 long term strategic overlap of interests between the
19 United States and China, they are enormous. I would
20 like to see us lock into a strategic relationship with
21 China as well as with India, which comes about,
22 really, with a rapprochement between us and Iran,

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1 which India considers to be one of its best friends in
2 the region.

3 To lock in on China, I think, requires us
4 to create some sort of security alliance in East Asia
5 that would bring us together -- us, a united Korea,
6 Japan, a China, perhaps a Russia, as well. On that
7 basis, I think you would see a rapid movement toward
8 free trade agreements and other things that would
9 really lock us into a long term situation there, and
10 it would be quite beneficial to both economies and
11 basically take great power of war off the table in
12 Asia.

13 I think the key opportunity is, obviously,
14 Kim Jung Il who has checked so many boxes in terms of
15 rogue regime behavior, is arguably responsible for a
16 good 3 million deaths in his own country through
17 criminal negligence, and has built fundamentally a
18 criminal enterprise which supports his regime.

19 I recently -- My wife and I, after having
20 three children, adopted a baby in China, and when we
21 went over there in August, I had to carry roughly
22 \$8,000 in uncirculated \$100 U.S. bills. The reason

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1 why I had to carry that to make various payments
2 throughout the process was because China suffers such
3 a huge amount of counterfeit currency. Where does a
4 lot of this counterfeit currency come from? It comes
5 from North Korea which funnels it into China, which
6 has a huge demand for foreign currency.

7 That is one of the ways in which the
8 amazingly cruel Kim Jung Il regime props itself up
9 over time, in addition, frankly, to selling narcotics
10 to about 24 different countries around that part of
11 the world.

12 So I think, if there is a long term effort
13 put in, if we are able to temporize in the Middle
14 East, find some local ownership for some of the issues
15 there -- and I think this is all possible -- then the
16 next obvious target to go after is Kim Jung Il, and
17 the reason to go after him is to build, in effect, an
18 East Asian NATO over his grave.

19 MR. CORBIN: I would echo the comment that
20 was made before about Africa's potential for getting
21 tied into the Islamic problem -- North Africa, of
22 course. I have lived in northern Nigeria, and I

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1 think, you know, some of the feelings there make al
2 Qaeda look pretty tame.

3 Just recently we saw entire states in
4 northern Nigeria refusing to participate in polio
5 vaccinations, because of a theory that it was some
6 kind of Western plot to kill them off. Of course, the
7 result was exactly opposite.

8 So I do think, given the number of failed
9 states in the area, combined with the Islamic and
10 anti-Western attitudes often, that that is a danger
11 point.

12 MR. NOONAN: I will just be brief on this.
13 I think that the situation in Korea largely will have
14 to be undertaken diplomatically. I think that the
15 South Korean forces there, plus our movement of
16 different precision strike platforms into Guam, covers
17 that scenario pretty well from a deterrent point of
18 view.

19 Other areas: Pakistan, obviously, has a
20 large stake in a peaceful and pro-Western regime, and
21 in Pakistan particularly with its possession of
22 nuclear weapons and also, as I said before and as Mr.

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1 Corbin just said about the Sahel, in making sure that
2 there is no movement of sort of a free area there
3 where training can take place.

4 Finally, just the Andean Ridge area of
5 Columbia and Bolivia, and just making sure that narco-
6 terrorism doesn't destabilize the region.

7 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: In all of your
8 answers, you -- at least most of you -- have spoken
9 primarily about dealing with these other threats,
10 doing it through diplomacy. Obviously, that would be
11 the optimum solution. But the military generally
12 likes to hedge their bets.

13 Do you see any -- In case diplomacy
14 doesn't work, what type of forces do we need, and
15 where should they be stationed in order to deal with
16 these other threats besides the global war on
17 terrorism?

18 MR. NOONAN: I'll go first. I think we
19 have -- I think an offshore balancing approach in East
20 Asia is probably the best bet. We have Third Marine
21 Division in Okinawa, and we have a battalion of First
22 Special Forces Group in Okinawa. We have our

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1 facilities at Guam, plus we will have at least one
2 brigade on the Peninsula, preferably rotated in and
3 out. So you have a cohesive unit that will have more
4 combat capability, perhaps modular as well.

5 We have units, obviously, in Afghanistan
6 to keep an eye on. We have some personnel in
7 Pakistan. In the Sahel, we are using trainers as well
8 as in the Andean Ridge. I think that probably in some
9 of those locations, probably less is better, and then
10 you have other forces that are -- Obviously, Iraq
11 right now is using a lot of manpower and using a lot
12 of personnel, but I think there are -- You know, if
13 something big happens, I think that we could leverage
14 some of our -- depending on the contingency and
15 depending on the location -- we can leverage using a
16 lot of our high end stuff to -- at least in a
17 conventional setting -- to be able to put a lot of
18 hurt on whoever we are engaging.

19 MR. CORBIN: I think my approach would be
20 to make sure you have the flexibility in the base
21 structure so that you can go where you need to,
22 because we don't know if Taiwan will be a problem or

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1 somewhere else entirely.

2 So that is really what is key to me, not
3 predicting ahead of time which specific places there
4 will be, but having the options to go places. I do
5 think we have temporal depth to respond generally in
6 weeks or months rather than in hours and days in terms
7 of conventional -- large scale conventional fights
8 such as Taiwan or something in Iran.

9 I think going after terrorists, that is an
10 element where, you know, in certain scenarios, raids
11 to seize or kill terrorists, that's where minutes and
12 hours are more important. But I think for the larger
13 conventional conflicts you do have more time
14 flexibility.

15 PROF. BARNETT: When I think of East Asia,
16 I don't see it as a long term requirement, really. I
17 see a denouement between the DPRK (Democratic People's
18 Republic of Korea), Kim Jung Il's regime, and the rest
19 of the region, probably coming within the next five
20 years. So I don't see that one as a long term issue.

21 In terms of Taiwan, frankly, I think that
22 our state of defense guarantee, which was given in

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1 another time and another era, won't survive the first
2 serious crisis. I think, as long as it remains in the
3 realm of shadowboxing and name calling, I think we
4 will maintain the pretense that that security
5 guarantee is real and profound, and that we would be
6 willing to go to the mat in order to pursue it. But I
7 think the almost suicidal-like outcome for both China
8 and America's economy in such a serious conflict
9 between us and China would simply overrule whatever
10 sense of outrage we might have with China's response
11 to a Taiwanese effort to frankly do nothing more than
12 declare rhetorically the impossibility of
13 reunification over time.

14 So I think we tend to box ourselves into a
15 situation on Taiwan that historians will look back
16 upon in the post-Cold War situation and wonder why we
17 got so wrapped around the axle on it, because in terms
18 of (quote/unquote) "interests," in terms of
19 international security and what-not, again the
20 strategic overlap between us and China, as I look
21 ahead over the next 20 years, is enormous compared to
22 whatever costs we may incur with, in effect, giving up

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1 that security guarantee.

2 I think Pakistan is the most interesting
3 problem with regard to what you raise. There, I think
4 we are really talking about a certain capacity load
5 limit for the United States in that part of the world;
6 that the only way we would be able to deal with a
7 Pakistan is if we successfully internationalize or
8 found local ownership for the Iraq and/or Palestinian-
9 Israeli question.

10 Absent a break on one of those two, I
11 don't see how we could do much more than we are doing
12 in a Pakistan, and I think the really scary scenario
13 there would be, you know, some weapon of mass
14 destruction in the United States and the American
15 public pretty much demanding a serious response to
16 that, and our intelligence telling us in rather
17 certain terms that the locus of this planning and the
18 headquarters of these organizations in effect are
19 located in northwest Pakistan. I think we would be
20 impelled toward a scenario that would be extremely
21 stressing for us.

22 So that's another good reason why I argue

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1 a rapprochement with Iran, which I think was, frankly,
2 well in the works prior to 9-11. It needs to be
3 pursued for all sorts of serious and realistic reasons
4 with regard to what we may much more likely be forced
5 into with a Pakistan, because there is really only a
6 very favorable and -- There is a very favorable
7 Pakistan military, frankly, standing between us and
8 outright declaring that situation a rogue regime.

9 I mean, they have exported, in effect,
10 weapons of mass destruction. They are a tremendous
11 drug exporter. They are a tremendous terrorism
12 exporter. If it was anybody other than the Pakistani
13 military maintaining a slim grip over portions of that
14 country, this place would be number one with a bullet
15 to the top of the list. We would be in Pakistan now.
16 There is no question about it. So that's the one I
17 worry about in terms of overload.

18 Africa: I think we wait for the fight to
19 shift there in terms of our success of driving Islamic
20 response to modernity and globalization out of the
21 Middle East and we successfully integrate those parts
22 of the world.

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1 So I think, absent success there, moving
2 that problem south, we are not going to make the
3 effort in Africa. We are just not going to create the
4 will for it.

5 In the Andean portion, you know,
6 transnational criminals are fundamentally interested
7 in profit. So they tend not to want to create macro
8 instability. They want to keep moving the product and
9 making the sales.

10 So absent our poking that situation and
11 trying to correct it and forcing their hand, in
12 effect, I think it continues in its current modality
13 *ad infinitum*, because it is simply good business for
14 the guys who can maintain a low enough profile, aren't
15 really interested in taking over Columbia, for
16 example, just want to have their neck of the woods.

17 COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: My last question:
18 In consideration of what each of you have spoken about
19 potential threats, are you comfortable that the
20 current IGPBS, as put forth by the administration,
21 adequately deals with each of those and, if not, what
22 would you like to see changed?

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1 All of you have spoken fairly positively
2 about the current proposal, but are there any -- Are
3 you comfortable that it addresses all these threats
4 that you see?

5 MR. NOONAN: Yeah, for the most part I am
6 comfortable with it. Perhaps it should engage more in
7 sub-Saharan Africa. I think, building security
8 bridges to the future there -- maybe places like Sao
9 Tome, Principe or other places where we could really
10 develop some positive relations moving forward.

11 Other than that, I think the general --
12 Obviously, hopefully, if things are done correctly,
13 this global posture statement won't be just sort of a,
14 you know, unchangeable map. Hopefully, it will be
15 reevaluated on a continuous basis and we will be able
16 to apportion resources as necessary.

17 That is one of the reasons I think it is
18 critical that we don't put too much -- too many
19 resources -- in places that might be very critical at
20 this point in time, but may not be a problem a few
21 years down the road. I think that -- More austere
22 bases, I think, makes sense from that perspective as

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1 well as from sort of the cultural implications there.

2 MR. CORBIN: I think it is -- You know,
3 you can get into the details, but I think it is okay
4 for a force structure. I think that there your
5 question is, "What other force structure changes need
6 to be made?" and what they want to see, and there's
7 supposed to be a quadrennial defense review next year.

8 So you know, I would suggest that they
9 might want to make sure that that doesn't have major
10 implications for the base structure before they plow
11 ahead too fast with changes, because these only come
12 along every four years, and they can be pretty
13 important. The last one was kind of a bust, the
14 Quadrennial Defense Review, because it was right
15 around September 11, but I think the next one will be
16 -- or can be, at least -- important, and so (it) might
17 have some force structure changes that we really
18 didn't see last time.

19 So I think they need to take that into
20 consideration.

21 PROF. BARNETT: I would agree with Mr.
22 Noonan. I'd like to see us, in effect, prepare the

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1 battlefield a bit more through military-to-military
2 contacts throughout sub-Saharan Africa because, again,
3 I think that's where the fight heads progressively
4 over the next years and decades.

5 Along those lines, I do welcome the notion
6 of a realigning of the Unified Command Plan to take
7 Africa, in effect, out of the bailiwick of European
8 Command, and probably either give it to CENTCOM or to
9 create a separate command that is focused on that,
10 because I think the combatant commanders are -- we
11 call them the proconsuls.

12 I think they are your natural sort of
13 System Administrator commanders. They are out there
14 working the states on a day to day basis. They have
15 the biggest foreign policy budgets of the U.S.
16 government. I think we need to dedicate a bigger
17 effort in Africa because, ultimately, I think it will
18 pay in dividends over the long haul.

19 I also point to the Southeast Asia issue
20 with all that energy moving through the waterways
21 there. I think we are making a certain effort there.
22 I think it has been plussed up recently. I think the

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1 Navy is very aware of it and does good things along
2 those lines. So I'm not too worried about that.

3 Again, to me, the big fly in the ointment
4 is that, as you try to move everything in closer to
5 what I call that non-integrating Gap, you are trying
6 to take advantage of successes from the Cold War.
7 Again, I think it is an easy decision in Europe. I
8 think it is a harder one in Asia, fundamentally,
9 because of Kim Jung Il and because of the situation we
10 set up *vis a vis* Taiwan and China.

11 To reiterate what I said at the end of my
12 statement, it disturbs me how much decision making
13 power we have in effect ceded to Taipei and Pyongyang
14 on those two issues; that, in effect, they are in the
15 driver's seat; and if they decide to do certain
16 things, we are forced, by the way we have defined our
17 relationships there and by the way we have dealt with
18 these issues over the past several decades, to
19 respond.

20 I think that is the big thing that can
21 screw up our efforts to relocate and refocus and put
22 in this long term effort to transform the Middle East

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1 -- which I believe in, which I believe is the natural
2 next step in what we are doing. But I think we may be
3 jerked right back to the past on those two issues if
4 we are not careful.

5 I think a lot of it is self-inflicted for
6 us. I think it is the policies we have, and the
7 continuation of statements and postures that really
8 harken to a different era. I don't think we should
9 have a security guarantee for Taiwan that puts them in
10 the driver's seat.

11 I think -- if you are dedicated to the
12 notion that you are not going to put up with rogue
13 regimes who check a number of boxes, like Kim Jung Il
14 checks on a daily basis -- then I don't think you let
15 that situation last, and you don't position yourself
16 long term to put a missile shield in East Asia that is
17 only going to alienate the Chinese and probably anger
18 the South Koreans, as well, and probably not buy you
19 much with the Japanese, who aren't going to feel
20 particular safer with that.

21 Instead, you need to deal with the problem
22 at its source, which is why I think, in effect, Kim

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1 Jung Il is up next.

2 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Commissioner
3 Martin?

4 COMMISSIONER MARTIN: One question, three
5 answers -- probably a value judgment would be
6 indicated on your part.

7 We are working very hard to squeeze some
8 particular numbers out of the analysis of the IGPBS
9 process and the map that goes with it. I am just
10 wondering, from your general sense -- senses -- of
11 this and what you have already said, at the end of the
12 day -- when we have taken into account deployments,
13 redeployments, rotations, prepositions, sea basing and
14 all those kinds of things and building of TRANSCOM
15 assets -- will we end up with a net savings or a net
16 cost out of this process?

17 There are a lot of dynamics in there, but
18 from your sense and working in Washington and knowing
19 what people expect of this, do you think individually
20 that this will all end up as being a net cost, net
21 savings, or a wash at the end of the day?

22 Don't fall over each other.

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1 MR. NOONAN: I think, in the long run,
2 there will be a marginal net savings down the road.
3 Now there's a lot of hedging, probably, on there, and
4 a lot of footnotes, but I think, in the long run, it
5 will probably be a net savings. When you factor in
6 human costs and the flexibility that it allows you to
7 be able to sort of shift forces around the globe, I
8 think it will be a marginal savings.

9 MR. CORBIN: Depending on what your
10 baseline is in terms of your overall force posture, I
11 think it might be a small net cost to the extent that
12 -- at least what I have in mind -- is a more active
13 U.S. involvement in the world.

14 I mean, going a lot of places, even if
15 it's a lot of small places with small forces, adds up
16 over time. You know, in the Cold War we were sort of
17 -- We had the large forces, but they were in a
18 routine, and we got pretty efficient at shipping
19 families over to Germany and back; and this is really,
20 you know, wide open and involves a lot more distances
21 in terms of going places, joint exercises with other
22 forces, maintaining forces overseas still while

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1 bringing some back, nevertheless maintaining a
2 capability.

3 When you just step back and look at it
4 from the perspective of maintaining an ability to go
5 anywhere, anytime -- possibly at short notice -- to
6 deal with a variety of unknown, unforeseen threats --
7 just coming at it from that perspective, you know, I
8 would be delighted if we could get a net savings out
9 of that.

10 Having said that, I do think that it is
11 close enough an issue that it shouldn't be the driver
12 of the issue. I mean, the strategic needs and the
13 logistic practical needs and so on really are
14 paramount. If you are going to choose a strategy to
15 be heavily engaged in the world, then we as a nation
16 have to be ready to pay for it.

17 PROF. BARNETT: I think, in terms of
18 absolute dollar costs, it is going to be a slightly
19 net cost. But I think it is going to be worth it, and
20 I think it has a lot to do with our sense of
21 perception of whether what we are taking on in this
22 effort represents an accumulation of additional

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1 responsibilities piled on top of everything else we
2 plan for over the long haul, or whether we are really
3 downshifting, which is the way I prefer to look at it.

4 When I got into this business 15 years
5 ago, I started out as a strategic nuclear planner,
6 planning system level or across the planet global
7 nuclear Armageddon with the Soviet Union. That's
8 gone, realistically, as a paradigm.

9 By the middle of my career in the mid-
10 Nineties, the focus had downshifted to regional
11 hegemony -- medium sized states -- and that was going
12 to be our future. Of course, they were going to
13 proliferate, and they were all going to get weapons of
14 mass destruction, and it was going to be a never-
15 ending effort, none of which has proven true, and
16 their numbers are shrinking, and state-on-state war
17 effectively disappears across the Nineties.

18 So we downshift even further, I would
19 argue, in our success. Today, our focus is largely
20 warfare against individuals. We went into Panama
21 looking for one guy. We went into Somalia, decided it
22 was one warlord and his lieutenants. We worked the

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1 Yugoslavia issue for years, and then when we started
2 going specifically against Milosevic and his cronies
3 and his family, we found success. We went into Iraq
4 looking for a deck of cards.

5 We can't find a military that is willing
6 to fight us in a straight-up fashion. I met the last
7 U.S. Air Force officer who has ever shot anybody down
8 in a dogfight. He's a one-star now. That's how
9 distant we are from that reality.

10 So, do I see the world going to hell in a
11 handbasket? Do I see global policing? Do I see a
12 huge accumulation of responsibility and effort? No.
13 I see a success trajectory that we are having a hard
14 time adjusting to.

15 So it is mostly about letting go of the
16 past and sealing off and capitalizing on effective
17 peace dividends that we actually did achieve from the
18 Cold War, and moving on to the new challenges.

19 So I think it is going to be a net cost
20 when you add it up over time, because we are going to
21 go from, frankly, more expensive real estate to
22 cheaper real estate, but we are going to go from

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1 players who could fund most of that activity for us
2 locally to those who are not -- they are not in a
3 position to fund, and the net resources transfer is
4 going to be from us to them over the long haul.

5 So we are going to be writing this stuff
6 off. But to succeed in these efforts -- to eliminate
7 these sources of violence and the catastrophic
8 consequences they can generate -- I think over the
9 long term, is a tremendous cost savings in terms of
10 the efficiency for the global economy.

11 So long as we understand that we have a
12 special role in playing and making that future come
13 about, and understanding that there are others willing
14 to pay through the purchase of our debt or through the
15 greater efforts they make in things like foreign aid,
16 then it is a useful transaction, and it is a useful
17 role that we play.

18 So we shouldn't be caught up too much, in
19 particular, with the net savings or costs associated
20 with any one aspect of this particular shift, because
21 I think it is historically necessary.

22 COMMISSIONER MARTIN: Thank you, Mr.

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Chairman.

COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: I guess I don't quite know where to go from here. I would like to make a few comments, but I think I will hold them for a later time.

I would just finish with one final question, I think, and that is -- First of all, I think you would have to realize that there are probably other threats out there other than terrorism and, you know, we talk about unknown threats or we just don't know what the threats are. We hear that all the time. I am sure all those concerns are not applied only to terrorism.

As we visited countries in Europe, almost every country we visited was drastically reducing the size of their military as well. So my question is this: Do any of you have any concern that our reduction of our military forces overseas will create any kind of a security vacuum and -- again, thinking of threats that might be other than terrorism?

PROF. BARNETT: Personally, I don't -- in the sense that, again, I think what we are doing is we

1 are moving off past successes. I think it takes a
2 certain amount of courage to realize those past
3 successes are a bit more stable than we give them
4 credit for being.

5 I think, until we solve a Kim Jung Il
6 situation in East Asia, we will be prevented from
7 realizing the real benefits of that situation, the
8 tremendous effort we have made in discouraging arms
9 races and interstate war across Asia for the last 25
10 years, which has facilitated the integration of
11 roughly half the world's population which lives there
12 into a global economy in a huge fashion over the last
13 quarter-century, lifting hundreds of millions of
14 people out of poverty. So -- an enormous good.

15 So I think what rushes into those
16 situations that we are (quote/unquote) "kind of
17 pulling out from" is the connectivity of the global
18 economy and economic opportunity. I think, over the
19 long haul, those forms of stability are far better
20 than anything offered by arms build-ups or big
21 militaries.

22 So I find the fact that rich countries, in

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1 effect, are unwilling to spend money over time on
2 defense to be a very, very good sign. That creates a
3 huge opportunity for us in terms of a role that we
4 have been entrusted with, and are still, I would
5 argue, largely entrusted with.

6 So I'm very sanguine about the future, and
7 I am very sanguine about our ability to ferret out and
8 understand threats as they appear.

9 MR. CORBIN: Specifically on your comment
10 about other nations reducing their defense
11 expenditures or personnel: I think that is more a
12 function of the end of the Cold War and their changing
13 their militaries. I think it is, in general, a good
14 thing. They tend to have excess numbers of personnel,
15 and I would much rather see, in general, much smaller
16 forces on their part that were able to do things -- go
17 places and do things -- more effectively.

18 So while they may be downsizing budgets or
19 personnel, I think what is more important is their
20 actual capabilities, and I am hopeful, if we haven't
21 seen it yet, that there will be overall an increase in
22 their capabilities which they can use to contribute to

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1 global security.

2 MR. NOONAN: I will also have to concur
3 that I don't think it will cause any great security
4 stress in either of the regions in Asia or in Europe,
5 particularly as NATO has moved to the Baltic Republics
6 and Poland and down the line.

7 In South Korea, for instance, I think that
8 actually it could create a lot of goodwill there,
9 especially if we cede some of the bases that we have
10 in Seoul, particularly the ones that are very
11 attractive to developers and business owners there. I
12 think that could create some goodwill diplomatically
13 there. And we are only talking about a 10-15,000
14 reduction in Asia, which I don't think will
15 drastically tip the strategic scales.

16 COMMISSIONER CORNELLA: Thank you.

17 Well, gentlemen, we thank you for being
18 here today, and your expertise has been very valuable
19 to us. We appreciate you sharing it with us. We
20 would like to call on you in the future if any
21 questions arise or if there are things that we want to
22 follow up on. Again, thank you for taking the time

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away from your other efforts to join us.

Anything else to be brought before the hearing?

The Commission has received and will take into consideration the written comments and statements from the Mayor of the City of Ginowan, Okinawa, Japan, the President of Okinawa International University, and the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture.

To the members of the general public, press and others, we thank you for attending and for your interest in these important issues that affect the defense of our nation. Future public meetings and hearings will be announced and appropriately published prior to their scheduled date. This concludes the November 9, 2004 hearing of the Overseas Basing Commission.

(One tap of gavel.)

(Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off the record at 3:32 p.m.)

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